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Fiat justitia, ruat caelum 
Let justice be done, though the heavens fall.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
The ‘Hypoplasia’ of the Defence
in International Criminal Law
‘[O]ne would expect that, some sixty years later, lessons would have be learned 
from Nuremberg, and matters would have improved dramatically for the defence 
in later war crimes trials. In some respects, they certainly have. In some others, 
however, the situation remains noticeably, almost mysteriously comparable.’1
1. Introduction
The term ‘hypoplasia’ refers to a biological inability to mature properly, due to disease 
or an inadequate supply of nutrients, which results in incomplete or arrested 
development.  This thesis will seek to demonstrate that the concept of ‘hypoplasia’ best 2
represents the arrested development of the Defence role in International Criminal Law 
(ICL). The limited and delayed development of the Defence during the creation of the 
institutions will be argued as having resulted in profound and lasting consequences, 
which affect all manner of defence functions, both in theory and in practice. It will be 
argued that whilst the ‘modern institutions’  provide fair trial protections in their various 3
statutes, rules and codes, such guarantees do not manifest adequately into practical 
safeguards at trial. Thus, it will be argued ultimately that, when considered collectively, 
there exists an Inequality of Arms at the modern ICL courts and tribunals, which is 
worthy of greater consideration and recognition. 
 METTRAUX, G. & CENGIC, A. ‘The Role of a Defence Office - Some Lessons from Recent 1
and not so Recent War Crimes Precedents.’ in BOHLANDER, M. (Ed.) (2007) ‘International 
Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures.’ London, Cameron May. 
p394
 See, MARCOVITCH, H. (Ed.) (2005) ‘Black’s Medical Dictionary.’ London, A & C Black 2
Publishers. p349
 The term ‘modern institutions’ will be used throughout to signify the ICTY, the SCSL & the ICC.3
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This Chapter will begin by considering the relevance of the international context 
for the ICL accused, both in relation to the severity of the crimes of which he is 
accused, and the global platform on which he appears. Next, Section 3 will provide an 
overview of the structure of this thesis. Section 4 will then set out the research methods 
used, together with a rationale justifying the selection of the ‘modern institutions’ (ICTY, 
SCSL & ICC), which form the focus of this study. Sections 5 & 6 will attempt to draw 
together some of the key themes of this thesis, including the anxiety surrounding the 
international accused which, it will be argued, has ultimately led to the ‘hypoplasia’ of 
the Defence.
2. The importance of the international context for the 
accused in ICL
Every domestic legal system faces the difficult task of dealing with perpetrators of very 
serious crime. Yet the extent and nature of the crimes of which an international 
defendant stands accused,  and the global media attention he will attract, might 4
suggest that his notoriety, and the perception of his potential dangerousness,  surpass 5
those of defendants in national jurisdictions. As observed by Arendt, the crimes of 
which the defendant stands accused have ‘disturbed and greatly endangered the 
community as a whole’.  Cogan argues that the ‘severity of the crimes alleged’, as well 6
as the ‘unsavoury background of a large number of the persons accused’, provides 
some explanation for the relative lack of interest in the rights of the defendant before 
 For example, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide - described as the ‘crime of 4
crimes’ - see, SCHABAS, W. (2003a) ‘National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the 
Crime of Crimes’ 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 39-63
 See, FOUCAULT, M. (2002) ‘Power.’ Volume 3. London, Penguin. p575
 ARENDT, H. (1963) ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.’ Penguin, USA. 6
pp.260-1
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international courts and tribunals.  In particular, the ‘burning sympathies for the plight of 7
the victims’ can obscure the fair trial requirements for the accused.8
‘Disinterest’ in the accused can extend to a far more vitriolic, active desire to 
see such individuals convicted, with little or no concern for fair trial protections. One 
academic even asks ‘why should we provide such unique and uniquely horrible 
offenders (in such strange circumstances) with the trappings of a fair criminal trial, with 
all its costly procedural safeguards and the ever present possibility of failure?’.  9
Furthermore, he argues that ‘in many international criminal cases, there is never any 
serious doubt that the accused is guilty of some of the worst crimes imaginable’.  10
Such a perspective suggests that a trial is both unnecessary, and a waste of time and 
resources, particularly regarding the Defence. Yet, as Groulx reminds us, these 
complex and large-scale crimes do not, in reality, result in ‘clear-cut court cases’, due 
to ‘factual ambiguity; ‘procedural and jurisdictional complexity’; ‘political controversy’, 
and the ‘potential arbitrary use of power’.11
The institutions in which the international accused is tried can be observed as 
possessing an inherent, ‘natural tendency’ to ‘become prosecution-minded’.  12
Furthermore, Groulx asserts that where ‘[e]motions run high’, ‘the desire not to listen to 
the accused is strong’.  Such a reaction might well have been present at the 13
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (NIMT), as the Tribunal was formed in 
reaction to the shock caused by the extent and nature of the crimes committed during 
 COGAN, J.K. (2002) ‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects.’ 7
27(1) Yale Journal of International Law. 111-140 at 112 
 DAMAŠKA, M. (2011) ‘The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International 8
Criminal Tribunals.’ 36(2) North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation. 365-388 at 373
 FICHTELBERG, A. (2005) ‘Crimes Beyond Justice? Retributivism and War Crimes.’ 24 9
Criminal Justice Ethics. 31-46 at 7
 Ibid. at 1010
 GROULX, E. (2010a) ‘"Equality of Arms": Challenges Confronting the Legal Profession in the 11
Emerging International Criminal Justice System.’ Revue Quebecoise de Droit International. 
21-38 at 34
 GROULX, E. (2001) ‘The Defense Pillar: Making the Defence a Full Partner in the 12
International Criminal Justice System.’ 25 (Oct) Champion. 20-27 at 22
 Ibid.13
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WWII. As Zappalà explains, the ‘heinous character’ of the crimes ‘meant that an in-
depth and thorough reflection on the protection of the rights of persons accused’ was 
far from easy.  However, the modern institutions, including the permanent International 14
Criminal Court (ICC), ought to be capable of acting in a more dispassionate and neutral 
manner. 
This thesis will seek to emphasise the central importance of a fair and rights-
respecting procedure in ICL. It will be argued that responding to the accused with a 
measured and consistent approach is the only way to prevent these individuals from 
over-stepping and ‘shattering’ the legal system.  Thus, the coming chapters will focus 15
on the important procedural guarantees, and whether these are given meaningful 
application, both at an institutional level, as well as during the trial process.
3. Thesis structure
This thesis will begin in Part I by examining some theoretical perspectives regarding 
the international defendant. Chapter 2 will examine the accused from the perspective 
that he is an individual deserving of fair trial protections as a rights-bearing citizen, 
beginning with the influence of both inquisitoriality and adversariality on the modern 
international institutions. This is important in order to explain fully the conflicts which 
have arisen as a result of the mixed, sui generis, nature of the procedure used in ICL. 
The cluster of rights which comprise the right to a fair trial will be examined, particularly 
with regard to the standard to which ICL can, and should, be held. The ‘minimum 
guarantees’ to be provided to the accused emerge as having developed as ‘bare’ 
 ZAPPALÀ, S. (2003) ‘Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings.’ Oxford, OUP. pp.14
21-2
 ARENDT, H. et al (1992). ‘Hannah Arendt - Karl Jaspers - Correspondence 1926-1969.’ New 15
York, Harcourt Brace. p54
!4
minimums, which cannot be assumed to provide adequate protection alone. Finally, the 
concept of the principle of ‘Equality of Arms’ (EoA) in ICL, which is linked to many of 
the crucial guarantees embodied in the right to a fair trial, will also be analysed in 
respect of its important role in proceedings which utilise a two-party system.
Chapter 3 will examine some of the different ways that the international 
defendant is perceived, through the use of concepts such as ‘moral panics’, labelling 
and stigmatising, in order to consider how society might react to those accused of 
serious crime. It will be argued that such concepts will impact more upon ICL 
defendants, in comparison with those accused at domestic levels. The dangers 
associated with highly notorious individuals, which can be inflamed through media 
coverage, must be duly acknowledged. The ultimate concern is that the accused is at 
risk of being both recognised and treated as a non-human, which could lead to a 
restriction, or dilution, of his fair trial rights and protections. Overall, Part I will argue 
that despite the difficulties associated with trying those accused of international crimes, 
compromising the fairness of the trials will not only damage the integrity of 
proceedings, but is also fundamentally ‘contrary to the rule of law’.16
Part II will analyse the institutional framework of the modern institutions, starting 
with an in-depth examination of the NIMT in Chapter 4, in order to understand its role 
in providing a ‘blueprint’ for the subsequent modern institutions. The Chapter will 
consider the provisions for the Defence, and the extent to which the Tribunal can be 
said to have adopted a fair and rights-respecting procedure. It will be argued that 
issues such as the significant restrictions regarding access to evidence, time to 
prepare the defence case, as well as the experience of defence counsel, together 
produce a tangible Inequality of Arms. Therefore, the use of the NIMT as a blueprint for 
 MAY, R. & WIERDA, M. (2002) ‘International Criminal Evidence.’ New York, Transnational 16
Publishers. p259
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the modern institutions is highly problematic, and the extent to which its influence has 
persisted must be closely analysed. 
Accordingly, Chapter 5 will go on to examine the internal architecture of the 
different ‘modern institutions’ (ICTY, SCSL & ICC). This will include an in-depth analysis 
of how each came to be structured, a topic which is often largely overlooked in the 
literature. As the ICC has its own unique structure of trial ‘phases’, it requires an 
additional consideration of how the accused’s fair trial rights are protected as he moves 
through the different trial stages. At the ICC, a ‘new type’ of defence counsel (‘ad-hoc 
counsel’) was needed ‘to represent the general interests of the defence at a stage in 
proceedings where no suspect has yet been identified or charged’.  This, it will be 17
argued, is another manifestation of the lack of consideration given to defence issues, 
due to the significant gaps in the protection of defence rights. Overall, Part II will seek 
to highlight the significant hypoplasia of the Defence at the developmental stages of 
the NIMT, which subsequently influenced the architecture of the modern institutions. 
Part III of this thesis will examine the practical applications of the fair trial 
guarantees at the modern institutions, with a particular emphasis on the principle of 
EoA. Chapter 6 will consider the logistical aspect of the principle of EoA by analysing 
the extent and nature of defence funding at the modern institutions, including access to 
facilities and time to prepare. To the extent made possible through the availability of the 
institutions’ actual and projected budgets, the funding allocated to the Defence will be 
compared with that of the Prosecution. Whilst the different Courts and Tribunals have 
had very different experiences with regards to funding (including relying solely on 
voluntary contributions), defence under-funding can routinely be observed to have 
affected each of the modern institutions, in stark contrast to the generous budgets 
allocated to the Prosecution. 
 DIECKMANN, J. & KERLL, C. (2011) ‘Representing the “General Interests of the Defence”: 17
Boon or Bane? - A Stocktaking of the System of the Ad Hoc Counsel at the ICC.’ 11 
International Criminal Law Review. 105-136 at 106
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Chapter 7 will address the extent to which there is an EoA at the institutional 
level at the modern courts and tribunals. First, the role of the Prosecutor at the ICC will 
be critically analysed in order to explore the complex nature of the dual requirement to 
investigate in a neutral manner, whilst also preparing the Prosecution case as a party 
to the proceedings. It will be argued that this novel role is conceptually flawed, as it 
places a highly problematic conflict at the heart of the fact-finding procedure. The 
second potential contributor to the inequality is the role played by victim testimony, and 
the associated risk posed to due process rights. The situation at the ICC will be the 
subject of particular focus given its significant efforts to include victim testimony, and 
the effect this has on trial fairness. It will be argued that victim testimony constitutes a 
considerable burden for the Court, and arguably imposes another accuser (in addition 
to the role of the Prosecution) for the Defence to face. The final issue to be considered 
will be the influence of the judiciary on the trial process. The need for an independent 
and detached judiciary will be analysed, focusing on the varied legal backgrounds of 
judges at international institutions. Instances in which judges have demonstrated a 
form of bias with respect to the accused will be examined, which it is argued could 
indicate an inappropriate ‘prosecutorial zeal’.  In essence, Chapter 7 will question the 18
extent to which the Defence is ‘engaged in agonistic confrontation with more than one 
procedural adversary’.19
Chapter 8 will examine the extent to which the principle of EoA can be 
observed as applying to evidentiary matters throughout the trial process itself. This will 
include three crucial forms of evidence: pre-trial investigations, the disclosure of 
evidence, and the use of witness testimony. With respect to pre-trial investigations, it 
will be argued that various factors give rise to significant inequality due to issues such 
as the inevitable delay in the start of defence investigations; the lack of provision for a 
 (EDITORIAL) (2001) Developments in the Law, International Criminal Law: III ‘Fair Trials and 18
the Role of International Criminal Defense.’ 114(7) Harvard Law Review. 1982-2006 at 1995
 DAMAŠKA, M. (2011) at 37319
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standing staff of defence investigators; a limited investigation budget; problems 
associated with the absence of State and witness co-operation. In particular, the timely 
and full disclosure of evidence has proven to be a highly controversial issue at the ICC. 
It will be argued that, regrettably, the Prosecution has failed on numerous occasions to 
disclose evidence in a timely manner. Finally, instances in which witness testimony has 
been falsified, or where bribes have been accepted in return for participation, serve as 
a reminder of the importance of the adequate funding of defence investigations, so that 
the veracity of witness testimony can be ascertained. Part III of this thesis will therefore 
address a diverse array of issues connected with the fairness of the proceedings for 
the accused in ICL, with a distinct focus on whether there can be said to be an EoA 
between the Defence and Prosecution.
Finally, Chapter 9 will conclude this study by drawing together the various 
issues which cause the hypoplasia experienced by the Defence in ICL. The collective 
effect of the manifestations and consequences of this arrested development tend to 
suggest an Inequality of Arms concerning the Defence at the modern institutions. It will 
be argued that there is particular cause for concern regarding the practical translation 
of fair trial rights into meaningful, tangible protections at trial. A failure to recognise the 
extent of these issues, and properly support the Defence in the representation of the 
accused, jeopardises the fairness of the proceedings, and thus the legitimacy of the 
institutions themselves. 
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4.  Methodology  
A. The use of Doctrinal and Socio-Legal methods
In order to analyse the unique challenges faced by the defendant in ICL, two methods 
will be utilised: both doctrinal, and socio-legal. The term ‘doctrine’ comes from the Latin 
‘doctrina’, meaning instruction, knowledge or learning, and can concern all manner of 
rules, principles and norms, allowing it to explain, clarify or justify the law.  Hutchinson 20
and Duncan explain that the concept is also closely linked with the doctrine of 
precedent, whereby legal rules are applied in a consistent, as opposed to arbitrary, 
manner, evolving ‘organically and slowly’.  They also argue that doctrinal research is 21
‘underpinned by positivism and a view of the world where the law is objective, neutral 
and fixed’.  Far from being prescriptive, the doctrinal method requires interpretation 22
and analysis - a process which is highly subjective, and is thereby heavily influenced 
by the perspective and experience of the researcher.  Doctrinal research necessitates 23
‘a specific language, extensive knowledge and a specific set of skills involving precise 
judgment, detailed description, depth of thought and accuracy’.24
The use of the doctrinal method therefore begins with identifying and locating 
the primary documents and sources relevant to the area, in order to establish the 
‘nature and parameters of the law’.  The primary sources for this thesis include, but 25
are not limited to: the discussions and working papers concerning the preparatory 
conferences for the international courts; statutes and rules of procedure and evidence; 
staff codes of conduct; rules relating to the appointment and payment of personnel. 
Another important source is the detailed judicial decisions - both majority and 
 HUTCHINSON, T. & DUNCAN, N. (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review. 83-119 at 8420
 Ibid. at 84-5 21
 Ibid. at 116 22
 Ibid.23
 Ibid.24
 Ibid. at 113 25
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dissenting - as well as the subsequent orders made by the court. There are additional 
sources which are more ‘external’ to the courts and tribunals which must also be 
considered given their influence, such as UN reports and resolutions, as well as the 
decisions of other international institutions, such as the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). Academic scholars provide a wide-range of invaluable perspectives, 
many of whom have had the benefit of first-hand involvement or experience. Overall, it 
can be observed that there is a wide range of sources which must be considered 
relevant to this area of ICL. The critical analysis of these crucial sources is necessary 
in order to appreciate the historical development of the position of the defendant in ICL, 
as well as to identify the potential pressures and conflicts between defence rights and 
other competing considerations. Through a measured and thorough critique of this area 
of law, with a view to the wider implications, the rigorous application of the doctrinal 
method should ultimately provide a comprehensive foundation for this study.
 All research methods receive both praise and criticism regarding their differing 
attributes, to which the doctrinal method is no exception.  The primary criticism of 26
doctrinal study arises from the observation that it can often be too ‘inward-looking’, or 
internal.  As a result, the method can be seen to be overly restrictive and narrow. 27
Since law cannot exist in a vacuum, (and ICL, in particular, is influenced by all manner 
of social, economic and political factors from individual states and international bodies) 
the need to examine and consider the wider context is compelling. Due to the risk of 
doctrinal research being too ‘inward-looking’, it will be complemented though the use of 
the social-legal method in order further to provide the ‘external’ perspectives.
The socio-legal method is perhaps even more diverse and difficult to define, 
since it is comprised of a wide variety of scholarship, which is ‘not confined neatly 
 See, SALTER, M. & MASON, J. (2007). ‘Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide 26
to Conduct of Legal Research’. Essex, Pearson. pp.112-8
 McCRUDDEN, C. (2006) ‘Legal research and the social sciences’. 122 Law Quarterly 27
Review. 632-650 at 663-4
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within well-defined boundaries’.  Perhaps the most notable benefit of the method is 28
the availability of a wide range of disciplines which can contribute significantly to legal 
research, such as sociology, psychology, political science, and economics.  As Morrill 29
et al recognise, socio-legal scholars have a ‘rich toolbox of methods’ available to 
them.  A particular benefit of utilising such diverse methods and perspectives lies in 30
the potential to pay closer attention to the contextual surroundings of the area of law in 
question. This attention to context can include important social, cultural, political and 
historical factors,  adding further dimension to the analysis of complex and 31
multilayered issues, thereby attempting to explain the law ‘in all its richness’.32
Interdisciplinary approaches provide researchers with opportunities to work 
across boundaries, and McCrudden argues that ‘legal research now embraces a 
pluralism of methodological approaches’.  This has particular implications for research 33
in the area of international law, given the ever-increasing influence of different states 
and institutions upon each other as the effects of ‘globalisation’ seemingly become 
further entrenched in modern society.  Arguably, the realm of ICL could benefit from 34
the increased use of interdisciplinary research.  This thesis will utilise both the more 35
classically ‘inward-looking’ doctrinal method, together with a more social-legal 
approach, in order to build a multi-dimensional perspective of the position of the 
accused in ICL. The doctrinal method will provide an analysis of the legal rules and 
procedures of most relevance to International Criminal Justice (ICJ), particularly 
focusing on important roles, such as defence counsel, prosecution staff, registry 
 COWNIE, F. & BRADNEY, A. ‘Socio-legal Studies. A Challenge to the Doctrinal Approach.’ in 28
WATKINS, D. & BURTON, M. (2013) (Eds.) Research Methods in Law. Oxford, Routledge. p35
 McCRUDDEN, C. (2006) at 650; 63629
 MORRILL, C. HAGAN, J. HARCOURT, B.E. & MEARES, T. (2005) ‘Seeing Crime and 30
Punishment Through a Sociological Lens: Contributions, Practices, and the Future: A 
Conversation’ The University of Chicago Legal Forum. 289-323 at 299
 Ibid. at 295 31
 McCRUDDEN, C. (2006) at 63732
 Ibid. at 642 33
 Ibid. at 644 34
 NIMAGA, S. (2007) ‘An International Conscience Collective? A Durkheimian Analysis of 35
International Criminal Law.’ 7 InternationalCriminalLaw Review. 561-619 at 619
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personnel and judges. This analysis is crucial in order to understand the complexities 
and difficulties encountered throughout the accused’s involvement with the 
international trial. Of particular relevance is the interplay of different rules and principles 
concerning the defendant’s procedural rights and requirements, especially when 
considered in relation to the needs of other actors within the system, such as victims 
and witnesses. In addition to this method, a socio-legal approach will provide 
invaluable insight into how the international accused is perceived to be a serious threat 
- an outsider at the social margins - in a wider context.  This ‘openness’  to a broader, 36 37
criminological perspective will provide a unique and innovative analysis of the 
difficulties faced by the international accused. Such interdisciplinarity is rarely utilised in 
ICL discourse. In particular, the sociological understandings of ‘otherisation’  will 38
present an original means of analysing the treatment of the Defence at the modern 
institutions. 
This thesis will provide a theoretical examination of the structure and 
functioning of the modern international institutions with respect to the position of the 
Defence. An alternative approach might have been to undertake an empirical study 
drawing upon interviews with key defence and prosecutorial staff, however it is doubtful 
whether an empirical study would have advanced this thesis, particularly given the 
limitations of such research.  This is particularly the case given the diversity of the 39
issues which this thesis will attempt to analyse. 
 See, in particular, Chapter 3.36
 McCRUDDEN, C. (2006) at 645 argues that such openness should be welcomed.37
 A form of ‘distancing’, see Chapter 3.38
 See, WATKINS, D. & BURTON M. (2013) p5539
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B. The rationale behind the selection of the three ‘modern institutions’
This thesis will focus largely on the ad hoc ICTY,  the SCSL and the permanent ICC, 40
which will be referred to collectively as the ‘modern institutions’. The rationale behind 
the selection is in recognition of their distinct differences, such as their respective 
mandates, objectives, international character, permanency and jurisdiction. All three 
institutions are the result of highly complex and very different political negotiations and 
compromises.  It is hoped that the contrast between the ICTY (an ad hoc, international 41
and primarily adversarial Tribunal), the SCSL (a ‘hybridised’ Court, which integrates 
both international and Sierra Leoneon law), and the ICC (a permanent Court, formed 
via a multilateral treaty, which operates an unique, mixed procedure), will provide some 
insightful comparisons regarding the crucial difficulties faced by the accused in ICL.
i. The blueprint provided by the NIMT
An analysis of the standing of the Defence in ICL would be incomplete without a 
detailed discussion of the NIMT, due to its significant influence on the internal structural 
position of the Defence, as well providing a blueprint regarding, for example, the 
provision of Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) designed specifically for an 
international criminal tribunal of mixed procedure.  The NIMT’s ‘precedential value 42
was, and remains, incalculable’.  The post-Nuremberg era witnessed the creation of a 43
multiplicity of human rights treaties and laws, yet the development of ICL stagnated for 
nearly fifty years.  With the benefit of hindsight, it can be observed that the NIMT’s 44
impact was merely postponed. Its achievements are ‘tangible and important’, not 
 To a lesser extent, the ‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (ICTR).40
 COCKAYNE, J. (2005) ‘The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals.’ 28 41
Fordham International Law Journal. 616-680 at 618
 See, HASSAN-MORLAI, P.M. (2009) ‘Evidence in International Criminal Trials: Lessons and 42
Contributions from the Special Court for Sierra Leone.’ 3 African Journal of Legal Studies. 
96-117 at 98
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because it provided a perfect conceptual and procedural model, but rather because it 
explored some of the successes and pitfalls of creating mixed international judicial 
mechanisms ‘in the face of mass atrocities’.45
ii. The ICTY
The ‘ad hoc’ ICTY was an experimental endeavour, with only the limited precedent 
provided by the NIMT.  In many ways, the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals of the 46
ICTY and ICTR  ‘marked the revival of international criminal law’.  The ICTY 47 48
constitutes the ‘first modern international criminal institution’, which provided a model 
for subsequent courts.  Regrettably, the Defence at the ICTY lacked ‘any institutional 49
position or even support in the initial stages’.  As a result, the Tribunal had to adapt in 50
response to all manner of shortcomings, including the difficulties experienced in 
relation to the unethical conduct of some early defence counsel.  Regardless of its 51
flaws, the experience and development at the ICTY of the Defence has served as the 
‘modern’ blueprint, which has been built upon and adapted by the subsequent 
institutions. 
 TOLBERT, D. (2008-9) ‘International Criminal Law: Past and Future.’ 30(4) University of 45
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. 1281-1294 at 1284
 COHEN, D. (2007) ‘‘Hybrid’ Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: ‘Lessons 46
Learned’ and Prospects for the Future.’ 43 Stanford Journal of International Law. 1-38 at 2
 The ICTR, anecdotally described as the ‘poor cousin’ of the ICTY. 47
 FEDOROVA, M. (2012) ‘The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal 48
Proceedings.’ Netherlands, Intersentia. p13
 Ibid. p14 49
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 See Chapter 2.51
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iii.  The SCSL
Hybrid courts, which are partly ‘internationalised’, constitute the ‘newest members of 
the community of courts’.  The ‘low-cost, quick turn-around alternative’ has also been 52
described as justice on a ‘shoestring’.  Ultimately, funding has proven to be one of the 53
‘major difficulties’ of these courts.  The question arises as to whether these courts 54
‘intermix the worst of both’ international and local institutions,  making the SCSL of 55
particular interest to this study, particularly with regards to the Defence through the 
creation of the ‘Office of the Principal Defender’ (OPD). The extent to which the Office 
is independent from the Registry will be considered carefully.56
iv. The ICC
The idea of an international court, designed to try crimes on an international scale, can 
be observed from as early as the Middle Ages.  Perhaps the most considered effort 57
came from the International Law Association (ILA) in the 1920s, which prepared a draft 
statute for a permanent criminal court.  As Bassiouni observed, the world was then 58
‘too disparate and not ready’ for the Court.   Tolbert observes that the ICC arose 59
during a ‘period of post-Cold War optimism and renewed faith in international 
 BURKE-WHITE, W.W. (2002) ‘A Community of Courts: Towards a System of International 52
Criminal Law Enforcement.’ 24 Michigan Journal of International Law. 1-101 at 3
Other Hybrid courts include: the ‘Special Panels for Serious Crimes’ (SPSC) in East Timor; the 
‘Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (ECCC); and the ‘Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’ (STL).
 COCKAYNE, J. (2005) at 61753
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University Journal of International Law and Politics. 1013-1053 at 2024
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institutions’.  Fedorova argues that, in many ways, the ICC’s legal framework was 60
intended to ‘codify’ the achievements of the ad hoc Tribunals.  The extensive 61
discussions and negotiations which took place leading up to 1998, particularly in 
relation to the Defence, will be examined closely in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Reference to the Defence unit at the ICC, now known as the ‘Office of Public 
Counsel for the Defence’ (OPCD), is completely absent from the Rome Statute, and 
consequently lacks the foundational status of an organ, or ‘pillar’ of the Court. This is 
regrettable given the permanent nature of the ICC, and the degree to which such 
shortcomings cannot be altered (without an amendment to the Statute - a complicated 
and arduous process). Therefore, the Defence at the ICC has faced considerable 
obstacles from the outset regarding its institutional position. The coming Chapters will 
demonstrate the extent to which the Defence must constantly operate at a 
disadvantage, particularly in relation to the formidable strength and resources of the 
Prosecution.
5. The accused in ICL: Anxieties of evil
In order to analyse comprehensively the apparent lack of interest in the position of the 
defendant in ICL, it is first necessary to reflect on the anxiety which can be associated 
with such individuals. The accused can be met with apprehension in response to their 
perceived dangerousness, as well as the more practical difficulties which they present 
for the trial process. Perhaps the most pronounced anxiety arises by virtue of the 
recognition that rather than being simply ‘evil’ or ‘monstrous’, the alleged actions of the 
accused represent the common capability of all mankind to act selfishly and 
 TOLBERT, D. (2008-9) at 128860
 FEDOROVA, M. (2012) p1461
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destructively.  The experiments carried out by Milgram in the 1960s, which examined 62
the obedience of superior orders, as well as those later conducted by Zimbardo, 
demonstrate the degradation of the participants’ values and norms as a result of the 
situations in which they were placed.  It is easier to avoid questioning our innate 63
propensity for evil by dehumanising the accused; simply labelling him as ‘evil’ allows 
difficult questions about human nature and the availability of rights protections to be 
evaded. Cooper raises the interesting concept of ‘moral luck’, whereby certain 
behaviour is condemned in spite of the fact that if ‘dealt a different hand in life’, then 
‘we too would likely have engaged’ in such behaviour.64
Further anxiety can arise in the context of the trial setting, such as the fear of 
providing defendants with a ‘soapbox’. Allowing the accused to speak openly at trial 
could supply them with a platform from which they could disseminate their views, or 
else provide justifications for the crimes committed, which could be perceived as being 
reprehensible.  As Groulx explains, a commitment to fair trial procedures ‘weakens’ in 65
practice.  However, a ‘true commitment to fair trial procedure means giving the 66
accused the opportunity to present a full, fair and vigorous defense’, which 
necessitates ‘carefully listening to the story of the accused, however deeply the 
majority of people may disagree with it’.  By allowing the accused to speak openly, 67
those listening are provided with the opportunity to make their own assessment. If the 
views presented are so abhorrent, they should react accordingly. Thus, the inclination 
to silence the accused during the trial process should be firmly rejected.  Koskenniemi 68
 These issues will be examined in depth in Chapter 3 of this thesis.62
 See, MILGRAM, S. (2009) ‘Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View.’ New York, Harper 63
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argues that ‘for the trial to be legitimate, the accused must be entitled to speak’, so that 
he is ‘able to challenge the version of truth represented by the prosecutor and relativise 
the guilt that is thrust upon him’.69
Trial verdicts can give rise to additional anxiety that the defendant will be 
acquitted. Wladimiroff suggests that there is a tendency for the ‘world community to 
expect convictions, not merely fair proceedings’ - a pressure which arises from ‘many 
sources, including the media, politicians and non-governmental organisations’.  The 70
corollary of this expectation is that acquittals can be perceived as constituting a 
‘failure’.  In this vein, the provision of a strong and effective defence could be regarded 71
as ‘risking’ a higher incidence of acquittals, to the extent that some may regard the 
resourcing of the Defence as a ‘waste’.  Groulx argues that the ‘common 72
misconception’ that a strong Defence weakens a court is to ‘misconstrue the dynamics 
of criminal trials and trial procedure’.73
Immense time, effort and resources have been invested into the creation and 
running of the modern institutions. It is an understandable aspect of human nature that, 
due to the pride taken in such a conscious effort to try those deemed to be the ‘worst of 
the worst’, it is difficult to perceive acquittals as anything other than a ‘failure’. In theory, 
it is regarded as being better to acquit the guilty, than wrongfully convict the innocent.  74
Yet the strength of this maxim is tested most robustly in the international criminal 
context. In light of the serious and disturbing nature of the crimes, the interest in the 
truth may become diminished in favour of achieving a guilty verdict.  However, as 75
 KOSKENNIEMI, M. (2002) ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials.’ 6 Max Planck Yearbook of 69
United Nations Law. 1-35 at 35
 WLADIMIROFF, M. (May 2002) ‘Challenges for Defence Lawyers Taking Cases for an 70
International Tribunal.’ 53 Deutscher Anwaltstag. Available online at: http://www.wlaws.com/
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Wladimiroff argues, with an appropriately high standard of proof imposed upon the 
Prosecution ‘in any properly conducted criminal trial’, the acquittal of ‘some guilty men 
as well as innocent ones’ must be expected.  Importantly, these should not be 76
regarded as a failure of the system. The pressure on international courts and tribunals 
to obtain convictions arguably ‘exceeds that of their national counterparts’.  Damaška 77
emphasises that if international criminal institutions are to ‘preserve their moral 
muscle’, they ‘must maintain a degree of suspense in regard to the final outcome’.  78
Furthermore, he argues, if the ‘perception were to spread’ that these courts and 
tribunals ‘stack the deck against the defendant, or that their proceedings are 
programmed to lead to convictions, their legitimacy in the eyes of their audiences 
would be doomed’.  This is arguably a very real risk, as a degree of presumption of 79
guilt has been observed by various academics and practitioners.  Wladimiroff goes as 80
far as to suggest that, in reality, ‘the presumption of innocence is effectively not worth a 
legal penny’, as it is ‘often taken for granted, and thus only paid lip service by some’.81
Ultimately, there is a fundamental concern as to whether the international 
accused ‘explode the limits of the law’, which in turn ‘shatters any and all legal 
systems’.  The breadth of the ambition in international criminal law is astounding. As 82
Brants explains, they include: 
‘not only ending impunity with regard to genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, but also establishing and/or reinforcing the rule 
of law and democracy by reconciliation, conflict solution, deterrence and 
retribution; providing a platform for the recognition of and redress for 
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victims; and, through all this, contributing to collective memory and history 
for the sake of future generations.’83
The (arguably excessive) expectations placed on international courts and tribunals risk 
undermining their work before a judgement can even be delivered. Damaška argues 
that trying international crimes is a ‘very difficult enterprise’, in part due to the aspiration 
of achieving such goals, which ‘exceed or complicate those of national criminal law 
enforcement’.  Arguably, the magnitude of these objectives only further heightens the 84
impact of any perceived failures.  Crucially for the accused, Damaška also asserts 85
that the ‘pressures on fairness toward the defendant would be lessened if international 
criminal justice were more modest in its ambitions’.  Chapter 3 will explore in further 86
detail the extent of the effect of such anxieties on the perception and treatment of the 
international accused.
6. Conclusion: The ‘otherisation’ of the Defence
Across the coming chapters, this thesis will attempt to examine the formidable array of 
difficulties faced by the accused and his defence team in ICL. The deeply compromised 
position of the Defence, it will be argued, arises as a result of a profound conflict. As 
discussed in the previous section, a great deal of anxiety surrounds the international 
defendant and his trial. If this fear were to influence or determine the international 
response to those accused of such serious crimes, it would constitute a return to a pre-
Enlightenment approach towards the individual, and his relationship with the State.  87
 BRANTS, C. (2011) ‘Guilty Landscapes. Collective Guilt and International Criminal Law.’ in 83
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The establishment of the ICC, in particular, constitutes a remarkable international effort 
towards the realisation of important ‘cosmopolitan ideals and practices’,  including fair 88
trial protections and guarantees. Despite these impressive developments over recent 
decades, it will be argued that the anxieties which surround the ICL accused could risk 
undermining the commitment to important principles of fairness, due process and EoA. 
The conflict at the heart of ICL has greatly contributed to the ‘otherisation’ of the 
Defence, whereby it has been marginalised, forgotten and even excluded (from the 
NIMT, and beyond). This otherisation, it will be argued, has contributed towards the 
systemic hypoplasia of the Defence at the international courts and tribunals. This 
otherisation, and subsequent hypoplasia, must be recognised as constituting a real 
threat to the progress and legitimacy of the modern institutions. To fail to put into effect 
the fair trial protections and guarantees is to put at risk the vast international effort, and 
hard-won achievements, of ICL to date. The credibility and legitimacy of these 
institutions must be protected fiercely; the victims of the atrocities, and indeed all those 
who desire to deny impunity for the ‘worst’ crimes, deserve no less.
 HAYDEN, P. (2009) ‘Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah Arendt and International Theory.’ 88
Oxon, Routledge. p9.
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Part I.
Theoretical Foundations:
The Accused and the Defence 
in International Criminal 
Proceedings 
Chapter 2.
The Defendant as an Individual 
Deserving of Fair Trial Protections:
The Role of Fairness and Equality of Arms
‘Fairness must be seen as an uncompromising concept. 
A trial is either fair or unfair. It cannot be less fair or fairer.’1
1. Introduction
Part I of this thesis will provide a theoretical understanding of the international accused, 
which will attempt to demonstrate a complex tension regarding the position of the 
Defence. The resolve to provide fair and rights-respecting trials can be weakened by 
the anxiety which surrounds the international criminal trial, and thus risks undermining 
the commitment to important fair trial principles and guarantees.2
This Chapter will consider the defendant in ICL as a rights-bearing individual, 
who faces the formidable opponent of the Prosecution at trial. Due to the distinct 
pressures and difficulties experienced by the international courts and tribunals, 
conducting trials which are fair and rights-respecting to the accused is by no means an 
easy task. International criminal procedure encounters unique ‘pitfalls’,  which arise via 3
the process of blending complex and divergent legal systems.  The incorporation of 4
these systems risks blending the worst features of both, which can also give rise to 
 SAFFERLING, C. (2012) ‘International Criminal Procedure.’ Oxford, OUP. p3831
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entirely unprecedented problems relating to fairness.  The extent to which the ‘pitfalls’ 5
hamper the ‘systematically disadvantaged’  Defence in practice will be examined in 6
Parts II and III of this thesis. 
This Chapter will begin by examining briefly the historical background, and 
influence of, both inquisitorial and adversarial systems of justice. This analysis is of 
vital importance in assessing the position of the accused, as well as his defence team, 
at the modern international institutions.  In connection with adversariality, the 7
introduction and impact of defence counsel on trial proceedings will also be examined. 
Section 3 will consider some of the difficulties associated with conceptualising 
‘fairness’, and in particular what this means to the accused in ICL. This will focus on the 
importance of the role of procedural fairness on the ability of a court to reach verdicts 
which are perceived as both fair and legitimate. In addition, the relevance of the 
international context on standards of fairness will also be considered, in particular in 
relation to the standard of fairness to which ICL can, and should, be held.
Section 4 will examine the right to a fair trial as forming a ‘cluster’ of individual 
rights, which in turn gives rise to important minimum guarantees for the accused. 
However, the danger of complacency in achieving these standards will also be 
considered. This necessitates examining the considerable influence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), particularly upon the ICC,  in relation to 8
understandings of trial fairness. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess trial 
fairness at every stage of proceedings, yet the omission does not imply that the other 
stages are immaterial. For example, Safferling has explicitly questioned Schabas’ 
 See, SKILBECK, R. (2010a) ‘Frankenstein’s Monsters: Creating a New International 5
Procedure’ 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 451-462
 CAIANIELLO, M. (2011) ‘Law of Evidence at the International Criminal Court: Blending 6
Accusatorial and Inquisitorial Models.’ 36 North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation. 287-318 at 288
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assertion that the ICC upholds a high standard in relation to defence rights due to the 
lack of provisions in the Rome Statute concerning the right to physical and mental 
integrity of the accused, the right to privacy of data protection ‘vis-à-vis prosecutorial 
measures’, as well as issues relating to forensic testing.9
Finally, section 5 will examine the principle of Equality of Arms (EoA), which it 
will be argued constitutes an important means of ‘holding the balance’ by considering 
the interests of both the defendant (who is faced with a formidable opponent, and 
deserving of fair trial protections), and the need to deny impunity for serious crimes. In 
order to understand the importance of the principle, its early origins will be considered, 
as well as the modern implications for ICL. It will be questioned whether ‘equality’ (in 
the sense of ‘sameness’) between the Defence and Prosecution is an appropriate or 
helpful analytical tool in light of their intrinsically different roles. The way in which the 
various international courts and tribunals have conceptualised EoA will also be 
examined, ultimately revealing the importance of the principle to the provision of fair 
trials, despite its inherently intangible nature. In essence, this Chapter is concerned 
with some of the theoretical foundations of the ‘paper’, substantive, fair trial rights, 
which must be properly implemented at trial if they are to translate into meaningful and 
tangible protections and guarantees.10
2. The influence of adversariality & inquisitoriality on ICL
Before attempting to conceptualise fairness at the international level, it is worth 
examining the considerable influence, and differences between, adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems of justice. Both have evolved extensively over time, and have 
 SAFFERLING, C. (2011) ‘The Rights and Interests of the Defence in the Pre-Trial Phase.’ 9 9
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influenced the development of the other.  Arguably, the terms ‘inquisitoriality’ and 11
‘adversariality’ are most helpful in reference to different legal traditions, rather than as a 
means of classification for the purpose of analysing the system in operation at the 
modern institutions, which ought to be acknowledged as being truly unique in nature.  12
The international courts and tribunals have been heavily influenced by both systems of 
justice - to the exclusion of others.13
As Zappalà observes, ‘it is generally recognised that the adversarial system is 
more suitable when it comes to offering protection to the rights of the accused.’  The 14
rationale behind this perspective will be examined in due course. Whilst adversariality 
generally can be said to be more focused on the ‘protection of individual liberties’,  the 15
following historical examination of inquisitoriality is not intended to suggest its inferiority 
with respect to the accused, but rather to warn of the inherent dangers associated with 
its methodology.  As Vogler explains, ‘inquisitoriality, expressing professionalism, 16
rigorous truth finding and deductive reasoning, is highly seductive’.  Although such 17
precepts must be particularly ‘seductive’ to the international institutions, the system’s 
brutal history should serve as good reason to proceed with caution. As will be explored 
and argued throughout this thesis, the real and ever-present danger for the 
international institutions is the haphazard mixing of features from different systems, 
without proper consideration as to their application.  It has been observed that the 18
blending of systems in this manner has particular ramifications for the accused, 
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whereby the ‘inherent procedural safeguards’  of a particular system no longer provide 19
sufficient protection. The most troublesome aspects of international criminal 
procedure’s unique features (of greatest concern to the accused) will be examined in 
particular detail in Part III of this thesis. 
A. Inquisitoriality 
The inquisitorial system of justice has been the dominant model throughout the world 
over the last eight hundred years, and continues to have a powerful influence.  Vogler 20
argues that there are four essential features of inquisitoriality.  First, there must be an 21
hierarchical system of authority. Secondly, the presence of a continuous bureaucratic 
process, based on written communication, is required. Thirdly, there should be forms of 
‘intolerable pressure against defendants in order to achieve co-operation. All early 
forms of inquisitorial method employed physical torture extensively’.  Finally, the 22
fundamental ideology is one of ‘rational deduction and forensic inquiry’.  The broad 23
ramifications of the inquisitorial system for the accused is that the active participation of 
the defence is ‘neither necessary nor expected’, ‘especially in the pre-trial process’.  24
However, this is reliant upon the theoretical ‘impartiality and objectivity of the 
investigative authorities’.  25
During the Middle Ages in continental Europe, the accused was typically viewed 
as an object of investigation, rather than as an individual subject of proceedings, and 
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as such was not thought to be in ‘need’ of representation.  Many of the proceedings 26
were highly secretive at this time.  During the 17th century in France, the inquisitorial 27
methodology underwent significant changes, ‘most powerfully expressed’ in the ‘Code 
of Louis’ of 1670, based on ‘rigorous scientific enquiry and experimentation’.  The 28
Code was widely regarded as an ‘outstanding example of progressive and effective 
criminal justice’, which was perceived to be less barbaric that its counterparts in 
Germany and Italy.  Despite some evidential restrictions, the threat of torture loomed 29
over the accused, regardless of the decline in its usage.  The Napoleonic ‘Code 30
d’Instuction Criminelle’ (Cd’IC) of 1808 was to have the most profound influence on 
criminal justice reform, not just in France, but across a substantial portion of the world, 
its main architecture serving as the predominant model.  Vogler argues that the Cd’IC 31
is a ‘deeply conflicted system’, which is based on a ‘hybridisation’ with eighteenth 
century English adversariality.  This resultant hybrid, he argues, blended the tradition 32
of ‘terror and rigorous scientific enquiry’, with ‘sufficient elements of due process and 
human rights, to make the authoritarianism of the Code Louis ideologically acceptable 
to bourgeois liberals’.  In essence, the procedural changes were largely cosmetic in 33
nature, with the accused nonetheless left subjected to ‘torments of fear, doubt, 
ignorance and the potential of absolute physical power’, and since the procedure 
ultimately continued to rely on the use of ‘unbearable pressure’, it was in effect a ‘much 
more effective weapon of repression than the original’.  The lack of real reform for the 34
defence is perhaps best demonstrated by the courtroom architecture, which located the 
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prosecutor alongside the judges, ‘whereas the lowly defence lawyers’ were separated 
below in the body of the courtroom.35
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a ‘violent intellectual revolt against 
the supposed ‘arbitrary’ nature of adversarial due process,’ arose, which was argued to 
constitute a direct threat to ‘social defence’.  Furthermore, due process norms were 36
seen as ‘irrational and obstructive’ to the pursuit of rigorous truth-finding.  This ‘attack’ 37
on adversariality, first articulated by Ferri and Garofarlo, had a large impact on attitudes 
towards the criminal process, and inquisitoriality’s revival.  As Vogler observes, by 38
1945, adversariality had become confined to current and former territories of the British 
Empire.  Yet, throughout the post-WWII era, there was a distinct shift towards 39
adversariality, ‘sweeping across Western Europe, Latin America, the former Soviet 
Union, and into the international tribunals’.  Therefore, adversariality is also worthy of 40
closer examination regarding its historical background and influence, especially given 
its impact upon ICJ.
B. Adversariality
Vogler argues that adversariality  is achieved through three essential procedural 41
mechanisms.  First, the State must be restrained from abusing its power to distort the 42
process. The State is undoubtedly in a position of superior power compared with its 
citizens, and so requires restrictions, for example those which are designed to ensure 
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that trials are public and impartial.  Secondly, the State must be prevented from using 43
its greater resources to its unfair advantage. This primarily refers to the principles 
encapsulated by the Principle of EoA, but also relates to issues such as the 
presumption of innocence and the use of rules concerning the exclusion of evidence. 
Finally, the defendant must be treated as an active subject of the trial.
The observation that adversariality is ‘generally more focused on the protection 
of individual liberties than on the interests of society’,  arguably arises to a great 44
extent from the procedure’s historical genesis. Having almost no connection to the 
accusatorial tradition, adversariality formed a ‘radical new procedure’, which developed 
in England during the 18th century.  Prior to this era, the principle that the accused 45
should not be aided by representation at trial prevailed.  The ‘pre-modern criminal 46
process’ was arguably ‘as rights-free, authoritarian and nearly as brutal as its 
continental counterparts’, whereby the accused was treated as a passive object of the 
trial.  Greatly influenced by Enlightenment thinking, in particular the work of John 47
Locke, and the ‘due process revolution’ of the 18th century, the development of 
adversariality between 1730 and 1770 was to have profound implications, not only for 
the individual accused, but also for the wider relationship between the individual and 
the State.  Important protective rules for the accused arose from the adversarial 48
system, including the presumption of innocence, the right to silence, and the right to 
cross-examination.49
Vogler argues that the development of the rights-based trial process coincided 
with the changing ideologies of the industrial revolution in England.  Despite these 50
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dramatic developments, by the end of the 19th century adversariality had failed to 
‘achieve the global importance which its early development seemed to promise’,  in 51
light of the growing popularity of inquisitoriality’s ‘rigorous scientific enquiry’.  However, 52
with the ‘slide into European totalitarianism’ after 1914, the attraction of the ‘scientific’ 
approach ‘began to diminish sharply in the common law world’.  Importantly, the ‘new 53
libertarian version’ of adversariality, as developed in both the US and England in the 
mid-to-late twentieth century, was to achieve ‘international prominence’.  54
The next section will examine what is arguably adversariality’s greatest 
contribution to the development of criminal justice, particularly with respect to the 
accused - the assistance of defence counsel. 
C.  The right to legal assistance
Legal representation at the modern institutions is an indispensable aspect of the 
protection of defence rights due to the complexity and duration of international trials.  55
The historical development of the role of defence counsel has impacted profoundly on 
the adversarial system, and the rights of the accused. As Langbein observes, for 
centuries it was thought that an individual accused of a ‘serious crime should not be 
represented by counsel’.  During the Middle Ages in continental Europe, the accused 56
was expected to speak for himself, rather than allowing him the opportunity to ‘distort 
the truth’ via representation.  As Tuinstra explains, since the accused was perceived 57
as an ‘object’ of investigation, there was ‘no need for a separate person to defend the 
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accused’s rights’.  The French Enlightenment was influential in promoting the right to 58
legal assistance for the accused in European, civil law systems.  Other European 59
countries were also inspired and influenced by Anglo-American procedure during the 
late nineteenth century, and so ‘granted the accused and his lawyer more rights, 
especially during the investigation stage’.60
The role of defence counsel in English criminal procedure increased gradually 
over more than one hundred and forty years.  The 18th century saw the ‘new and 61
aggressive trial lawyers’, such as William Garrow, greatly influence the system.  62
Judges slowly allowed defendants to ‘invoke the aid of private lawyers for protection at 
trial’, which became a ‘milestone on the road towards the adversary system of lawyer-
dominated trial’.  Defence counsel began to articulate the, now familiar, ‘language of 63
rights’ on behalf of their clients.  Their role produced numerous changes and reforms, 64
such as a ‘radical reorganisation of the procedure’, by imposing a ‘clear structure on 
the hitherto formless trial’.  In addition, defence counsel also contributed to the 65
creation of important fair trial rights and trial features, such as the doctrine of the 
presumption of innocence, which Vogler argues was ‘entirely a creation of defence 
counsel, clearly articulated by William Garrow in 1791, and well established by 1824’.  66
The influence of defence counsel at the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal (NIMT) will be examined in Chapter 4. However, it is worth noting here that 
despite the ‘rather scarce provisions protecting the rights of the accused’ at the NIMT, 
Zappalà notes its considerable impact on the provision of defence rights, which had 
‘not yet received international proclamation, and were not yet as detailed as they would 
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be a few decades later’.  The right to legal assistance is clearly articulated in Human 67
Rights (HR) instruments,  as well as the Statutes and ‘rules of procedure and 68
evidence’ at the modern courts and tribunals.  For example, Article 6(3)a of the ECHR 69
states that the accused can defend himself in person, ‘or through legal assistance of 
his own choosing’. The right to self-representation is crucial for the international 
accused, not least because numerous high profile defendants have elected to exercise 
this right, which is an incredibly difficult task for a layperson.  In the alternative, 70
defendants are entitled to legal assistance ‘when the interests of justice so require’.  71
The ECtHR has ruled that ‘everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be 
defended by counsel’, and that this right should be ‘practical and effective, and not 
merely theoretical’.  Furthermore, ‘mere nomination does not ensure effective 72
assistance’.   73
 Defence counsel in international criminal proceedings are the ultimate 
‘watchdogs’  of fair procedure, who must attempt to ensure that the rights of their 74
client are duly respected.  As Safferling recognises, defence counsel hold a 75
‘somewhat ambiguous position’, as whilst representing the accused, counsel must also 
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act as a ‘servant of justice’ to the court.  Wladimiroff, having acted as Milošević’s amici 76
curiae, can attest that defence work can be ‘extremely difficult’.  He also argues that it 77
is an ‘honorable profession, focused on the fair administration of justice’.  Ultimately, 78
the provision of quality representation at the international criminal institutions forms an 
invaluable part of the accused’s right to a fair trial, and in upholding EoA.  79
3. Conceptualising fairness 
Given that the word ‘fair’ is seemingly so ubiquitous, particularly in modern international 
law discourse, it is interesting that the word itself appears to have no direct equivalent 
in other languages, and is thus ‘thoroughly untranslatable’.  The concept of fairness is 80
often associated with developments during the thirteenth century, and the Magna 
Carta.  The Enlightenment period during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 81
gave rise to more philosophical connotations being attributed to the word ‘fair’, which 
has since become deeply ingrained in modern ‘consciousness’.82
Robinson asserts that to ‘be fair is to be just and equitable’.  Broadly speaking, 83
the provision of a trial which is ‘fair’ for the accused could be described as one which 
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provides them with a reasonable opportunity to present their case, which in turn 
requires standardised procedural rules. As Judge Shahabuddeen expressed in his 
dissenting opinion in Milošević, ‘the fairness of a trial need not require perfection in 
every detail. The essential question is whether the accused has had a fair chance of 
dealing with the allegations against him’.  84
A. The importance of procedural fairness
Procedural fairness is important to both the accused and wider society, as Safferling 
argues that criminal procedure is ‘the most repressive form of state intervention into the 
private sphere of citizens’.  Bassiouni notes that, as a result, the administration of 85
criminal justice is a battlefield ‘in which democracy and human rights are tested’.  86
There can be said to be a tangible connection between respect for collective human 
rights, and the due process protections afforded to defendants.  May and Wierda 87
argue that procedural fairness must be the ‘paramount consideration’, as to 
compromise the fairness of international criminal trials ‘does more than damage the 
integrity of the proceedings; it is contrary to the rule of law’.   88
Logically, a fair decision cannot be obtained without utilising a process which is, 
both structurally and operationally, fair. A fair procedure, in essence, gives life to the 
substantive structure of a trial, providing a standardised framework with minimum fair 
trial standards and guarantees. In turn, it also provides a degree of legal certainty and 
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uniformity as to the expected process and treatment of defendants.  Whilst upholding 89
procedural fairness is widely recognised as being a crucial objective in the process of 
reaching verdicts which are ‘perceived as fair and impartial’,  it must be recognised 90
that it cannot guarantee the overall fairness of a trial.  Whilst fair trial procedure 91
contributes to the accuracy of the fact finding process,  there is no guarantee of a fair 92
outcome,  as an ‘arbitrary or evidently unjustified result’ could still be reached.  As the 93 94
judiciary at the modern institutions acts as the sole trier of fact, there is arguably a 
distinct obligation to oversee trial fairness in a scrupulous manner.  Judges must be 95
assisted by other actors in this endeavour, including defence counsel, who must serve 
as ‘fair trial watchdogs, acting both for their clients and for the system’.  96
B. To what standards can, and should, ICL be held?
Fairness is, in linguistic terms, an ‘absolute modifier’. Thus, as noted by Safferling, 
fairness is ‘an uncompromising concept. A trial is either fair or unfair. It cannot be less 
fair, or fairer.’  A suitable boundary must then be drawn to demarcate impermissible 97
unfairness from the minimum standards which act as a safeguard. This divide must 
balance competing pressures, such as the financial and temporal costs of attempting to 
 See, CROQUET, N.A.J. (2011) ‘The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of 89
Defence Rights: A Mirror of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence?’ 11(1) Human 
Rights Law Review. 91-131 at 92
 NEGRI, S. (2005) ‘The Principle of “Equality of Arms” and the Evolving Law of International 90
Criminal Procedure.’ 5 International Criminal Law Review. 513-571 at 514
 ‘I believe that the right to a fair hearing/trial is not confined to procedural safeguards but 91
extends also to the judicial determination itself of the case.’ See, Göktan v. France, ECtHR 
Judgement of 2 July 2002, Application no. 33402/96  ‘Partly dissenting opinion of Judge 
Loucaides’, pp.14-15
 SOLUM, L.B. (2004) ‘Procedural Justice’ 78 Southern California Law Review. 181-322 at 18592
 As would be the case for ‘pure’ procedural justice - see, FEDOROVA, M. (2012) p85  93
 Göktan v. France, supra pp.14-1594
 See Chapter 7 for the role of the judiciary.95
 GROULX, E. (2001) at 2296
 SAFFERLING, C. (2012) p38397
!36
uphold various standards. Rawls identifies the criminal trial as an example of imperfect 
procedural justice.  Therefore, as Solum argues, ‘procedural perfection is 98
unattainable’, and attempting to devise such a system would be ‘unjustifiably costly’, 
and could not be justified as a reasonable use of resources.  99
International criminal trials are perpetually faced with complex difficulties 
concerning issues such as inadequate financing; lack of State co-operation; 
investigational difficulties; trouble locating witnesses - to identify just a few. In light of 
these numerous obstacles, it must be asked, to what standard of fairness should ICJ 
be held? Cogan argues that this is not straightforward given the sui generis nature of 
the institutions, which do not replicate a single national legal system.  The 100
conceptualisation of fairness with respect to the accused at the international level 
cannot be understood in a vacuum, removed from the context of ICL.  As Damaška 101
explains, the complexity of the crimes, the multiplicity of objectives, and the innate 
weaknesses of the courts mean that the criteria which is used to evaluate fairness 
‘should thus be crafted with an eye to the [..] peculiar difficulties they face’.  The 102
danger with this approach is that the particular challenges brought about by the 
international context could be used as justification for diminishing the fair trial rights of 
the accused.  Fedorova and Sluiter argue that the recognition of the unique nature and 
context of international trials has ‘regularly resulted in reduced protection’, rather than a 
‘discernible increase in protection’.  Damaška contends that, nevertheless, there 103
should remain an ‘elusive core minimum, or kernel’.  To compromise these core 104
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standards, he argues, would be to jeopardise ‘the hard-won achievements of 
civilization’, as the ‘reputation of international criminal justice depends on respecting 
this kernel and leaving it intact’.  Others are less ‘compromising’, instead believing in 105
the importance of standards of fairness being the same in a domestic setting as in an 
international criminal court.  Despite the important role of a rights-respecting 106
procedure in achieving fair trials and the rendering of reliable decisions, practical 
considerations are necessary in the international context, and must be carefully 
considered when engaging in the discourse of procedural fairness. The way in which 
the modern institutions have interpreted fairness will be examined next.
4. The Right to a Fair Trial
‘However dreadful a crime may be, the person accused of committing it has 
certain rights, including the right to a fair trial.’  107
Fair trials serve multiple actors’ interests in the international arena, as those which are 
perceived to be fair can help to bolster the legitimacy of the international institutions 
themselves.  Fairness is also of crucial importance to the international criminal 108
defendant, particularly in light of the disparate nature of power and resources in 
comparison to the institution.  Given the serious and complex nature of the crimes 109
with which they stand accused, the provision of a fair trial becomes both increasingly 
important and, arguably more challenging to achieve. Undertaking a comprehensive 
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analysis of fairness at trial involves an examination of institution-wide issues, in order 
to reveal whether it can be said to be operating according to the rule of law.  110
A. Fair trial as a ‘cluster’ of individual rights
The difficulties associated with the conceptualisation of fair trial rights arises largely 
from the ‘mixed character’ of fairness.  Croquet contends that defence rights 111
represent a ‘subcategory of fair trial rights, which also include institutional guarantees, 
such as the publicity and the expeditiousness of the trial proceedings, as well as the 
impartiality and independence of the court’.  The concept of a ‘fair trial’ can arguably 112
be most productively analysed through the recognition that it constitutes a ‘cluster’ of 
rights, which, in order to provide a fair trial, must be considered collectively. Safferling 
perhaps best encapsulates this by referring to the concept as a ‘kaleidoscope of rights’ 
which includes ‘a whole range of different rights and obligations’.  A thorough 113
examination of each is a considerable task.  As Warbrick explains, the right is so 114
general that giving ‘detailed, practical life to it requires that a large number of precise 
matters be resolved’.  Safferling attempts to break down the concept of procedural 115
fairness into three concepts: the ‘institutional guarantees’ including the independence 
and impartiality of the court; the ‘moral principles’, such as EoA and the presumption of 
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innocence; the narrower, more general, rights, such as the right to counsel.  Together, 116
these can be argued to contribute to procedural fairness, yet Safferling also warns that 
fairness, as a somewhat vague concept, ‘must be seen as a dynamic principle, which 
goes beyond these separate rights’.  The Rome Statute of the ICC, in terms of the 117
rights of the accused articulated therein, can be said to be highly ‘protective’.  Article 118
64(2) contains a general commitment to the ‘fair and expeditious’ conduct of 
proceedings, ‘with full respect for the rights of the accused’. Many of the more specific 
defence rights are set out in Article 67, which includes the right to a fair, impartial and 
public hearing, which also sets out the ‘minimum guarantees’.  119
B. The danger associated with minimum guarantees 
In the search for the appropriate standard to which international criminal justice should 
be held it can be argued that, with respect to ideas of fairness and protection of the 
accused’s rights, there has emerged a trend towards upholding the lowest common 
denominator.  This can be seen as a natural consequence of a process which 120
attempts to consolidate varying standards in an international context. The overarching 
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concern is that mixing different legal systems and traditions can result in the ‘worst of 
both worlds’.  Mégret argues that when mixing different systems, the most ‘protective’ 121
rule concerning the protection of rights and trial fairness should prevail.122
Whilst minimum guarantees play an important role in marking the ‘permissible 
limitation of human rights and an impermissible intrusion upon them’,  care should 123
nevertheless be taken to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’, whereby only the minimum 
standards are complied with. The presence of minimum guarantees should ideally not 
result in a lack of ambition to strive beyond their provision to, in turn, strengthen fair 
trial provisions. Furthermore, additional guarantees may be required in order to ensure 
fairness at trial. Croquet argues that the ICC has recognised this, and has 
correspondingly assigned ‘an open-ended scope to the right to a fair trial’, which is not 
limited to the minimum guarantees.  The Court in Lubanga noted the ability of the 124
Chamber to exceed the guarantees as stated in Article 67 of the Statute, by referring to 
the article’s ‘chapeau’.  125
C. Understandings of fairness at the ICC: The influence of the ECtHR
The right to a fair trial has been afforded the status of a fundamental right under many 
of the international instruments on HR.  The international criminal courts and tribunals 126
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have likewise reflected this through their statutes, which are also complemented by the 
provisions in their rules on procedure and evidence.  The ICC has stated 127
unequivocally that the right to a fair trial is ‘without doubt, a fundamental right’.  128
Despite this resolute approach to the existence and importance of the right to a fair 
trial, difficulties soon arise when attempting to conceptualise both what it entails, as 
well as how to ensure its practical translation into tangible and functioning guarantees 
and protections at the international level. The ICC appears to have frequently drawn on 
the decisions of the ECtHR, which has often been justified on the grounds of Article 
21(3) of the Rome Statute, which states that its application and interpretation ‘must be 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights’. Whilst at times ICC 
judgements have explicitly referred to the Article’s obligation, there have similarly been 
instances in which ECtHR decisions have been applied without any justification.  As 129
Croquet explains, the decisions of the ECtHR are a ‘particularly attractive source of 
inspiration’ for the ICC, in light of the institutions’ shared objective of compromise 
between different and varied legal systems.  In terms of defining the scope of 130
defence rights, he argues that the ICC has significantly deferred to, and hence largely 
‘mirrors’, the ECtHR.  The statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals did not specify external 131
sources of international law.  As Fedorova observes, the ICTY in particular began 132
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with a ‘somewhat dismissive approach’ to the ECtHR in Tadić,  before increasingly 133
embracing the Courts jurisprudence.  In a strict legalistic sense, the international 134
courts and tribunals are not bound by HR conventions, or their corresponding fair trial 
standards, as they lack the status of a State party.135
In terms of defining procedural ‘fairness’, Croquet argues that both the ICC and 
ECtHR have experienced difficulties in presenting a precise definition, ‘instead 
contenting themselves with a reference to a broad standard, and incrementally deriving 
new procedural guarantees from the abstract notion of ‘fairness’’.  By refraining from 136
fixing the definition of procedural fairness, its scope is therefore left open to 
interpretation.  This flexibility is accompanied by the very real danger that without a 137
clear definition, the right to a fair trial could be left exposed to the discretion of decision 
makers.  This could result in an arbitrary and unequal application, thereby 138
undermining the rule of law. 
The ECtHR has nonetheless articulated broad principles concerning trial 
fairness. It has held that Article 6 of the Convention guarantees ‘as a general principle’ 
that a person be ‘entitled to be present and participate effectively in the hearing 
concerning the determination of criminal charges against him’.  This is includes the 139
opportunity ‘to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or 
observations filed’, ‘with a view to influencing the court’s decision’.  The Court has 140
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determining where the balance lies between the accused's right to a fair and public trial and the 
protection of victims and witnesses, the Judges of the International Tribunal must do so within 
the context of its own unique legal framework.’ Prosecutor v. Tadić, ‘Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses’ (10 August 
1995) Case No. IT-94-1-A at 27
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also observed the importance of the ‘opportunity for an adequate defence’ as a vital 
component.  Furthermore, it has expressly stated that,141
 
‘the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or 
illusory but rights that are practical and effective; this is particularly so of the 
rights of the defence in view of the prominent place held in a democratic 
society by the right to a fair trial, from which they derive.’142
Thus, the ECtHR has long recognised the importance of fair trial rights corresponding 
to real and tangible protections at trial. Although the creation of the Convention 
predates that of the ICC by almost half a century, it was of course only intended to bind 
the European Member States. Despite including various legal systems and traditions, it 
attempts to unify their ‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the 
rule of law’ to guarantee specific rights to a recognised standard.  Despite its current 143
influence on the ICC, its effect on an international criminal institution of this kind could 
not have been foreseen. More recently the ECtHR has interestingly held that in its own 
assessment of potential violations of Article 6, ‘the seriousness of what is at stake for 
the applicant will be of relevance to assessing the adequacy and fairness of the 
procedures’.  This could potentially resonate with the accused at the international 144
criminal level given the serious nature of the indictments, as well as the potential for 
very lengthy prison sentences following a guilty verdict.
Due to the ICC’s relatively infancy with regards to processing cases, the 
Chambers have understandably not yet made extensive considerations of fairness. 
However, in 2006, the Court recognised that the decisions made at the European and 
international level regarding the fairness of proceedings at the investigation stage must 
 Goddi v. Italy, ECtHR Judgement of 9 April 1984, Application no. 8966/80 para 31141
 Artico v. Italy, ECHR Judgement of 13 May 1980, Application no. 6694/74 para 33142
 ‘Preamble’, EConventionHR.143
 Zhuk v. Ukraine, ECtHR Judgement of 21 October 2010, Application no. 45783/05 para 26, 144
referring to A.B. v. Slovakia, ECtHR Judgement of 4 March 2003, Application no. 41784/98 para 
55
!44
be considered in light of the context.  The Pre-Trial Chamber then went on to explain 145
more generally,
The term “fairness” (equité), from the Latin “equus”, means equilibrium, or 
balance. As a legal concept, equity, or fairness, “is a direct emanation of the 
idea of justice”. Equity of the proceedings entails equilibrium between the 
two parties, which assumes both respect for the principle of equality and 
the principle of adversarial proceedings.146
Thus, the relative treatment of the Defence and Prosecution is of significance when 
conceptualising fairness.  The Court has also previously recognised that a 147
‘requirement of fairness exists for all participants in the proceedings and therefore also 
operates to the benefit of the Prosecutor’.  In terms of its importance with respect to 148
the Defence, the Pre-Trial Chamber articulated that the essential element of fairness is 
that ‘participants be granted a genuine opportunity to present their case and to be 
appraised of and comment on the observations and evidence submitted to the Court 
that might influence its decision’.  149
Whether defendants are in fact provided with such a ‘genuine opportunity’ will 
be examined in Part III of this thesis, particularly with regard to the principle of EoA. 
The Court has certainly expressed its own commitment to protecting and upholding the 
fairness of its trials, stating that a ‘fair trial is the only means to do justice. If no fair trial 
can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and the process must be 
 Situation in the DRC, ‘Decision on the Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the 145
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ICC-01/04-135-tEN para 37
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stopped’.  Such attitudes, however powerfully articulated, risk becoming meaningless 150
abstractions unless and until defendants are provided with tangible protections and 
guarantees.
5. Holding the balance through ‘Equality of Arms’ (EoA)
The principle of EoA initially invokes connotations of chivalry and honour. This is 
arguably not without merit given the common law roots of the principle from the twelfth 
century onwards.  The adversarial system of justice is ‘founded on the presumption 151
that the truth is more likely to emerge from the contest between zealous advocates’.  152
Despite the now influential role of defence representation, the principle remains that for 
a fair contest to be possible, ‘the two contenders must have the same chances of 
winning’.153
Many practitioners and academics are keen to stress the importance of the role 
of EoA in the international criminal context regarding its role in providing important 
safeguards for the accused,  particularly in light of the discrepancy in resources and 154
power in contrast with the ‘State’.  In fact, it is precisely the scale of this inherent 155
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga 150
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disparity which renders the principle of EoA so indispensable.  Caianiello feels that ‘it 156
is unthinkable that one side should constantly be in an advantaged institutional 
position’.157
Due to its historical background, EoA is most strongly associated with 
adversariality.  A literal understanding of its meaning focuses only on the comparison 158
between the parties’ relative arms. However, when considered from a wider 
perspective of modern criminal trials, or in connection with a particular institution, the 
principle arguably has much broader implications concerning various aspects of 
fairness and equal (or rather, equitable) treatment.  Thus, EoA has important 159
procedural ramifications, which are closely associated with the right to sufficient time 
and resources to prepare.  160
Conceptualising a concrete definition of EoA is somewhat problematic. Despite 
forming ‘a central element of the right to a fair trial’, the principle has not been explicitly 
defined.  The use of the specific phrase ‘EoA’ (as opposed to the general concept) is 161
thought to have originated in connection with Article 6 of the ECHR.  Safferling is 162
critical of its ‘military wording’, and finds it to be ‘unseemly for a liberal criminal law’.  163
Nevertheless, it continues to be utilised at the modern institutions. As with the concept 
of ‘fair trial’, EoA is perhaps best articulated as encompassing a cluster of individual 
rights, including for example, the right to a fair hearing; to adequate resources and time 
 This point is recognised by Safferling who states: ‘This image might be fitting to a private law 156
action, where plaintiff and defendant stand on equal footing, but a criminal trial is surely shaped 
by a structural inequality between the state, represented by the prosecutor, and the citizen; that 
is; the accused.’ SAFFERLING, C. (2012) p411. It appears somewhat counter-intuitive to use 
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to prepare; to call and examine witnesses;  to have access to information relevant to 164
the case.  Safferling expresses concern that the relation of important rights to the 165
‘higher principle’ of EoA could risk their restriction through ‘purely formal 
interpretation[s] of equality’.  Whilst the principle may not tangibly enhance the 166
application of defence rights, one could also argue that it helps to draw much needed 
attention to an important cluster of fair trial rights, whilst also highlighting the 
discrepancy in resources between the Defence and Prosecution. 
The degree of intangibility of the principle is reflected by the fact that the 
Statutes of the ICC, ICTY and SCSL do not refer directly to EoA.  No doubt this is 167
largely reflective of their hybrid or unique compositions. Similarly, some of the key 
covenants and charters relating to HR make no direct reference, instead noting that the 
guarantees to be afforded to the accused must be provided in ‘full equality’, whilst 
others make no such reference.  Knoops has argued that the EoA ‘as derivative of 168
the overarching right to a fair trial, has attained the status of a fundamental human 
rights notion’.  More commonly however, EoA is afforded the status of a ‘principle’ by 169
virtue of its ability to conflict, and therefore be balanced with, other principles (as 
opposed to rules).  Whilst EoA may possess the ‘lesser’ status of a collective 170
principle, given the nature of its constituent components - many of which are important 
fair trial rights (rules) - the importance of the principle should be duly recognised in a 
manner similar to, and interconnected with, the cluster of rights which together form the 
right to a fair trial. 
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A. The differing roles of the Defence and Prosecution in ICL: Equality, or equity?
The concept of ‘equality’ frequently arises in the discourse of HR from an egalitarian 
perspective. In various contexts, the ideal of ‘sameness’ is often cited, yet can 
oversimplify persons and concepts which are in fact too different to be simplistically 
equated to one another. In this manner, arguing for a formal equality between the 
Prosecution and Defence might cause the differences in their roles to be under-
appreciated. In international criminal justice, the Prosecution is often charged with 
conducting the bulk of investigations, issuing indictments, bringing the Prosecution’s 
case to trial, and will ultimately carry the burden of proof.  The Defence, whilst also 171
having a complex and difficult role, is primarily charged with ‘discrediting the 
prosecution’s case’.  This is by no means an easy task. Defence counsel will have to, 172
among other duties, process thousands of evidentiary documents; deal with numerous 
witness (who are often not easily accessible or willing to co-operate);  review the 173
Prosecution’s evidence; cross-examine witnesses in order to identify any weaknesses 
in their testimony; arrange and conduct additional investigations and interviews with 
potential witnesses.  In addition, the Defence must continuously act in the best 174
interests of the client, and seek to defend his rights against ‘any and all 
infringements’.175
The modern international criminal institutions have, in the past, failed to duly 
recognise the complexity of the defence role. During the trial of Orić at the ICTY, the 
Tribunal held that the Defence ‘focuses on poking specifically targeted holes in the 
 Ibid. p113171
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Prosecution’s case, an endeavor which may require less time and fewer witnesses’.  176
The SCSL later cited the ICTY Appeal Chamber, giving further weight to the ‘poking 
specifically targeted holes’ phrase which, it is argued here, undermines and 
oversimplifies the complexity of their role, which it undertakes amidst often highly 
challenging circumstances.  Without undervaluing the role of either party, it should be 177
acknowledged that they do indeed differ in their objectives, strategies and positions 
within the institutions’ frameworks. Fedorova similarly warns that focusing on equality in 
terms of ‘sameness’ can overlook the differences that ‘might constitute important 
considerations for the achievement of pre-set goals’.  As a result, Safferling argues 178
that ‘equality should not even be intended’.  Analysing whether two different entities 179
have been provided with roughly similar resources when their roles inherently differ will, 
therefore, never be straightforward. The ICTY Appeals Chamber later recognised that 
its ‘duty to ensure the fairness and expeditiousness of proceedings will often entail a 
delicate balancing of interests’.  Tuinstra ultimately argues that given their 180
fundamental differences, ‘equalizing the prosecution and the defence is an unattainable 
and unnecessary goal’.181
If procedural symmetry is neither possible nor helpful, the question becomes 
how best to ensure a fair balance between the parties. Fedorova contends that a ‘strict 
observance of certain minimum requirements’ for the accused plays an important role 
in achieving and maintaining fairness.  In essence, procedural equality is of 182
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paramount importance in order to ensure that both parties are operating under the 
same conditions, without one being at a substantial disadvantage in comparison to the 
other.183
B. The principle of EoA at the modern international criminal institutions
Despite the insistence by some academics that modern ICL procedure is 
‘predominantly adversarial’  in nature, there is arguably more merit in acknowledging 184
its truly sui generis character.  Whilst the principle of EoA is more closely linked with 185
adversariality and the common law tradition, in the international HR and criminal law 
context it has ‘not been applied in a tradition-specific manner’.  Safferling argues that 186
the inquisitorial system does not ‘incline’ to the principle due to the inquiring role of the 
judge and his or her ‘full knowledge of the prosecutor’s files’.  Regardless, as 187
Fedorova explains, the ECtHR in particular has impacted upon modern inquisitorial 
systems, affecting issues such as the extent of defence participation at trial, as well as 
the activity of the active, inquiring judge.  Considering that modern international 188
procedure has adopted the two-party system of Prosecution and Defence, and given 
the large disparity between their resources, it is fair to assert that EoA continues to 
represent an important principle in the international criminal context.
The ICTY, being the first of the major modern international organs, had to 
interpret EoA within the context of complex and costly international criminal trials, with 
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little in the way of guidance.  Due regard for the principle was arguably made more 189
challenging by virtue of its omission from the Statute, as it was instead thought to be 
incorporated through the fair trial provisions.  In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber 190
ultimately held that the principle of EoA ‘between the prosecutor and accused in a 
criminal trial goes to the heart of the fair trial guarantee’.  The ICC has echoed this 191
sentiment, finding that fairness and EoA are ‘closely linked’, as it ‘concerns the ability of 
a party to a proceeding to adequately make its case, with a view to influencing the 
outcome of the proceedings in its favour’.  192
It is worth noting that the ECtHR has stressed the importance of providing fair 
opportunity ‘to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the 
evidence adduced by the other party’.  In essence, the parties should not be placed 193
at a disadvantage ‘vis-a-vis his opponent’.  Additionally, the Court has confirmed that 194
EoA, by its nature, has a comparative element between the parties;  if both are 195
similarly denied something, there cannot be said to be a disadvantage in relation to the 
other.  The Human Rights Committee has further emphasised the link with the 196
provision of ‘adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence’, adding that 
what is ‘adequate’ will depend on the circumstances of each case.197
Ultimately, due to the abstract and referential nature of EoA, as well as the lack 
of explicit mention in the various Statutes, the principle is arguably left in a somewhat 
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tenuous position. Much will depend on the importance attached to EoA, particularly at 
the ICC, which inevitably will continue to be faced with issues relating to the equality of 
the parties. The principle of EoA, however it may manifest itself in terms of labelling, is 
undoubtedly an important principle, particularly for any system which utilises opposing 
parties. The Prosecution, being funded and supported by the ‘State’, is routinely in a 
fundamentally stronger position than the Defence, whether at the domestic or 
international level.  The existence of the principle in many ways is an 198
acknowledgement of the inherent inequality, which requires a degree of proportionate 
compensation, relative to the different roles of the parties.  199
One of the principle aims of this thesis is to question whether there is more than 
a mere formal, ‘paper’ EoA at the modern international courts and tribunals. It will be 
argued that there is a real risk that the guarantees embodied by the principle, in 
practice, become ‘vitiated by considerable differences in resources’.  A formalistic 200
commitment to EoA alone provides no guarantee of translation into tangible equality at 
trial.  The extent to which the principle is given life in practice will be examined in 201
greater detail in Part III of this thesis.
In order for international criminal trials to function as legitimate and fair 
expressions of justice, rather than mere sentencing mechanisms, it is crucial that the 
individual defendant is given a real and reasonable opportunity to defend his case. It is 
suggested here that the principle of EoA is the primary means at a court’s disposal to 
reconcile the competing interests of the defendant, who stands in opposition to the 
 “Equality of arms doesn’t exist at all in ICC. Why? It’s natural and it’s not only ICC, it is in all 198
systems.” Verbatim, per Xavier-Jean Keïta, Principle Counsel at the ICC’s ‘Office of Public 
Counsel for the Defense’. IBA video ‘In the Dock - Defence Rights at the International Criminal 
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institutions’ considerable resources, and the important objective of denying impunity to 
those responsible for serious crime. Due regard for the principle at the procedural level 
- at all stages of the criminal trial - will help to promote fair trials, as well as perceptions 
of fairness, which are of such crucial importance to the institutions’ functioning.
6. Conclusion
Fairness is undoubtedly a complex and practically arduous concept to achieve, 
particularly in the realm of international criminal justice. Cogan argues that the 
‘absence of interest in defendants' rights’ arises from a general assumption that as 
international tribunals have been created and run by informed and respectable 
individuals, they must necessarily adhere to fair and proper standards relating to the 
accused.  There is cause for concern that this assumption could result in a 202
complacent attitude regarding the protection of defence rights. It can be observed that 
the architects (of the Rome Statute of the ICC, in particular) included fairly robust 
formalistic fair trial protections and minimum guarantees.  Yet, as Fedorova and 203
Sluiter argue, the minimum requirements for a fair trial do ‘not automatically imply that 
the trial is 'fair'’.204
Achieving fairness at the international criminal institutions is a highly 
challenging endeavour by virtue of its sui generis nature, as it must operate without the 
benefit of ‘a long and learned history of its own from which to draw’.  It could be 205
argued that there is a pressing need for greater recognition of the fragile nature of 
fairness in ICJ. As Zappalà explains:
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‘If only one of these rights is violated, in only one aspect, in only one 
instance, the whole process loses credibility and is likely to fail in its 
objective of properly establishing the truth and of imposing just punishment. 
There is no truth outside the process; there is no truth that can be reached 
without full respect of the rights of the accused.’206
Thus, a diligent respect for the core fair trial rights is of utmost importance, as the 
‘reputation of international criminal justice depends on respecting this kernel and 
leaving it intact’.  The overarching right to fairness ties together the vital procedural 207
guarantees and minimums which must be afforded to the accused.  Although 208
unjustifiable violations of the minimum guarantees will constitute a breach of the right 
to a fair trial, it does not correspond that mere compliance will guarantee fair criminal 
proceedings.  209
If the modern institutions are to be regarded as legitimate, the guiding principle 
of fairness needs to radiate throughout each stage of the trial. If these institutions are 
to produce verdicts befitting of their vast human and financial investment, the ethos 
that, if worth conducting, these trial are worth conducting fairly, must prevail.  As 210
Groulx explains, the rigorous application of this principle ensures that courts ‘become 
stronger, not weaker’.  The unfair treatment of the accused can leave institutions 211
open to an array of criticism, potentially undermining their credibility and legitimacy. As 
May & Wierda argue, further than damaging the integrity of proceedings, compromising 
fairness is fundamentally ‘contrary to the rule of law’, which the very proceedings are 
attempting to promote.212
This Chapter has attempted to analyse some of the historical and theoretical 
understandings of fairness, particularly with regard to trial procedure, and the 
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substantive rights of the accused. This thesis is ultimately concerned with the critique 
best articulated by Buchet, who asserts that ‘defence rights have been conceptualized 
in the Statute only in a static manner: they are legally recognized but not legally 
organized. They exist, but do not live’.  Thus, a determination of trial fairness must go 213
beyond the formalistic, substantive rights provided to the accused.  As Groulx 214
asserts, ‘the right to a fair trial needs to be grounded not just in legal texts, but in 
institutional reality’.  Whether the modern institutions succeed in providing tangible 215
fairness at trial will be assessed over the forthcoming chapters. Chapter 3 will now 
examine some of the anxiety surrounding the international accused, which could risk 
undermining the modern institutions’ theoretical commitment to fair trials. 
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 Chapter 3.
Perceptions of the
International Criminal Defendant
‘It is the criminal, in fact, that is needed by the press and public opinion. 
It is he who will be hated, against whom all the passions will be directed, 
and for whom the penalty and oblivion will be demanded.’ 1
1. Introduction
The previous Chapter has established the importance of treating the accused as an 
individual who is deserving of fair international criminal trials. In order to appreciate the 
inherent tension in ICL, this Chapter will now consider some of the anxieties 
surrounding the international accused from a criminological perspective. It will be 
argued that the intensity of the fear surrounding his trial has led to the ‘otherisation’ of 
the Defence, and the resultant hypoplasia.
It is first worth noting that the principle of individual accountability inevitably 
means that only a few, selected individuals will face trial, due to constraints of time, 
resources and efficacy. One of the major criticisms of, not only the ICC but of 
international courts more generally, is that it is possible for indictees to escape arrest, 
sometimes being able to live openly in countries which have no inclination to co-
operate.  The selectivity inherent in ICL will be argued as intensifying the perceptions 2
of the international defendant. 
As a result of this context, the accused will be recognised as constituting the 
‘worst of the worst’ of offenders, having committed the ‘most serious crimes’.  Due to 3
 FOUCAULT, M. (2002) ‘Power.’ Volume 3. London, Penguin. p4321
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19/africa-congo [Last accessed 6.8.2014] Radovan Karadžić evaded capture for over a decade.
 The ICC preamble states: ‘Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the 3
international community as a whole must not go unpunished..’
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the gravity of the crimes in question, the multitude of victims, and the scale of the 
abhorrence felt in reaction, it can be challenging to consider the provision of defence 
rights and protections. Throughout this thesis, it will emerge that the position of the 
Defence has been considered in a piecemeal, ex post facto manner.4
Building on the discussion in the Introduction, this Chapter will focus on how the 
accused can come to be labelled as a contemporary ‘folk devil’, which has serious 
implications for his procedural position. This will include examining the criminological 
concept of the ‘moral panic’ as a means of understanding the extent of the adverse 
reaction and aversion regarding the accused. The impact of labelling the defendant, 
and the resultant stigmatisation which occurs, will be analysed. Particular attention will 
be given to ‘otherisation’ - the process of distancing the accused. Ultimately, it will be 
argued that there is a need for greater awareness concerning the potential danger that 
individuals may, as a result, no longer come to be considered as constituting a part of 
humanity, thus leading to a corrosion of their fair trial protections.
2. ‘Moral panics’; the defendant as the ‘folk devil’ 
A moral panic arises where an individual or group becomes ‘defined as a threat to 
societal values and interests’.  The concept was developed by Stanley Cohen in the 5
1960s, who also noted its connection with collective behaviour.  Moral panics can 6
typically occur during difficult and troubled times, and can be focused within particular 
groups who experience a trauma or disturbance.  According to Goode and Ben-7
 See, for example, NEWTON, M.A. (2011) ‘Evolving Equality: The Development of the 4
International Defence Bar.’ 47(2) Stanford Journal of International Law. 379-440 at 409
 COHEN, S. (1972) ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers.’ 5
Oxford, Robertson. p9
 GOODE, E. & BEN-YEHUDA, N. (1994) ‘Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance.’ 6
Oxford, Blackwell. p104
 Ibid. p327
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Yahuda, there are five crucial elements needed in order to define a moral panic: 
concern, hostility, consensus, disproportionality, and volatility.  Concern usually 8
materialises in the form of media attention, or other forms of public commentary. 
Although there is a distinction made between concern and fear, both are seen as a 
‘reasonable response to what is regarded as a very real and palpable threat.’  9
Secondly, there must be an increased level of hostility towards the individual or group, 
who are collectively recognised as the enemy, deemed to pose a threat to society.  10
Thirdly, there must be ‘substantial or widespread agreement or consensus’ concerning 
the threat, recognising both that it is serious, and that it is caused by the behaviour of 
the individual(s) in question.  The fourth requirement, disproportionality, is harder to 11
ascertain, as such an evaluation requires one to know the ‘true’ level of the threat in 
order to compare it to the perceived level. Nevertheless, disproportionality regarding 
the extent of the threat is a key requirement of the moral panic.  Finally, the 12
requirement of volatility concerns the speed at which the panic will be brought to the 
forefront of the public’s consciousness, and will disappear at a similar rate.13
There is an additional element relating to the final requirement of volatility that is 
perhaps particularly relevant to its application in ICL. Although the focus on certain 
indictees will increase, particularly during an accused’s capture or trial, it will also often 
subside again just as quickly as the media moves on to the next ‘newsworthy’ story. 
The moral panic in ICL can thus be understood in one of two ways. It could be 
observed that a series of smaller moral panics arise, as and when a specific individual 
is considered to constitute a threat, and is met with hostility. In the alternative, a wider 
 Ibid. p338
 Ibid. 9
 Ibid. 10
 Ibid. p34 11
 Ibid. p38 12
 ‘Kony 2012’ is a clear example of this type of sweeping global interest, which burns with great 13
ferocity, before largely burning out. This involved a ‘viral’ video, concerning involvement of 
Joseph Kony (Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05) in crimes committed in Uganda, which consisted of 
misinformation, as well as factual inconsistencies and errors.
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moral panic could exist concerning the ‘worst of the worst’ offenders. Both are possible, 
and arguably need not be mutually exclusive. Goode and Ben-Yehuda point out that 
some moral panics can become ‘routinised or institutionalised’, in that the concern 
shown by society can ultimately become fixed ‘in the form of social movement 
organisations, legislation, [...] or practices for punishing transgressors.’  14
ICL has developed rapidly over recent decades, with the creation of courts and 
tribunals which have served as blueprints, and set important precedents, for 
successive institutions. If there can be said to be a larger moral panic concerning the 
dangerousness of the ‘worst of the worst’ of offenders, (which must have some merit, 
based on the measures which have been taken by the international community to 
attempt to deny impunity), then the reaction has indeed become institutionalised. The 
threat of these individuals is regarded as so damaging that serious steps are thought to 
be needed in order to ‘control the behaviour, punish the perpetrators, and repair the 
damage’.  This feeling has certainly materialised into the creation of all manner of 15
institutions in order to address the perceived threat. Despite the fact that many moral 
panics disappear from sight almost as quickly as they appear, this does not preclude 
them from having ‘structural or historical antecedents’ and moral panics may consist of 
a ‘conceptual grouping or a series of more or less discrete, more or less localised, 
more or less short-term panics.’  Ultimately, the distinction as to whether moral panics 16
in ICL are short-term, or whether they are in fact part of a wider moral panic which 
reignites itself through different indictees, may be relevant only in principle, making little 
difference to the resultant moral panic that ensues.  
 GOODE, E. & BEN-YEHUDA, N. (1994) pp.38-9 14
 Ibid. p3115
 Ibid. p3916
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A. The creation of the ‘folk devil’?
In ICL, the concept of the moral panic is strongly connected with that of the ‘folk devil’ - 
the physical embodiment of evil, who is instantly recognisable.  Importantly, suspects 17
are ‘stripped of all favourable characteristics and imparted with exclusively negative 
ones.’  Thus, any positive qualities can become engulfed by the overwhelming fixation 18
on the wickedness of the person.  Folk devils are seen to be ‘legitimate and deserving 19
targets of self-righteous anger, hostility, and punishment.’  Regarded as the ‘enemy of 20
society’, it is acceptable, and indeed expected, for society to react with hostility towards 
those who are deemed to be hostile themselves.21
The continuing appeal of the concept of the ‘folk devil’, particularly at the ICL 
level, can be argued to stem from the idea that viewing defendants as ‘folk devils’ 
serves several purposes. They act as an example, or cautionary tale, which highlights 
those in society with whom we should avoid contact, and refrain from emulating. As 
Rock argues, folk devils therefore can serve an ‘exemplary and educative purpose. 
They are caricatures of abhorrent behaviour which frequently stress the most 
unpleasant features of rule breaking’.  Thus, the ‘demonology’  of the ‘folk devil’, as 22 23
he is portrayed, can act both as a deterrent, and as means for society to reaffirm its 
boundaries through identifying what is unacceptable, harmful behaviour. 
 Ibid. p28 17
 Ibid.18
 Whether Issa Sesay’s role in the disarmament process, and subsequent Lomé agreement, 19
were duly taken consideration concerning during mitigation is interesting. Whilst Sesay was 
described as ‘very very co-operative’ with the process, the consideration of the accused’s 
positive attributes might have proved too troublesome to reconcile with negative labels. See, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7405481.stm [Last accessed 3.6.2014]
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3. The role of labelling and ‘otherisation’ 
All too often, the complexities of human behaviour and diversity cannot be pigeonholed 
into distinct categories, at times leading to the application of overly simplistic labels in 
order to come to terms with difficult attributes or events. The process of ‘labelling’ helps 
to simplify the position of the accused in ICL, and allows the object to be ‘detached 
from its background and made discrete’.  Labels, such as ‘dangerous’, ‘monstrous’ or 24
‘evil’, can have the effect of singling out individuals ‘for purposes of education, action 
and often, the justification of action.’  If an accused is seen to be ‘capricious, random 25
and unpredictable in his behaviour’,  he can be at risk of being perceived, and treated, 26
as an outsider, or ‘other’. 
The process of ‘otherisation’ is a means of distancing, which is argued here as 
being particularly problematic, as the more remote issues or objects become, the more 
difficult it is to test information concerning them. As Rock explains, ‘we have little 
opportunity to dispute contentions about those who are socially distant. Not only is 
opportunity lacking, incentive may also be weak.’  The latter point is important. The 27
‘gap’ which is created through the process of negatively labelling an individual has the 
potential to increase fear and loathing towards them. By virtue of the nature of the 
crimes with which ICL accused are indicted, they are not individuals with whom it is 
easy to identify. Instead, they tend to be the individuals at the social margins, in 
networks which are removed from most people’s daily existence.  This distance 28
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ means that it is highly unlikely that most people will gain ‘any 
experience of the non-normal’, further isolating ‘them’ from the rest of society.  It is 29
also unlikely that many would wish to minimise this gap, due at least in part to the risk 
 ROCK, P. (1973) p27 24
 Ibid. p19 25
 Ibid. pp.58-926
 Ibid. p2927
 Ibid. p2928
 WILKINS, L.T. (1964) ‘Social Deviance.’ London, Tavistock. p6329
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of becoming stigmatised through association: ‘Closeness to deviancy can impugn our 
own moral standing.’  30
 The process of ‘otherisation’ should be recognised as being potentially highly 
destructive. It is suitably ironic that various criminal campaigns and regimes have 
stemmed, at least in part, from demonising certain groups or individuals. This is not to 
suggest that society’s demonisation of ICL defendants is on a par with those groups 
who have been targeted in criminal atrocities. However, it is interesting that a similar 
reaction can arise towards those deemed to be harmful. Importantly, if guilt has not yet 
been established, the treatment which arises as a consequence of the ‘otherisation’ is 
far from well-founded. 
A. The attraction, and danger, of ‘otherisation’
Distancing oneself from the defendant not only helps to distinguish ‘you’ and ‘us’ from 
the hostis generis humani in a personal sense, but there is also a sense of 31
community and safety created by unifying against these individuals in solidarity. Those 
accused of crimes of such magnitude are often labelled, either consciously or through 
our reaction to them, as ‘the enemy of us all’.  By firmly rejecting the ‘monsters’ we 32
can attempt to help solidify acceptable and desirable traits, and in turn reject those who 
we have deemed to be ‘evil’ or damaging to the fabric of society.  The creation of a 33
‘gap’ provides comfort through distancing those who have been identified as potentially 
or actually harmful. As Rock notes, ‘[t]he sense which is made can be inaccurate or 
misleading, but triviality has been restored and life can be resumed.’  Although this act 34
 ROCK, P. (1973) p2930
 ‘Enemy of mankind’.31
 FOUCAULT, M. (1995) ‘Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison.’ New York, Vintage. 32
p101
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of distancing may only create an illusion of safety, it is also a means of preserving the 
integrity of a given society or group.  Arendt spoke of the concept of ‘inter-est’ as 35
being our collective interests and ‘‘web’ of human relationships’ which allow us to relate 
to each other, and in turn bind us together.  The creation of international courts and 36
tribunals signifies this on a larger scale; the unification against a common enemy, even 
if the ‘enemy’ is broader than any particular individual.
 Extreme feelings of fear and hatred can be directed at a defendant in ICL, to 
the extent to which they are no longer perceived as human; instead, they appear to be 
‘a villain, a monster, a madman, perhaps, a sick and, before long, ‘abnormal’ 
individual.’  The labelling of the accused as a non-human, outsider or ‘outlaw’ is 37
potentially dangerous, as it can give rise to a legitimisation that their subsequent 
treatment can be likewise less-than-human. The label of ‘monster’ enables a distancing 
from the painful notion that a fellow member of your species, similar to you in many 
ways, is capable of such actions. According to Nietsche, as mankind has attempted in 
many ways to create laws and structures for itself, a hatred is felt for those who are 
seen to ‘remain closer to the animal state’ which can lead to individuals being 
‘disdained as a non-human, a thing’.  38
The alternative is to recognise that the accused is not a monster, but an 
individual not entirely unlike oneself. This would mean accepting that we have, at the 
very least, the capacity to act selfishly, dangerously and, perhaps most strikingly, with 
full awareness and comprehension of our actions. This is not an easy concept with 
which we are able, or willing, to reconcile. Perhaps the most recounted observation 
made by Hannah Arendt, regarding the trial of Adolf Eichmann, involves her perception 
of the accused. ‘The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, 
 Ibid. p128 35
 ARENDT, H. (1958) ‘The Human Condition.’ University of Chicago Press, USA. p18336
 FOUCAULT, M. (1995) p10137
 NIETZSCHE, F. (2008) ‘Human, All Too Human. & Beyond Good and Evil.’ England, 38
Wordsworth Classics. p40. Nietzsche uses the example of the slave as being disdained as ‘non-
human’.
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and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, 
terribly and terrifyingly normal.’  This so called ‘banality of evil’ is a difficult concept to 39
come to terms with. Not only does labelling the defendants as ‘monsters’ provide a 
means of ‘coping’, but accepting the alternative is incredibly troubling, as such a 
recognition could be ‘painful, inconvenient, or disruptive.’  40
A trial itself will largely focus on the individual defendant and his accountability; 
there is little scope to consider the collective nature of many crimes. Brants argues that 
this can afford bystanders a form of amnesty.  In turn, this can provide an opportunity 41
to ‘gloss over’ difficult, wider issues including concepts such as the ‘banality of evil’. It 
is suggested that if ‘evil’ in its broad sense is in fact banal and ever-present within our 
nature, this ‘threat’ is the most difficult to conceive of, as it suggests that these crimes 
will continue to be committed, as the ongoing global occurrence of war and violence 
tends to suggest may well be the case. 
B. Labelling and stigma
The international criminal accused can attract negative labels readily due to the strain 
they place on the boundaries of social and legal order. ‘The anomalies are not so much 
abhorrent in themselves, but abhorrent because of their implications for the way in 
which reality is constructed.’  Criminal behaviour will always push the limits of legal 42
systems, and of wider social systems; no more so is this true, or more visible, than at 
the ICL level. Due to the emphasis placed on individual guilt, and the selective nature 
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of prosecutions, there is undoubtedly a great deal of focus placed on the need for an 
individual target, which is best articulated by Foucault:
‘One doesn’t punish an act, one has to punish a man. And so, once again, 
a crime one can no longer do anything about will be dropped in order to 
deal with the criminal. It is the criminal, in fact, that is needed by the press 
and public opinion. It is he who will be hated, against whom all the passions 
will be directed, and for whom the penalty and oblivion will be demanded.’43
As a result of this intense concentration on just a few, selected accused, there is ample 
opportunity for stigmatisation to occur.  For example, Lubanga was found guilty at the 44
ICC on the sole charge of enlisting and conscripting children.  Mégret argues that, as 45
a result, his prosecution ‘considerably elevated the stigma of child recruitment’.  46
Furthermore, Lubanga’s name will ‘go down in history as the first person convicted 
internationally for recruiting children’, despite the fact that there are undoubtedly others 
who share culpability.  The very fact that others could have been indicted for 47
prosecution furthers Lubanga’s stigmatisation.48
Stigma is a form of ‘social opprobrium’, which does not have to be deliberately 
or consciously ‘performed’.  Reflecting on the impact of sociologist Emile Durkheim’s 49
idea of ‘collective conscience’,  Mégret explains that it is not the crimes themselves 50
which are necessarily shocking, ‘but that their commission contradicts our deeply held 
beliefs’, which must be met with ‘strong disapproval’.  In this way, stigmatising 51
individuals is both an expression of society, as well as a means of manifesting that 
 FOUCAULT, M. (2002) p43243
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society itself.  By placing individuals ‘on the outer borders of humanity’,  the 52 53
attachment of stigma by international criminal institutions can be seen to constitute a 
form of ‘otherisation’. This can occur long before the finding of guilt, as the status of 
‘suspect’ alone can attract stigma, ‘despite the presumption of innocence’.  Such is the 54
strength of the stigmatisation at the ICL level, it can be seen to extend to defence 
counsel and their teams.55
Although there may be a ‘very real distaste for the idea that international 
criminal justice is about stigmatisation’, it could provide important understandings of 
power roles in ICL.  Mégret observes the Prosecutor’s ‘considerable power in the 56
global economy of shame’, by virtue of the authority to make decisions relating to the 
initiation of investigations, and the formation of indictments.  Arguably, this is further 57
reinforced by the public perception that the ‘Prosecutor "must be pretty sure" of her 
case to have selected a particular defendant’.  Thus, the role and influence of stigma 58
as a means of otherisation can be argued to provide useful insights into the context in 
which the international accused finds himself.
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4. Conclusion
In order for the courts to address the question of individual guilt, it is necessary to 
separate the defendant’s individual responsibility for their own actions, from the 
circumstances and events which surround the trial. The defendant’s guilt ought to be 
separated from: the general knowledge, and abhorrent nature, of the crime; the 
association of the defendants with any other individuals who are suspected/indicted; 
perhaps most importantly, the victims who have been affected. Due to the heightened 
reactions as a result of the occurrence of the crime, this can be far from easy. Ben-
Gurion, the former Israeli prime minister, commented in reference to the trial of 
Eichmann, “[i]t is not an individual that is in the dock at this historic trial, and not the 
Nazi regime alone, but anti-Semitism throughout history.”  The sentiment expressed is 59
an honest one. How can such crimes, and their victims, be separated from the ‘face of 
evil’ standing before us in the dock? 
This leads us to question what exactly is being ‘judged’ in the trial process itself. 
Practically speaking, the focus of the trial is inevitably on the individual, ‘a man of flesh 
and blood with an individual history, with an always unique set of qualities, peculiarities, 
behaviour patterns, and circumstances.’  However, as already suggested, the focus 60
may not be strictly limited to the defendant himself, but in fact may go far beyond him, 
extending to much wider circumstances, events and other individuals - factors which 
may well have been beyond his influence, control or involvement. These factors may 
be included within the trial - perhaps not in explicit terms or in ways which are directly 
tangible - but included nonetheless. As Foucault describes:
‘[I]t is these shadows lurking behind the case itself that are judged and 
punished. They are judged indirectly as ‘attenuating circumstances’ that 
introduce into the verdict not only ‘circumstantial’ evidence, but something 
 ARENDT, H. (1963) p1959
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quite different, which is not juridically codifiable: the knowledge of the 
criminal, one’s estimation of him, what is known about the relations 
between him, his past and his crime, and what might be expected of him in 
the future.’61
Foucault’s last point, concerning future expectations of the defendant, ties in with the 
perception of his ‘dangerousness’. This is a question of potentiality; society will also 
consider, in addition to what the defendant has actually done, his potential 
dangerousness in the future.  This will join the myriad of other factors which will be 62
considered in addition to the defendant’s guilt for the crimes indicted. 
Overall, the wider moral panic associated with the accused in ICL, can be said 
to cement further feelings of division between ‘us’ (the law-abiding onlookers who are 
united in their abhorrence of the crimes) and ‘them’ (the ‘bad guys, undesirables, 
outsiders, criminals, the underworld, disreputable folk..’).  There is a distinct danger 63
associated with the process of ‘otherisation’, which is arguably best summed up by 
Rock: ‘He has lost many of his rights to be taken seriously as a fully human member of 
society.’  Through the use of negative labelling, the accused is at least at risk of being 64
thought of, and treated as, a non-human which could, in turn, lead to a restriction or 
dilution of his rights and protections. It is argued here that it is crucial to remain aware 
of such tendencies, particularly regarding the rights and treatment of the accused 
within international criminal justice.
It is worth noting that individuals who have been acquitted from the ICTR 
nevertheless continue to struggle to find countries which are willing to permit them 
leave to reside, thus leaving them stranded.  This demonstrates the longevity of the 65
stigma which attaches to an ICL accused. A continual awareness as to the impact of 
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such issues is required regarding how defendants are processed, throughout the trial 
system, and beyond.
Part I of this thesis has attempted to conceptualise the inherent tension 
surrounding international criminal trials, which arises as a result of the conflict between 
the idealistic aspirations of ICL (Chapter 2), and the anxieties which surround 
international defendants (Chapter 3). The recognition of key concepts, such as the 
‘otherisation’ and resultant arrested development (or ‘hypoplasia’) of the Defence, will 
provide an invaluable foundation for the doctrinal analysis of the ‘institutional 
otherisation’ at the modern institutions in Part II. 
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Part II.
The Modern International 
Courts and Tribunals:
‘Institutional Otherisation’
Chapter 4. 
The Influence of Nuremberg IMT 
on the Rights of the Accused: 
The Beginnings of an International Criminal 
Procedure
‘If the foundation is wrong, nothing that comes from it can be right.’1
1. Introduction
The ‘unimaginable atrocities’ which were committed during WWII served as a rigorous 
test of the commitment to the right to a defence, as many of the Allied leaders ‘toyed’ 
with the option of summary execution for the Nazi leaders.  The ‘Nuremberg 2
International Military Tribunal’ (NIMT) was an important development in ICJ and its 
cosmopolitan aspirations,  and has had a profound impact on the seismic development 3
of ICL over the past half century. It is worth emphasising that extent of the shock 
caused by the crimes of WWII cannot be underestimated. Despite the continuation of 
wars and atrocities, it is still very difficult to comprehend the sheer scale and extent of 
the human suffering and loss, which went far beyond casualties of war that one could 
have reasonably anticipated in the circumstances. Arendt commented, ‘[t]he Nazi 
crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; and that is precisely what 
constitutes their monstrousness... That is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, 
 BIRKETT, N. (1947) ‘International Legal Theories Evolved at Nuremberg.’ 23 International 1
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oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.’  Arendt’s view is understandable; if 4
‘justice’ is represented through punishment, then there is very little one can award a 
genocidier, which will in any way be proportionate to the crimes committed. 
The NIMT was created by way of the ‘London Charter’, signed by the Allies on 
the 8th of August 1945, which Safferling describes as the ‘birth of international criminal 
procedure’.  Although senior figures in the Third Reich such as Hitler and Goebbels, 5
committed suicide, other key figures were captured, leaving the Allies with the 
extremely difficult question of how to deal with them.  Whilst it was clear that an 6
innovative means of dealing with these individuals was needed, the means by which 
this should be achieved was less apparent.  After the failure of attempts made to 7
impose sanctions after WWI, such as the Treaty of Versailles and the Leipzig trials,  8
there was a renewed effort in striving to enforce individual accountability. Since the 
NIMT, there has been a significant and lasting change in the status of the individual 
under international law.  9
How, then, to best analyse and assess the Tribunal? Naturally, a qualitative 
analysis is necessary, and will be provided hereafter, regarding its establishment, 
structure and functioning in relation to the accused and defence counsel. It would be all 
too easy to pass judgement on the proceedings with the benefit of hindsight and 
subsequent development of international criminal procedure. However, perhaps a fairer 
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analysis should involve a more measured and contextual approach, in light of the lack 
of preceding institutions, as well as the political and social pressures which existed at 
that time. As Bassiouni explains: 
‘Most commentators on the Nuremberg legacy tend to approach the 
analysis and appraisal.. in much the same terms as the proverbial optimist 
and pessimist describing a glass as half full or half empty.’  10
Some commentators tend to hold the tribunal up as a shining beacon of justice,  whilst 11
other see a ‘political’ application of victor’s justice and ex post facto law, and hence see 
it as ‘half-empty’. Caution should be taken when faced with the temptation of judging 
the Tribunal by current standards of due process and human rights. 
The NIMT provides valuable insight across many aspect of ICL, and has 
particularly important ramifications for the role of the Defence and the rights of the 
accused. Procedurally, the NIMT is of crucial importance since it gave rise to an, albeit 
limited, ‘Rules of Procedure’,  designed specially for an international tribunal of mixed 12
character.  It will be argued that since the NIMT, the Defence has struggled to acquire 13
varying degrees and means of independence.  The hypoplasia of the Defence in ICL 14
can be seen as originating at the NIMT, particularly since some of its shortcomings 
continue to be ‘endemic to courts’  at the modern institutions.15
As the NIMT is undoubtedly the cornerstone in the foundation of ICL, the extent 
to which it is structurally sound with respect to defence issues must be assessed. This 
Chapter will examine the substantive provisions in the Charter and ‘Rules of Procedure’ 
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regarding issues relating to the fair trial of the accused. This will include the 
appointment and background of defence counsel, and the overwhelming nature of the 
their role in light of the vast restrictions regarding time and resources. The numerous 
difficulties presented by the acquisition, translation and submission of evidence will 
also be examined so as to ultimately assess whether there can be said to have been 
an ‘Equality of Arms’ (EoA). The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, 
or ‘Tokyo IMT’) will also be examined briefly for any significant differences regarding 
the Defence. 
2. The Composition of the Tribunal
The London Charter laid out the key provisions for the establishment and functioning of 
the NIMT. The Allies had a significant level of control over every aspect of the trial: the 
Prosecution, the Bench, custody of accused and possession of extensive evidence.  It 16
is worth recognising the contribution of Robert Jackson, who has rightly been 
described as the ‘architect’ of the Tribunal.  When addressing the American Society of 17
International Law in 1945, Jackson explained:
 
‘The ultimate principle is that you must put no man on trial under the form of 
judicial proceedings if you are not willing to see him freed if not proved 
guilty. If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there is no 
occasion for a trial. The world yields no respect to courts that are merely 
organized to convict.’18
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‘Courts’ which are established with the only purpose of convicting and sentencing, are 
nothing more than political mechanisms designed to ‘rubber-stamp convictions - and 
executions’.  19
A.  The Selection of the accused to stand trial
The criteria for the selection of the accused who were ultimately indicted by the 
Tribunal and stood trial, changed considerably throughout the course of negotiations. It 
appears that the Allies had assumed that the selection of accused would be somewhat 
self-evident, which was not to be the case.  No criteria for selection existed per se, 20
which meant that the list took shape as a result of months of political negotiations and 
requests from each of the Allies.  Whilst the inclusion of some of the accused was 21
relatively non-controversial, the rationale behind the addition of specific individuals was 
a clear cause for concern. Perhaps one of the most self-evident examples of this was 
the so called ‘Krupp fiasco’, which initially involved Gustav Krupp, whose health was 
extremely poor. Realising this it was unfeasible to pursue the prosecution, Jackson 
attempted to instead include his son Alfried, mentioning that he might, ‘as a sporting 
gesture’, volunteer to fill the void.  This notion, whilst thankfully rejected, demonstrates 22
a questionable approach to the selection process.
In August 1945, after the signing of the London Charter, the number of possible 
defendants on Jackson’s list stood at approximately seventy-three. However, upon 
presenting the list to France and the USSR, both were perturbed that none of the 
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individuals whom they had detained were included.  By the 25th of August, this 23
number had been narrowed down to twenty or so defendants, with Bormann being the 
only individual not yet captured. At the last moment, prior to the list being released to 
the public, the Soviets requested the addition of two individuals: Raeder, a commander 
of the German Navy, and Fritzche, a radio newscaster. The addition of Fritsche is 
particularly troubling in the sense that he was not considered to be a major war 
criminal, but as the Soviets at this point would not be trying any of the individuals in 
their custody, it was felt to be appropriate to ‘allow’ him be included in the indictment.  24
The Soviets could not be seen to not to have any of their detainees included in the 
indictment; it was a matter of political pride.25
Meanwhile, the US was concerned with attempting to deem certain 
organisations as criminal (under the conspiracy charge), with a view to enabling further 
prosecutions post-Nuremberg, simply by virtue of an individual’s membership of the 
relevant organisation.  An example of the ramifications of such an approach, can be 26
seen in the inclusion of Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, as a result of the 
American plan to prosecute organisations.  The questionable decision to include 27
Schacht is perhaps best understood in terms of the need for a continued discovery of 
evidence. In contrast to many of the other accused, the evidence relating to Schacht, 
‘tended to exculpate him’,  perhaps demonstrating the questionability of his indictment.  28
The selection process at the NIMT has been described as ‘arbitrary in the 
extreme’.  Ultimately, the defendants were selected hastily, without due concern as to 29
their suitability for indictment.  Hess, for example, may well have been insane, and yet 30
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was tried, found guilty and given a life sentence.  Kaltenbrunner, having suffered a 31
potentially fatal haemorrhage preceding the trial, spent time in hospital and as a result 
was absent for several weeks.  32
B. The provision and omission of defence rights in the Charter & Rules of 
Procedure
Whilst there is no deception in the title, ‘Nuremberg International Military Tribunal’, this 
aspect of the trial has a tendency to be overlooked both in terms of its assessment, as 
well as its place in history as an influential precedent for subsequent Courts. The 
concept of a ‘military tribunal’ suggests that it does not operate within the ‘usual’ 
framework of national Courts, but instead has its own (reduced) standards of process 
and procedure.  In particular, these differences are concerned with due process, 33
whereby expediency is arguably the most prominent objective, which results in a 
degree of relaxation when compared with ‘civilian’ standards.  It was for precisely 34
these reasons that a military tribunal was sought.  It was crucial that the trial did not 35
escalate beyond the Allies’ control. 
As the NIMT has played such an influential and formative role in shaping the 
subsequent Courts, caution must be taken in acknowledging the disparities between 
using a military tribunal as a template for more traditional, ‘formal’ Courts. The fact that 
the NIMT was constructed as a military tribunal must undoubtedly shed light on why the 
rights of the accused, or the importance of fair trial, were at times subsumed under 
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other considerations or aims. To then extrapolate the approach taken at the NIMT 
across to strictly ‘legal’ trials, is to risk perpetuating and institutionalising such 
principles. Whilst human rights law developed exponentially after WWII, the NIMT as 
an institution was in many ways the only available blueprint for the subsequent Courts. 
Thus, its shortcomings must be recognised with a view to whether any ‘defects’ have 
managed to filter through to the modern international institutions.
i. The Charter
Gallant argues that the drafters of the Charter ‘paid very little attention to the rights of 
the accused’, other than providing the right to counsel.  Although due process 36
protections were recognised, such considerations were closely followed by concerns 
regarding the potential for obstructive behaviour on the part of the accused, and so 
were ‘justifiably’ restricted.  Meron argues that due process protections were simply 37
not amongst the Allies’ chief concerns.  Despite the brief nature of the Charter, in 38
particular the Defence provisions, some basic fair trial features were nonetheless 
included. It is worth noting that the due process protections of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were in contemplation at this time.39
The rights of the Defence can be found primarily within Article 16 of the London 
Charter. Article 16a) stated that the accused must be provided with a copy of the 
indictment, translated into a language which they understood at a ‘reasonable time 
before the Trial.’  Article 16d) provided for the accused to have the right to ‘assistance 40
of counsel’ or to conduct their own defence, with no mention as to the adequacy or 
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guaranteed standards of such representation. Article 16e) allowed defendants to 
present evidence in their defence, as well as to cross-examine witnesses called 
against them. 
The London Charter was deficient in several respects in relation to the rights of 
the accused. For example, Bormann was tried, convicted and sentenced to death 
completely in absentia.  The London Charter also omitted any protection regarding ne 41
bis in idem. In fact, Article 11 expressly stated that a defendant ‘may be charged before 
a national, military or occupation court’ despite being convicted at the NIMT.  A 42
deliberate inclusion of such a provision provides a ‘catch-all’ mechanism should any of 
the defendants have been acquitted, or should defence counsel have attempted to 
pervert the course of justice. Three of the accused (Fritzsche, von Papen and 
Schacht), were later prosecuted in German Courts, despite being acquitted at the 
NIMT. 
There was no right to appeal the sentences handed down by the IMT. Clemency 
could be sought only from the Allied Control Council.  On the 1st of October 1946, 43
when the judgement and sentences were handed down, the President advised that the 
defendants would have four days in which to apply for clemency.  All submitted 44
applications were denied, as were the requests to be shot instead of hanged.  On the 45
16th of October, a little over two weeks after the judgement, the sentences were 
promptly carried out. Access to any form of appeals process was consequently denied 
by the use of the death penalty.   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ii. The Rules of Procedure & Evidence (RPE)
The ‘Rules of Procedure’ at the NIMT were highly flexible.  By virtue of creating a 46
military tribunal, and the objectives of expediency therein, the Rules of Procedure were 
thus of a versatile and fluid nature. Article 19 of the London Charter of the NIMT was 
explicit: 
‘The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall 
adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and 
nontechnical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to 
be of probative value.’
Naturally, the Rules of Procedure had a large impact upon the proceedings, and the 
lack of technical rules relating to evidence was troubling to those from the Anglo-
American systems.  Whilst the intention of such flexibility was likely to have been to 47
expedite the proceedings and maintain control, the reality of the situation was that the 
Court was forced to rule ‘almost daily’ on issues relating to the admissibility of 
evidence.  The trial, being primarily adversarial in nature, had no jury from which 48
evidence of a prejudicial nature needed to be excluded. This meant that the usual rules 
preventing such evidence from being admitted were ‘discarded’.  The flexibility of the 49
Rules of Procedure have been sharply criticised. For example, according to Wallach, 
‘the overriding reality [was] that the rules of evidence and procedure which governed 
the trials were flexible beyond not just the norms of criminal trials in democratic 
systems, but beyond the bounds of fairness as well.’50
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C. The fairness of the Tribunal’s composition
Zappalà argues that some of the procedural rules were applied inequitably between the 
Defence and Prosecution,  thus creating a procedural imbalance. Kranzbühler, 51
perhaps the most prominent defence counsel at the NIMT, made a strong argument 
that the procedures adopted significantly disadvantaged the accused.  Much of the 52
academic commentary tends to analyse the fairness of the NIMT by concluding that the 
Charter itself was essentially just, but the Rules of Procedure were responsible for 
providing much of the unfairness. This can certainly be argued to be ‘a trifle too 
generous’, as the ‘blame’ cannot fall solely on the Rules of Procedure.  Perhaps the 53
greatest cause for concern centres around the omission of fair trial provisions. Zappalà 
refers to three examples in order to demonstrate such deficiencies: ‘the absence of a 
detailed procedure for discovery, the absence of any provisions on exculpatory 
materials, and the absence of the presumption of innocence.’  That there was no 54
explicit mention in the London Charter of the presumption of innocence, the burden of 
proof,  or the principle of EoA is perhaps most indicative of the serious absence of 55
some of the more crucial aspects of a fair trial. 
Considering the important defects and omissions in the Charter and RPE, the 
potential for fairness at trial is questionable.  Laternser,  defence counsel, argued that 
when questioning the fairness of the trial, only a negative answer is possible due to the 
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fact that the unfairness began ‘outside of the court chamber and therefore had to 
continue in it.’  56
3. The Trial Stage at Nuremberg IMT
A. Overwhelming Evidence and the ‘sui generis’ Mixed Procedure
The amount of evidence collected by the Prosecution at the NIMT was astonishing. 
The Nazis were thorough record keepers, which provided the Prosecution with a 
wealth of evidence. Due to the availability of extensive affidavit evidence, this 
necessarily shaped the approach of the Prosecution, who adduced extraordinary 
amounts of, primarily written, evidence at trial.  57
Also fundamental to the nature of the Tribunal, was the merging and 
compromise between the legal systems of the Allies. Due to their shared English 
common-law foundations, the US and Britain had sufficiently similar legal systems and 
procedures so as not to cause too much difficulty. Despite differences between the 
French, Soviet (and German) systems, they were clearly distinct from the Anglo-
American system.  It can be observed that little attention was actually given as to how 58
the ‘two systems could be married.’  Necessarily, due to the lack of time available to 59
prepare such an unprecedented institution of this kind, this intrinsic feature of the 
proceedings unavoidably caused much confusion and difficulty. For example, counsel 
from the continental systems were clearly shocked that evidence could be submitted 
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for the first time at the trial stage, rather than being disclosed.  Such disbelief was not, 60
however, limited to counsel. The Soviet Judge, Nikitchenko, appeared to fail to 
understand Jackson when he stated that the Judges must be independent and 
impartial, in accordance with the adversarial system, in which the judge acts as arbiter 
between the Prosecution and Defence.  It can be argued that the mixed procedure 61
affected defence counsel profoundly, who were all of a German legal background, 
unfamiliar with features of adversarial procedure.  As will be argued next, they were 62
nevertheless expected to cope with very little support from the Tribunal.
B. Defence counsel at the NIMT: appointment, attributes and ability
Any potential counsel for the Defence at the NIMT could be under no illusion as to the 
difficulty of their complex role. The extent to which the trial would test their abilities as 
defence lawyers was, however, less clear. To be asked to defend those accused of 
crimes of such magnitude, at a time when such trials were far from the norm, would 
have been a difficult proposition to consider for a number of reasons. Most of the 
individual defendants were notorious, and public perception was almost inexorably 
negative towards them; such ‘revulsion’ would naturally extend to those lawyers 
accepting to act in their defence.  Described as ‘the auxiliaries of the damned’,  the 63 64
defence counsel who agreed to represent the accused undertook a difficult burden. 
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Remuneration of counsel stood in stark contrast, as whilst the Prosecution were 
paid in accordance with their own national standards,  the Judges agreed to offer 65
German defence counsel payment in Marks, by way of an advanced payment of four 
thousand Marks, followed by two-thousand-five-hundred Marks per month. Conot notes 
that this level of payment, whilst being in-line with German standards at the time, was 
of ‘academic’ importance only, ‘since the only viable currency in the Reich was now 
American cigarettes.’  With basic necessities such as food and shelter being in such 66
short supply in Germany, the decision to accept the role of defence counsel is likely to 
have been swayed by factors other than appropriate standards of remuneration. Whilst 
agreements were reached with respect to the remuneration of defence counsel, these 
were made ‘only after great effort and time had passed.’67
It was feared that the selection of entirely German defence counsel would 
provide a platform for Nazism, and for the actions of the Nazi regime to be 
‘defended’.  Jackson, even with his determined drive to establish the Tribunal, stated 68
that he would prefer there to be no trial at all, rather than risk allowing the German 
defence counsel to ‘exploit’ the process.  69
With regards to the appointment of defence counsel, no selection criteria or 
mechanism was agreed upon in the Statute.  As such, a huge reliance would be 70
placed on the personnel capable of aiding the defendants in seeking representation. 
The Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure made some accommodation for the selection of 
personnel. According to Rule 2(d):
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‘The Tribunal will designate counsel for any defendant who fails to apply for 
particular counsel or, where particular counsel requested is not within ten 
days to be found or available, unless the defendant elects in writing to 
conduct his own defense.’71
As such, the Tribunal was prepared to assign defence counsel in situations where none 
could be found in accordance with the requests of the accused. Whilst many counsel 
were selected by the accused, twelve had not been assigned defence counsel with 
only three weeks remaining prior to the start of the trial.  It was not until the 12th of 72
November, that it could be reported that all of the defendants had, to some basic 
degree, secured defence representation.  With the trial starting on the 20th of 73
November, this left some of the defence counsel with little more than a week to prepare 
their cases. Such limitations on time are incredibly burdensome for any trial, let alone 
one of such complexity, which carried threat of the enforcement of the death penalty.
The reported abilities of defence counsel vary between commentators. With 
regards to experience, Conot notes that only eight of the counsel for the Defence ‘had 
had substantial experience in criminal cases.’  Dodd, assistant to the US Prosecution, 74
felt that whilst some defence counsel were ‘outstanding lawyers at the German Bar’, 
overall they could be deemed only as ‘competent’.  Taylor particularly notes Dix and 75
Kranzbühler as being of superior ability, whilst he also observes that ‘a few were 
painfully incompetent’.  The task before defence counsel was onerous, and due to the 76
circumstances and considerations already discussed, it follows logically that such a 
role might attract counsel of varying quality. Their abilities must be viewed in light of the 
demands made on their professional capabilities, particularly in view of their legal 
backgrounds, and lack of training with regards to the key differences between legal 
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systems. Cross-examination is perhaps the clearest example of a crucial skill required 
at the NIMT. Having no experience by virtue of their German legal backgrounds, they 
were clearly placed at a disadvantage; some managed to respond more effectively to 
this task than others.  Despite this lack of experience, the Judges were clear that the 77
role of cross-examining prosecution witnesses lay firmly with defence counsel.78
C. The principle of ‘Equality of Arms’: constraints on time and resources
In what was largely an adversarial procedure at the NIMT, considerable importance 
was placed on the respective roles of the Prosecution and Defence. Thus, the principle 
of EoA has significant importance when considering the fairness of the trial. As 
discussed in Part I of this thesis, the parties should be in a position to have a real 
chance of succeeding with their case. The principle of EoA is foremost observable via 
the time afforded to both parties in the preparation of their cases, as well as the 
resources with which they are provided. 
The defence counsel at the NIMT argued strongly that there was a lack of EoA 
between themselves and the Prosecution.  One factor which indicated the perceived 79
imbalance, was the number of staff assisting each side. As previously mentioned, the 
defendants were entitled to one lawyer to represent them, some of whom represented 
multiple defendants. On the other hand, the US Prosecution team alone had the largest 
number of personnel, with around seven hundred people assisting their effort.80
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A strong case can be made that the Defence were not provided with adequate 
time to prepare their cases ab initio, as well as throughout the trial. As Skilbeck notes, 
the Defence had little in the way of resources, which meant that, together with the 
speed at which the trial process started, there could be ‘no real investigations.’  The 81
denial of time to prepare can be seen from as early as the entering of the defendants’ 
pleas. Dr. Rudolf Dix, speaking at the time on behalf of defence counsel, was forced to 
protest due to the fact that they had not yet had an opportunity, prior to the session 
starting, to ascertain how their clients wished to plead.  A short recess was granted to 82
allow consultation with their clients. However, it is somewhat astonishing that such an 
essential factor as the plea, which is central to how counsel will proceed with the 
accused’s defence, was not foreseen to necessitate client consultation.
The provision of resources for the Defence was a crucial aspect concerning 
their ability to properly fulfil their role. Initially, it is argued that the defence counsel 
‘stood there with literally empty hands’ and were allocated only a small library room, 
which did not even provide enough space for each counsel to have their own work 
place.  Over time, the facilities afforded to the Defence improved somewhat, with the 83
provision of a larger room and limited access to a single shared telephone.84
Overall, it seems appropriate to conclude that at the NIMT there were worrying 
indications that the principle of EoA was not duly respected. The Prosecution was slow 
to provide any support, and did so only ‘grudgingly’.  Despite some limited recognition 85
of their difficulties, the Defence was nonetheless faced with an arguably 
insurmountable challenge, due in main to the lack of resources and time afforded to 
them. This issue becomes most troubling when considered in relation to the strength 
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and resources afforded to the Prosecution; it can be argued that the comparative 
disparity between the parties ‘stood in no expressible proportion’.86
D. The Allied Judges
The Bench at the NIMT comprised of judges selected from each of the Allies. The 
absence of a neutral Judge, much less a German Judge, is perhaps one of the most 
significant criticisms relating to the fairness of the proceedings. Had a Judge from a 
‘neutral’ State been included, it would have afforded the Bench a great deal more 
legitimacy, both at the time as well as in retrospect.  87
Even if a neutral or German Judge was not required in the interest of fairness, it 
can nevertheless be argued that the defendants were entitled to an impartial and fair 
judiciary. It has been argued that there existed an ‘overriding intention’ on behalf of the 
judges to presume the guilt of the accused.  Certainly, there were incidents which 88
indicate such a presumption on the part of some of the Judges. The Tribunal presented 
an extraordinary situation, stretching over many months in which the Judges and 
Prosecutors from the Allies socialised together. Taylor recounts a toast made by Soviet 
Judge Vishinsky, who raised his glass to the other Judges and Prosecutors present 
and announced: “I propose a toast to the defendants. May their paths lead straight 
from the courthouse to the grave!”  Due to the language barrier, several of the Judges 89
drank to this toast before the translation was explained, causing considerable anxiety.90
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E. Evidence admitted at trial: nature, restriction and effect
The way in which evidence was adduced at the Tribunal had a large bearing on the 
fairness of the trial and the effectiveness of the Defence.  Already at a disadvantage 
due to the unfamiliar procedure, the German defence counsel were required to adapt 
quickly to the procedure, within the evidentiary restrictions placed upon them. This was 
by no means an easy task, and it has been observed that many counsel, at least 
initially, struggled to cope.  91
i.  The dominance of affidavit evidence
Due to the mass of evidence collected in advance by the Allies,  aided by the avid 92
record keeping of the Nazi Regime, the issue arose as to whether the Tribunal would 
allow, and rely on to a great extent, the use of affidavit evidence. As a general rule in 
Anglo-American systems, the principle of ‘best evidence’ suggests that preference 
should be given to a witness, who can be called before the Court and so cross-
examined and ‘tested’ for accuracy, over a sworn document, which by its nature cannot 
carry the same safeguards. Therefore, it would not have been unsurprising if the 
Tribunal would look less favourably on written evidence, especially where witnesses 
may be available. However, as one of the overarching aims of the trial was to compile 
an historical record, the Tribunal was in practice far more ‘ambivalent’ regarding the 
admission of affidavit evidence.  Consequently, the vast majority of evidence accepted 93
by the Tribunal was comprised of written documents.  94
The sheer volume of written evidence available to the Prosecution was 
overwhelming. After a while, Jackson had to call to a halt the searching for further 
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evidence, as the number of documents recovered was in the region of five thousand.  95
Despite the overwhelming array of material from which the Prosecution could select, all 
evidence was not necessarily reliable; in some instances it came to light that 
documents had been falsified.  96
With such a heavy reliance on written evidence, the issue of translation was of 
great importance. With English, French, Russian and of course German all being 
spoken (and needing to be understood) simultaneously within the court room, the 
language barrier had the potential to undermine and greatly protract the proceedings. 
Due to the innovation of the system provided by IBM, translation was provided almost 
simultaneously in Court. This meant that all those participating could speak in their 
language of choice, and could also ‘tune in’ to the channel broadcasting in the 
language they wished to hear.  Without such a novel system, it is hard to conceive 97
how the Tribunal could have properly functioned; certainly the trial would have lasted 
considerably longer, and would have likely caused greater difficulties for the defence 
counsel and accused in presenting their cases. 
However, it was not just the Court room itself which required comprehensive 
translation. Crucial to the preparation for both parties to the trial, documents needed to 
be translated in a timely and accurate manner. This is perhaps where the Defence 
suffered most greatly. Whilst only half of the approximate five thousand documents in 
the Prosecution’s hands were translated, only around five hundred were made 
available to the Defence.  Kranzbühler, defence counsel, recalls being initially ‘flooded’ 98
by documents which were only in English, which meant that often the Defence did not 
have any meaningful knowledge of such evidence prior the Prosecution presenting 
them in Court.  Ultimately, defence counsel were given the Prosecution’s material only 99
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five days prior to the start of the trial.  Defence counsel routinely argued that 100
documents were not delivered to them until the evening prior to the proceedings.  101
Such extreme delays would render it almost impossible to prepare adequately the 
defence case.
The Tribunal decided to create what was known as the ‘Defendants’ Information 
Centre’. This was the mechanism through which the Prosecution, to a certain extent, 
made the documents which they intended to submit to the Court available to the 
Defence. Although the Prosecution placed many documents within the Centre, Marrus 
notes that the Defence had to comply with an ‘elaborate procedure’.  The Defence 102
were not permitted to access the Prosecution’s evidentiary archives, nor was it 
permissible for them to submit non-German documents to be used in favour of the 
accused.  The Defence, as Kranzbühler explains, ‘had to live on what was left 103
over’.  Thus, one could argue, that with such extensive restrictions, to not provide the 104
‘Defence Information Centre’ would have been for the Prosecution to completely 
incapacitate the Defence. However, providing the ‘Centre’ was, in reality, merely 
another way of controlling the nature of evidence available, and the extent to which it 
could be conceivably accessed by the Defence.
ii.  The Restrictions on Disclosure of Evidence and Exculpatory Material
Access to evidence by the Defence was purposefully highly controlled and ‘effective’. 
This had serious implications for the objective of compiling the evidence admitted at 
trial in order to create an accurate historical record.  The restrictions also impaired 105
the Defence in their efforts, resulting in valuable material not being used in defence of 
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the accused.  Specific to the needs of the Defence was the issue of exculpatory 106
evidence uncovered by the Prosecution, and the extent to which this was disclosed. To 
disclose such evidence is a key safeguard concerning fair procedure, particularly in 
circumstances where the Prosecution holds an advantageous position due to its 
dominant possession and control of the evidence.  107
It is contended that the Defence at the NIMT had ‘no possibility of obtaining 
exculpatory evidence from the Prosecutor’.  By withholding such evidence from the 108
Court, the Prosecution was not acting contrary to the Rules of Procedure.  This 109
suggests, in line with the Allies’ general approach to the Tribunal, that there was a 
reluctance to provide any scope for the Defence to ‘abuse’ the Tribunal. Perhaps 
realistically, preventing the Defence from being more likely to achieve acquittals was 
also integral to this position. 
Defence counsel left the Tribunal in no doubt that they suspected that 
exculpatory evidence was not being disclosed to them.  The most frequently withheld 110
form of evidence appeared to relate to material concerned with cross-examinations.  111
With no requirement for the Prosecution concerning early disclosure,  there can 112
strictly speaking be no accusation levelled at the Prosecution regarding this matter. 
Whilst the provision of further assistance for the Defence would have positively 
impacted upon the fairness or the proceedings, such an omission ultimately lies with 
the drafting of the London Charter, as well as the Rules of Procedure. 
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iii. The use of prejudicial evidence?
The horrors of WWII, particularly the concentration camps, are so shocking that they 
are understandably hard to conceptualise or accept as true. As the technology to 
record moving images with sound had become more readily available, the American 
forces, in particular, utilised film to record the scenes they discovered. Much of the film 
which was taken was then compiled to make an hour-long ‘documentary film’ known as 
‘Nazi Concentration Camps’. Even by today’s standards, despite any possible 
desensitisation to violence, the film is highly disturbing and portrays the level of human 
suffering and the appalling number of dead. 
The film ‘Nazi Concentration Camps’ was admitted as evidence, and attested to 
by affidavits shown prior to the film being projected, in an attempt to authenticate it. 
Video evidence, without the filmmaker present, could amount to hearsay if there is no 
possibility to cross-examine the evidence. (The admission of hearsay, as well as other 
‘unsubstantiated evidence’ was permissible at the NIMT.  For example, evidence was 113
admitted from the defendants’ pre-trial interrogations. ) The documentary attempts to 114
appear objective, yet goes beyond providing mere descriptions of the scenes.  The 115
film, it could be argued, was admitted to the Court for reasons other than its evidential 
value. Again, due to the desire to create an historical record of the atrocities, it was felt 
necessary to include it.  Whilst it is not disputed that these images were in any way 116
‘forged’, the relevance of showing this ‘documentary’ at the NIMT must be rigorously 
questioned. 
The gruesome film undoubtedly had a massive effect on all those present in the 
courtroom: Judges, counsel and defendants alike.  Taylor observed that the film 117
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‘certainly hardened sentiment against the defendants generally, but it contributed little 
to the determination of their individual guilt’.  The admission that the film contributed 118
little to the guilt of the accused is supported by the fact that no discussion or 
explanation of the film was offered. Instead, the Court adjourned at only 10.00, and 
reconvened the following day with no mention whatsoever of the ‘documentary’.  This 119
suggests that the film was given little consideration as evidence, perhaps due to the 
fact that Courts had not yet developed an awareness of how to treat video evidence at 
trial. Nevertheless, the film clearly had a shocking effect on the Court. Taylor also 
recounts that some of the defence counsel could be heard to say that it had “become 
intolerable to sit in the same room with men like Kaltenbrunner and Frank.”  Thus, it 120
can be deduced that permitting the film to be admitted as evidence at the NIMT 
produced significant, tangible negative effects for the defendants.
It is submitted here that evidence, such as the film shown at the NIMT, together 
with the way in which the evidence is utilised, has the potential to be highly prejudicial. 
This is on the basis that the need to admit such evidence, with questionable relevance 
to the individual guilt of the accused, is outweighed by its potential to negatively impact 
on the defendants. In light of the availability of the developing technology, as well as 
the need for an historical record for current and future generations, it is understandable 
that the film was accepted with little questioning or relevant explanation.
iv. Witnesses
At the NIMT, sixty-one witnesses appeared on behalf of the Defence, as opposed to 
just thirty-three for the Prosecution.  In addition to these witnesses, many of the 121
defendants elected to testify on their own behalf, which took up much of the Defence’s 
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time.  Considering the length of the trial, the number of defendants before the Court 122
and the extensive nature of the relevant crimes, it is surprising that so few witnesses 
appeared before the Tribunal, and this demonstrates further the reliance on written 
evidence. This approach was confirmed by the Prosecution when it was realised that 
many of the witnesses were providing contradictory or ambiguous statements to the 
interrogators, often in attempts to avoid attracting blame themselves.  123
Balancing the needs of the witnesses with those of the defendants is by no 
means an easy task, but as Zappalà argues: ‘Under no circumstances may the rights 
of victims prevail over the rights of the defendant, nor may the interest in discovering 
the truth.’  As previously discussed, the German defence counsel, with their non-124
adversarial backgrounds, were struggling to overcome such a disadvantage from the 
outset. Difficulties were compounded by the deliberate time restrictions placed on the 
Defence, as they were given notice of witnesses’ appearance only the day before.  125
With the Prosecution preparing weeks in advance for cross-examinations,  a skill 126
which would not have been alien to most Prosecution counsel, they held a distinct 
advantage over the Defence. 
Where a decision has been taken to admit questionable evidence, there is then 
the risk that the judges could attribute it with a disproportionate weighting during the 
decision-making process. Lippman argues that as the determination of guilt was largely 
the product of negotiation and bias, the deliberate consideration of the appropriate 
weight to assign to evidence was in fact a more minor concern.127
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v. The Judgement and acquittals of the IMT
The judgement of the NIMT has been criticised for its lack of detail concerning the 
individual guilt of the accused.  Instead, the focus of the judgement appears to be 128
more concerned with ‘concluding’ the historical record, which the Tribunal was intended 
to provide. Another criticism concerning the judgement, as well as sentencing, is the 
inconsistent and somewhat haphazard nature of decision making. Lippman argues that 
judicial decisions, concerning guilt and punishment, were reached through ‘judicial 
bargaining, negotiation, lobbying and biases.’  It has been argued, for example, that 129
Schacht most likely had his acquittal strengthened by virtue of his time spent 
imprisoned at the Dachau concentration camp.  130
The three acquittals at the NIMT shocked many who had anticipated that a 
finding of ‘not guilty’ was inconceivable in the circumstances. Rather, it was felt that the 
Tribunal was merely a formality to be complied with, prior to punishing the accused.  131
The acquittals are often presented as the real ‘acid test’ of fairness at the NIMT.  132
However, in light of the process by which the defendants were selected (as previously 
discussed), such an argument is significantly weakened. If the Tribunal was in fact fair, 
then it was very right that those individuals were acquitted; to fail to acquit them would 
have demonstrated that the Tribunal was wholly unfair. The Soviet Judge Nikitchenko 
strongly dissented to the judgement, arguing that all defendants should be found guilty 
and that Hess should receive the death penalty.  Due to the political and highly 133
arbitrary nature of the selection process of the accused, it is problematic to use 
acquittals rates at the NIMT in order to demonstrate due process. The acquittals do 
not, in and of themselves, necessarily demonstrate a significant level of fairness given 
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the accused which were selected. Nonetheless, the acquittals have seemingly provided 
legitimacy to the Tribunal.
Those sentenced to death by hanging were not told when their executions 
would take place, reminiscent of the treatment depicted by Nabokov.  The harshest of 134
all sentences was needed in order to secure co-operation with the nations who would 
have executed the captured, without trial. The hangings brought about a brief finality to 
the proceedings, after the lengthy trial at the NIMT. 
4. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), otherwise known more 
colloquially as the Tokyo IMT, has had far less impact on the development of 
international law. Whilst it shared many features with the NIMT, the principle 
differences, and reasons for its lack of impact, will be briefly analysed. As Bassiouni 
argues, ‘the Tokyo trial was shamefully unfair and riddled procedurally with every type 
of error, bias, prejudice and unfairness that one can imagine.’  Thus, although the 135
Charters of the two IMTs were not dissimilar, the main difficulties, and source of 
unfairness, appears to have emanated from the procedure adopted at Tokyo. The 
perceived bias and lack of due process are the crucial factors which attract most 
criticism.  136
The Defence at Tokyo was likewise not of the same standard as at the NIMT. 
Defence counsel were faced with similar hostility; when a radio appeal was made 
asking the Japanese people for practical help with funding, food and accommodation 
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for the Defence, it seemingly produced almost no response.  The IMTFE employed a 137
mixture of American defence counsel, as well as Japanese. However, the former did 
not arrive until two weeks after the commencement of proceedings.138
Regarding the functioning and resources of the Defence at Tokyo, there is 
relatively little information recorded.  As Wilson argues, this was at least in part due 139
to the reported levels of disorganisation within the Defence.  As was the case at the 140
NIMT, the Defence faced restrictions of time and resource, and were also denied 
access to relevant material.  For example, the Prosecution had the use of two 141
hundred translators, of which seventy-two were also used by the Defence. However, 
only four or five were perceived to be competent by the Defence.  142
Overall, the efforts of the Defence have been described as ‘extremely weak, 
frequently causing laughter in the courtroom.’  Due to the lack of support and 143
procedural fairness, as well as an inefficient and disorganised approach, the objectives 
of defence counsel appear to have been unattainable.  Deale, an advising American 144
lawyer at Tokyo, most chillingly described the perceived role of the Defence as, 
‘figuratively speaking, to put flowers gracefully on his client’s grave.’145
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5. Conclusion
‘There is no need to recall that one of the main teachings of the Nuremberg 
legacy is that the fairness of the proceedings to the defendants is the main 
yardstick against which the legitimacy of the whole exercise will be 
measured.’146
The architects and personnel of the NIMT failed to recognise the importance of the 
Defence, and thereby also failed to provide it with the necessary support. The Defence 
was essentially seen as ‘ignoble and inconvenient’.  Such an attitude, it has been 147
argued, was the result of a fear that defence counsel would attempt to derail, or unduly 
delay, the judicial process. In terms of legitimacy however, the Tribunal would have 
been better served by recognising the crucial role of the Defence. 
The NIMT presented itself as a tribunal in which international law, as the Allies 
defined it, would be applied according to due process. This is the standard against 
which the Tribunal must be judged. As a result, as Zappalà has argued, the rights of 
the accused are central to the credibility and legitimacy of the Court.  However, the 148
circumstances surrounding WWII and the creation of the Tribunal cannot be forgotten; 
other aims, in particular that of creating an historical record, were perhaps equally the 
objectives of the Tribunal. When understanding the importance of the NIMT, and its use 
as a precedent for subsequent Courts, it must be remembered that as a military 
tribunal, any extrapolations should be made with care. Military courts and tribunals 
utilise relaxed rules of procedure and evidence, in an effort to be as expeditious as 
possible - ‘sometimes excessively so’.  We must be conscious of the values and 149
objectives in ICL as to the standards and procedure we wish to promote where the 
rights of the accused are concerned. 
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In light of the heightened political and social pressures, it could reasonably be 
suggested that the defendants at the NIMT benefited only from a very superficial level 
of presumption of innocence. The Tribunal was undoubtedly politically motivated, which 
affected its legitimacy as a legal justice mechanism. The Soviets in particular were 
painfully honest regarding their assumption of the defendants’ guilt.  When a 150
multiplicity of factors points to the Allies seeking the conviction and punishment of the 
individuals indicted at the Tribunal,  it becomes difficult to argue that a tangible, 151
meaningful presumption of innocence existed.  Furthermore, given the disparities in 152
available resources, personnel and access to evidence, it is reasonable to argue that 
the NIMT was lacking in a meaningful EoA between the Prosecution and Defence. 
The Tribunal was an amazing accomplishment for its time, overcoming 
numerous obstacles simply to come into creation. As noted by Jackson, the decision to 
establish the NIMT was ‘one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to 
reason’.  Due to the abhorrent nature of the crimes, the resultant anxiety which 153
surrounded those indicted at the NIMT could have easily precluded the idealistic aim of 
creating such a Tribunal.
Undeniably, there was a considerable period of time in which it was legitimate to 
argue that the NIMT, whilst a valiant effort, had in actuality contributed little to the 
tangible development of ICL. Whilst the post-Nuremberg era saw the birth of a 
multiplicity of human rights treaties and laws, in terms of the creation of an international 
criminal justice system, no progress was made for nearly fifty years.  With the benefit 154
of hindsight, in can reasonably be suggested that this ‘delay’ is no reflection on the 
NIMT and its influence. As Overy argues, ‘[i]t is a consequence of a persistent reality in 
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which power will always tend to triumph over justice.’  The fact that the subsequent 155
ad hoc and permanent Courts have drawn from the experience of the NIMT, means 
only that its impact was postponed. The NIMT is not of such significance because it 
functioned flawlessly, but rather because it demonstrates both the successes and 
pitfalls of creating an international court. 
The primary concern of this thesis is that the position of the Defence was 
unsatisfactory at the NIMT, and that this disadvantaged position has continued in 
various significant ways. As Birkett observes, ‘[i]f the foundation is wrong, nothing that 
comes from it can be right.’  It is argued that the NIMT represents a significant 156
hypoplasia in the rights and treatment of the defence in ICL at a crucial, developmental 
stage. 
The extent to which the influence of the NIMT has been disseminated through 
to the modern international institutions will be analysed across the coming chapters, 
particularly in Part III, in order to ascertain the degree to which defendants in ICL have 
been passed a ‘poisoned chalice’.   157
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Chapter 5.
The Architecture of the Modern ICL Institutions:
The Defence as an Afterthought
‘..[A] perfect equality of arms is a structural impossibility 
in the current system of international justice..’1
1. Introduction
A detailed analysis of the extent of the ‘otherisation’ of the Defence in ICL necessitates 
a rigorous examination of the different architectural designs utilised at the modern 
institutions. This Chapter will seek to demonstrate that since the NIMT, the Defence 
has routinely failed to attract due consideration during the establishment of the modern 
international courts and tribunals. It will be argued that, regrettably, defence issues 
have invariably received attention at a very late stage. The focus will be on the 
architecture adopted at the ICTY, SCSL and ICC. Where the Defence is subjected to a 
fundamental structural imbalance (together with delays to its organisation), serious 
issues concerning the respect for the principle of Equality of Arms (EoA) could arise. If 
the Defence is placed at a tangible disadvantage ab initio, procedural measures taken 
at trial may prove to be insufficient to correct any imbalance. Particular attention will be 
paid to the structural formulation of the ICC, given that the Rome Statute excludes any 
provision for the Defence as a unit in its own right. This will include a close examination 
of the negotiations and proposals, shedding considerable light on the prevailing 
attitudes of those most influential to the Court’s creation.  The timescale of the creation 2
of the Court’s ‘Office of Public Counsel for the Defence’ (OPCD) further reveals the 
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prevailing trend in ICJ to defer the creation of the Defence unit until the other 
institutions have been established.
Additionally, this Chapter will examine the unique role of ‘ad-hoc’ counsel at the 
ICC, who are employed at the ‘Situation’ phase, prior to the identification of named 
accused. The use of ad-hoc counsel will be included in the discussion in order to 
demonstrate the extent of the Court’s chaotic and ill-conceived provisions for the 
defence in a trial process which requires multiple forms of representation. It will be 
argued that the transition between these different stages did not receive proper 
consideration, which will become evident during the analysis of the multiple difficulties 
which have arisen as a result of the lack of clarity surrounding the role.
2. The internal architecture adopted at the modern 
institutions
Whilst the modern courts and tribunals were created and operate under varying 
mandates, one observation common to almost all can be made regarding the position 
of the Defence ‘unit’ within the institutional structures. Namely, when devising many of 
these institutions, the Defence has routinely been considered only as an ‘afterthought’,  3
a defect which will be shown to have serious and far-reaching consequences. 
Court structures are often centred around foundational ‘pillars’, which are 
usually found enshrined in the statutes. These pillars, in international criminal justice, 
are often tripartite in nature, so as to include the Registry (the administrative and 
organisational organ), the Chambers (the judiciary), and the Office of the Prosecutor.  4
Notably, the Defence does not rank amongst the branches of the court which have 
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been afforded foundational status. The only major exception is the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (STL), which has commendably broken away from the usual approach by 
including the Defence Office as an official organ.  In fact, Groulx argues that the ICC 5
and ICTY/R are in reality only two-pillared institutions, as the Prosecution and 
Chambers are ‘well defined and independent’.  The composition of the core organs of 6
any court will have a number of consequences, such as how the different organs and 
sections interact with one another, their level of independence, and the levels of 
support and funding which they might expect to receive.
Within these unique frameworks the Defence has an interest in structural 
uniformity.  In order to secure a fair trial, it can be argued that ‘[o]nly a sound and 7
unbiased structure permits the effective adjustment of procedural rights’.  Even where 8
the ‘paper rights’ of the accused are coherently integrated into the working documents 
of a court, structural weaknesses can nevertheless pose a serious danger to defence 
independence, the parity of resources and, in turn, this can create an Inequality of 
Arms between the Defence and Prosecution.  Hence, the absence of the Defence from 9
the core structures must be explored in order to better understand their development, 
as well as any ongoing consequences. Groulx notes that the structural absence of the 
Defence is observable at several institutions, whereby the Defence fails to be 
recognised as ‘an essential organ, or pillar, of the justice system.’  It will be argued 10
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that the void into which the Defence falls is a ‘structural defect in the architecture of 
these institutions’.  11
This ‘structural defect’ can be seen to have several unfortunate consequences. 
Primarily, one could infer that the Defence is regarded as unimportant to the trial 
process and, secondly, that the Defence does not function on an ‘equal footing’.  This 12
regrettable premise is not a new phenomenon, as the Defence has failed to have 
statutory recognition since the NIMT.  As explored in the previous Chapter, the 13
creators of the NIMT were faced with the monumental task of devising a tribunal with 
little in the way of relevant precedent to guide them. 
One critical consequence of the omission of the Defence as a separate organ in 
the various Statutes is that from a very early stage the Defence has all too often 
suffered serious difficulty and delay with initial funding, organisation and support. As a 
result, the Defence has been deprived of the ‘sense of urgency necessary for its 
prompt and efficient establishment.’  As Mettraux explains, there was almost complete 14
uniformity across the institutions in the delay in setting up the Defence, which generally 
occurred ‘well into the life of the international tribunal to which it relates, and well after 
other organs or sections of the tribunal had started work’.  The latter point is of 15
particular importance, as the other organs were given the opportunity to begin their 
organisational development from the outset. 
The justification for the late establishment of the various Defence offices has 
often been based on financial reasons.  Understandably, at the initial stages of any 16
new, large-scale institution, questions of how best to utilise funding will be crucial. 
Additionally, it will be important to establish the Prosecution in order to initiate 
investigations with a view to forming indictments. However, it should be regarded as a 
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mistake to ignore the Defence in this process, as it too requires time to organise itself, 
build a pool of appropriate and qualified defence counsel, and prepare itself in the 
same manner as the Prosecution, in readiness for the first investigations and cases.  17
It is doubtful that the other organs would be willing to accept a similar delay in their 
initial funding and organisation. Mettraux argues that this deferral could be prejudicial 
to the accused and their defence teams, arguing that it ‘not only prevents the defence 
from organizing itself, but might also create a structural imbalance between those - 
prosecutors and defence counsel - who will eventually face each other as parties in 
proceedings’.  This suggests that there is at least the potential for an Inequality of 18
Arms to exist from the outset.
The other requirement which must be borne in mind before analysing the 
respective defence structures at each of the major courts, is that of defence 
independence. There is the risk that if the Defence were in fact included as a 
fundamental pillar of an international court, it could appear to be an extension of court 
itself, ‘unless its independence was fully understood and guaranteed’.  The 19
independence of defence counsel is indispensable to the role, both as an ‘officer of the 
court and as a safe keeper of his client’s interests’.  Groulx, president of the 20
International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association (ICDAA), notes that there is ‘no 
universally accepted definition’ of defence independence.  However, Groulx argues 21
that defence counsel must be free to ‘conduct unencumbered investigations, choose 
litigation tactics and determine trial strategy’,  and should not be influenced improperly 22
by ‘judges, prosecutors and court officials’.  Communications, particularly the 23
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discussion of defence strategies with an accused, must be confidential.  Any leaks or 24
inappropriate sharing of information can have a profound impact, as Wladimiroff 
experienced when acting as defence counsel at the ICTR. Upon starting to investigate 
in Rwanda, his team learned that the Prosecution had just left the very sites that they 
had intended to visit, deciding to ‘poach the same things’ as a direct result of their 
awareness of the defence itinerary.  As will be explored, due to the Prosecution’s 25
superior funding and resources, such behaviour is unacceptable, considering the 
difficulties faced by the Defence with their investigations, using meagre resources.  26
Rather than making the Defence an organ of the courts, the usual approach has been 
to integrate the Defence unit within the the Registry. The architectural structure 
adopted at the ICTY, SCSL and ICC will now be explored in more detail.
A. The ICTY
The ICTY had the difficult challenge of setting up an institution without the benefit of a 
modern equivalent from which lessons could be learned. As de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh 
explains, ‘unlike the Greek goddess Athena, the ICTY did not spring from its parent the 
Security Council, fully clad to do battle for justice and fully mature to dispense 
wisdom’.  Yet expectations for the Tribunal were high, even in its ‘vulnerable infant 27
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stages’.  Had a permanent, fully-funded defence office at the ICTY been created, a 28
stronger message concerning the importance of defence rights would have been 
sent.  Whilst the Statute and ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (RPE) of the ICTY 29
articulate the rights of the accused,  there is no mention of the Defence as a unit at all. 30
Instead, the ICTY was to provide for the Defence solely via the Registry. 
The Tribunal established the ‘Defence Counsel Unit’ (DCU), which was 
reorganised in 2000 to form the ‘Office for Legal Aid and Detention Matters’ (OLAD).  31
OLAD has a dual responsibility to both aid the Defence in some respects, whilst also 
dealing with issues such as indigence, the assignment of counsel, and their payment.  32
However, OLAD is not responsible for providing legal aid or assistance to counsel 
concerning substantive or procedural issues.  It is also not involved with the preparing 33
or running of the defence case, with the exception of some financial and administrative 
matters.  Therefore, it does not have an extensive role to play in the support of 34
defence counsel. It has been noted that OLAD’s dual mandate has ‘greatly 
complicated’ its ability to assist the Defence.  As a result, tensions have arisen 35
between OLAD and many defence teams, making it difficult for the Office to be 
‘regarded as an unbiased partner which could in fact ‘aid’ the defence in preparing its 
cases’.  Sadly, this has lead to the perception by the Defence that there is a lack of 36
transparency, although the situation is said to have improved over more recent years.  37
The key problem could be seen to centre around the involvement with, and lack of 
independence from, the Registry. Mettraux argues that OLAD’s positioning within the 
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Registry has resulted in its ‘inability to actually become a partner to the defence’,  and 38
reasons that it would have been preferable to assign the financial and logistical 
responsibilities elsewhere in the Registry so as to allow OLAD to focus on assisting the 
Defence.  39
The relationship between the Defence and Registry is also worth considering 
more generally in terms of their interaction, and potential influence. The Registry’s 
responsibilities, which are perhaps the root cause of much of the ‘conflict’, include 
matters such as: determining whether counsel are appropriately qualified; their 
appointment and removal; the management of funding.  At times, such issues have 40
left defence counsel feeling as if the Registry is their ‘worst enemy’.  An exacerbating 41
factor is the extreme diversity of the Registry’s roles.  As Wilson argues, this 42
‘disparate list of functions may result in less focus exclusively on the defense aspects 
of the tribunals, perhaps the key component to a fair trial’.  This disparity can arguably 43
result in the Registry, by virtue of its mandate, encountering conflicts of interest, 
particularly as its main administrative function is to ensure efficiency.  Most 44
problematically for the Defence, there may be instances where the Registry, when 
allocating resources, will have to choose between Defence needs, and the needs of 
other areas of the Tribunal.  Such budgetary conflicts are not desirable and place the 45
Registry in a difficult position. It is worth noting that the ICTR’s ‘Defence Counsel and 
Detention Management Scheme’ (DCDMS), which was set up in July 1997, provides 
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even less support. Once appointments are made, little other assistance is offered 
relating to the preparation or running of a trial, making its usefulness ‘almost non-
existent’.46
Given the omission of provision for a defence office in the Statute of the 
Tribunal, as well as the minimal support supplied by OLAD and DCDMS, there was a 
distinct lack of defence co-ordination and peer-based support. Wladimiroff explains that 
in 1995, when the Tribunal began issuing charges against individual accused, ‘there 
was no experience whatsoever available, no jurisprudence, no practices, nothing but 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’.  Remarkably, for the first nine years of the 47
Tribunal’s life, defence counsel practiced on an entirely individual basis,  and were not 48
collectively represented until 2002 with the creation of the ‘Association of Defence 
Counsel’ (ADC-ICTY).  This was undoubtedly a ‘slow genesis’.  The formation of 49 50
such an organisation was instigated by ICTY judges, who were concerned with issues 
such as the need to attract counsel of quality, who were accountable to the Tribunal, in 
recognition of the need to become better informed of defence issues.  The Association 51
is not an organ of the Tribunal, but a non-profit organisation established under Dutch 
national law,  although it has been formally recognised as the Tribunal’s defence 52
counsel organisation under Rule 44 of the ICTY’s RPE.53
Prior to the establishment of the ADC-ICTY, there was insufficient regulation 
regarding the quality and conduct of defence counsel, which led to unethical practices 
emerging, perhaps most notably encapsulated by the practice of ‘fee-splitting’. In many 
ways the scandals which emerged marked an ‘inescapable watershed in the ethical 
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and procedural evolution of the tribunals’.  Fee-splitting arrangements involved 54
defence counsel giving a percentage of their fee to the accused, or else providing them 
with other indirect support.  This inappropriate diversion of funds was made possible 55
due to a lack of proper controls and caps in the early stages of the Tribunal’s operation, 
which in turn contributed to its rising costs.  At the time, defence counsel were paid on 56
an hourly basis, without a mechanism of control,  which in turn led to some counsel 57
delaying progress in order to continue receiving payment. Newton argues that this 
scandal had,
‘a visceral power that would in time create a frozen perception of defense 
dysfunction in the minds of many observers and pundits. Fee splitting 
became emblematic of a profligate and out of control international 
bureaucracy seemingly manipulated by a corrupt bar in pursuit of personal 
enrichment while engaged in the facade of justice’.58
Unfortunately, this had damaging repercussions for defence counsel, who were already 
met with circumspection, suspicion and even abhorrence. As with any professional 
misconduct, the unethical and improper conduct of the few can collectively damage the 
reputation of colleagues. The ICTY has since made considerable improvements, 
including switching to a lump-sum system of payment.  Tougher standards and 59
sanctions, together with the implementation of the ‘Code of Professional Conduct for 
Defence Counsel’, have formed a significant ‘milestone’ in dealing with the ethical 
misconduct of counsel.60
In addition to unethical and improper conduct, there was also remarkably little in 
the way of training or support offered to defence counsel. For example, Professor 
 NEWTON, M.A. (2011) at 39754
 ELLIS, M.S. (2003) ‘The Evolution of Defence Counsel Appearing before the International 55
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.’ 37 New England Law Review. 949-973 at 964-5
 DE BERTODANO, S. (2004) ‘What Price the Defence? Resourcing the Defence at the ICTY.’ 56
2 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 503-508 at 504
 NEWTON, M.A. (2011) at 39857
 Ibid.58
 TUINSTRA, J. T. (2009) p3459
 ELLIS, M.S. (2003) at 97360
!112
Wladimiroff - counsel for the ICTY’s first case of Tadić - an experienced and highly 
competent lawyer, lacked experience with skills such as cross-examination by virtue of 
his domestic legal background in Dutch law.  After seeking further training outside of 61
the Tribunal, he nevertheless felt it was necessary to ask Steven Kay QC, to join the 
defence team.  In recent years, the ADC-ICTY has continued to make considerable 62
efforts to redress the lack of training and support. In 2011, the Association produced 
the ‘Manual on International Criminal Defence’, drafted by its members and associates, 
with particular contribution from Colleen Rohan.  It has also produced a 63
comprehensive two hundred and forty page document, which offers practical help and 
advice to those representing an accused at the ICTY, so that the knowledge and 
experience already gained in this field can be disseminated.  It is also hoped that the 64
Manual will be of use to other practitioners, across the various ICL institutions.65
Overall, it is reasonable to argue that the ad hoc Tribunal set an unfortunate 
precedent in terms of the architectural structure of the Defence position, as well as the 
minimal support offered via the Registry. The lack of organisation of defence counsel 
for nearly a decade gave rise to haphazard defence representation, which was 
inherently vulnerable to abuse and unethical behaviour. Although the ICTY has made 
considerable effort to uphold fair trials in many respects, its precedent in this particular 
area is, in many ways, a continuance of the shortcomings of the NIMT. As will be 
examined, other international courts and tribunals similarly have adopted structures in 
which the defence largely falls into a ‘void’.66
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B. The SCSL
The SCSL was the first international criminal court to establish a Defence office, yet it 
was nonetheless not in existence at the time of its inception. Again, the Defence as a 
unit is not mentioned within the Statute of the SCSL. Rule 45 of the ‘Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence’ (RPE) instructed the Registrar to create a Defence Office, 
headed by the Principal Defender. Hence, the Office is not an organ under the Statute 
of the Court, and is now known as the ‘Office of the Principal Defender’ (OPD). As with 
previous international criminal courts, the establishment of the OPD occurred 
comparably ‘late’ in comparison with the other organs of the Court. Skilbeck highlights 
that the Principal Defender was not appointed until April 2004, some four years after 
the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1315,  and a mere week before the 67
opening ceremony of the Court.  The severe financial difficulties that have plagued the 68
SCSL will be explored elsewhere.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting here that the delay 69
in the appointment of a Principal Defender satisfied the budgetary constraints by ‘only 
recruiting the defence at the last possible moment’.70
The aim of creating the Office was to bring together and coordinate the 
Defence, so as to provide ‘a more efficient, effective, and cost-saving system than 
those in place at the ICTR and ICTY.’  Whilst the primary aim of establishing the Office 71
would at first seem to be an attempt to uphold and improve fair trials at the Court, 
Jalloh interestingly argues that the OPD was ‘hurriedly established as a semi-
autonomous unit within the Registry because of a fear of bad publicity on the eve of the 
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Prosecutor's release of his first indictments’.  Although the motivations may have been 72
mixed, the attempt to create such an office should be commended. However, its merits 
and achievements must be critically analysed.
The crucial issue surrounding the OPD at the SCSL concerns the issue of the 
Office’s placement within the Registry, despite the assertion of independent operation. 
Safferling describes it as a ‘quasi-autonomous entity’.  Importantly then, it must be 73
asked, can the Office be sufficiently independent with only a quasi-autonomous status? 
The very fact that the OPD operated from within the Registry made its mandate ‘mixed 
and inherently tense’.  This can be attributed to the different driving forces behind the 74
OPD and the Registry. Particularly, the Registry was ‘fixated’ on keeping costs low.  As 75
Jalloh argues, it was therefore ‘inherently contradictory that the two bodies, with such 
divergent interests and views, were lumped together in the first place’.  76
The OPD’s autonomy, due to its quasi-independent status, created tension. For 
example, had the Registrar, in establishing the OPD, divested itself of part of its power 
and responsibility to create an independent office? In the alternative, could the 
Registrar act concurrently with the Principal Defender, and thus retain some control? 
This issue came before the Appeals Chamber, which affirmed that the latter approach 
was correct, unequivocally stating that the OPD is ‘not an independent organ of the 
Special Court’, which remains ‘under the administrative authority of the Registrar’.  77
Herein lies the heart of the problem regarding the autonomy of the OPD, which could 
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find itself being overruled by the Registrar, who in reality may have divested himself of 
very little real power. 
One particular example, in the trial of Taylor,  supports the notion that the OPD 78
lacks meaningful independence. The trial took place in The Hague for security 
reasons,  far from the seat of the Court in Freetown. The Registrar at the time, 79
Herman von Hebel, refused a request for funding to allow the Principal Defender to 
travel to the Hague and meet with Taylor, arguing that he felt it was ‘not necessary’.  80
Such an attitude is troubling, as there can be little value in creating the OPD if the 
accused is denied access to the Principal Defender. Presiding Judge Sebutinde found 
the situation to be an ‘unhappy’ one, and felt that the request was both reasonable 81
and within Taylor’s rights, adding ‘the Office of the Principal Defender was set up 
precisely for reasons like that.’  Wilson argues that the denial of the single trip 82
‘appeared vindictive and small’.  A directive was immediately issued to ensure that the 83
Principal Defender could travel to The Hague.  Thus, in this instance, it fell to the 84
judiciary to redress the Registrar’s undue restriction. Unfortunately, the Registrar’s 
actions significantly contributed to a seven month delay to the proceedings.  85
Overall, it has been argued that, in reality, the Defence Office ‘lacked the 
necessary autonomy to actually fulfil its immense potential’.  Through its narrow 86
mandate and lack of independence, its ability to secure funding and facilities for 
counsel was limited.  Jalloh argues that the office ‘fell short of what its initial 87
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supporters had envisaged’, and instead the OPD ultimately found itself ‘pitted’ against 
the Registrar in several instances before the Chambers.  However, in spite of these 88
difficulties the Office has made some notable contributions. It was able to offer initial 
advice to defendants, and maintained a list of counsel which it appointed.  ‘The Report 89
on the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, produced by Cassese, found that in some ways 
the office gave an institutional voice to defence teams that was otherwise lacking at the 
ad hoc Tribunals.  Nevertheless, Cassese concluded that for a variety of reasons, ‘the 90
Defence Office has not lived up to these high expectations. Many efforts within this 
Office are devoted to the financial management of the defence teams rather than to 
providing substantive legal support.’  Also recognised were the inherent tensions 91
experienced between the OPD and some teams, which were compounded by 
‘financial, bureaucratic, and resource constraints’.  As opposed to forming the crucial 92
additional pillar in the structure of the court, the Office instead was ‘relegated’ merely to 
an office subordinated within the Registry.  The ‘Berkley War Crimes Studies Center’ 93
Report in 2007 found that, as a result, valuable time was spent by the OPD ‘lobbying 
the Registrar for funds for the defence teams - time that could be better spent ensuring 
that the Defence Office is able to be responsive to the needs of the Defence’.  The 94
report also recommended that independence should be achieved from the Registry, or 
else it is merely paying ‘lip service to the needs of the defence’.95
By contrast, it is also possible that the creation of the Office may have had 
some tangible negative effects on the Defence. Tuinstra argues that, as a result of 
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having limited resource and little independence in the allocation of their budget, the 
Office regrettably ended up restraining defence teams, rather than providing them ‘with 
substantive legal support, logistical resources, administrative assistance, or sufficient 
remuneration’.  As a result, the creation of a defence office which is independent only 96
in theory, rather than practice, could ultimately do more damage than assigning the 
responsibilities to the Registry. The OPD at the Special Court provides valuable 
lessons. The importance of defence independence, from which the Office would have 
benefitted greatly, cannot be underestimated.  Experiencing a significant decrease in 97
budget at its inception, when the cases were increasing in number, greatly affected its 
effectiveness.  Such offices must be able to concentrate on how best to support 98
defence teams, rather than be overburdened by how best to cut costs. As Safferling 
argues, the main lesson to be learned from the OPD is that its success hinges on its 
‘status and mandate’, as he points out that the Office has been rendered ‘a somewhat 
toothless tiger, struggling to find its place within the SCSL’.99
C. The ICC 
The Defence does not constitute a ‘pillar’ within the architecture of the ICC.  The 100
Rome Statute is completely silent concerning the standing, role or duties of the 
Defence. Considering its important role in ensuring due process, the absence is 
striking. It can be strongly argued that the omission at least creates the impression that 
the Defence is regarded neither as a primary concern, nor as an integral part of a fair 
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trial.  As a result, Groulx has argued that there is a prosecutorial bias inherent in the 101
Rome Statute, and an ‘institutional imbalance between the Prosecution and the 
Defence’.  Buchet asserts that this is a ‘regretful omission’, and that when discussing 102
the Defence at the ICC, this acknowledgement must not be forgotten.  103
The Rome Statute entered into force in 2002, but it was not until 2004 - upon 
the adoption of the ICC’s Regulations - that the Court finally began to recognise the 
Defence as an entity.  This was achieved through the creation of the ‘Office of Public 104
Counsel for the Defence’ (OPCD). Described as a ‘semi-independent’ office, it falls 
structurally within the Registry,  according to Regulation 77 of the ICC, ‘solely for 105
administrative purposes and otherwise shall function as a wholly independent office’.  106
In due course, the veracity of this claim concerning defence independence will be 
examined. Rule 20 of the ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (RPE) lays out the 
responsibilities of the Registrar to the Defence, in that the Registry must be organised 
‘in a manner that promotes the rights of the defence, consistent with the principle of fair 
trial as defined in the Statute’.  It should be acknowledged that the development of 107
the RPE meant that the Defence was no longer an invisible ‘silent partner’, completely 
lacking in status.  However, these implementations were belated and, it will be 108
argued, cannot fully compensate for the lack of formal structure within the Court’s 
framework. 
The Registry has been endowed with a significant responsibility concerning its 
support of the Defence, yet it must also strive to permit its independent functioning. 
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This role will likely prove difficult to exercise effectively, in addition to the myriad of 
other responsibilities it must balance and prioritise. As Tuinstra notes, the central 
problem with burdening the Registry with so many diverse responsibilities is that there 
is a real possibility that defence issues may be overlooked or undervalued.  109
Furthermore, Registry staff are not required to be legally trained, and so may, quite 
reasonably, be lacking in due appreciation of fair trial requirements and key principles 
such as EoA, as well as the overall need to properly equip the Defence.110
It is questionable whether the Registry should have been burdened with 
obligations towards the Defence, since conceptually it should be providing services in a 
neutral manner for all parties.  Despite the creation of the OPCD, the Registry 111
nevertheless has an important role to play through the support and management of 
various issues, such as the legal aid programme.  Thus, the attitudes held by the 112
Registrar and his/her wider staff have the potential to impact upon defence 
independence, as well as the support it receives. The concern expressed here is that 
there is a great deal of reliance on the discretion of those employed in the role. A 
Registrar who sympathises and understands the difficulties faced by the Defence has 
the potential to improve conditions, whereas an individual who fails to do so could as a 
result inadequately support the Defence. Such observations are likewise applicable to 
the competency of the Principal Defender. The success of the OPCD therefore will be 
dependent upon the individuals who function at their head.  Defence counsel will rely 113
on such personnel, and Tuinstra argues that successful cooperation will be dependent 
on their personalities.  Bestowing too much power over defence issues to any given 114
individual could risk an abuse of power, or arbitrary decision making.115
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In order to appreciate the role and functioning of the OPCD, it is first crucial to 
explore and understand how key discussions and working groups of the ICC came to 
omit the Defence from the Statute, and subsequently create the OPCD in an ex post 
facto manner. It must be accepted that the ICC, which was unprecedented in its scale 
and ambition, was created within a very narrow timescale. The key discussions which 
will be examined are related to the Rome Diplomatic Conference, which took place in 
1998, and the subsequent Preparatory Committee (‘Prep Comm’) in 1999. It appears 
that the legal profession, in particular the Defence, was not involved in an ‘organized 
and continuous manner’ during the early stages of ICC.  116
The early discussions concerning the creation of the Court largely failed to 
substantively discuss the role of criminal defence lawyers, a topic which too frequently 
fails to draw attention.  When dealing with the ‘worst’ crimes, other issues such as the 117
fight to end impunity and the recognition of victims, were given priority over 
consideration of the position of the defendant. In fact, the basic rights of the accused 
were included very late in the process. As Gallant explains, until the ‘Zutphen’ draft of 
the Rome Statute prior to the 1998 Conference, there was ‘no general requirement that 
the Court apply internationally recognised human rights as part of its law’; protections 
for the accused were added only in the last months of negotiations.118
i. The 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of the ICC
The unfortunate omission of the Defence from the discussions can be seen throughout 
the various stages of the ICC’s development, including the crucial stage of the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference. Unfortunately, as neither minutes nor detailed reports are 
 Likewise, at the ad hocs, see GROULX, E. (2010a) at 23-4116
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 The 1998 ‘Zutphen’ (inter-sessional) draft attempted to consolidate the various proposals into 118
a more coherent draft, used as the basis for much of the discussion at the Rome Conference. 
See, GALLANT K.S. (2003) at 319
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readily available of the discussions,  the main source as to their content must be 119
drawn from the delegates who were present. Strijards attended, representing the 
Netherlands, and gives an account of how the discussions were formatted and 
influenced.  He recalls that for ‘reasons of expediency’ two groups were created: the 120
‘red room’ which was mainly constituted of diplomats and experts in military law, and 
the ‘green room’ which consisted of ‘legal experts experienced in international criminal 
law’.  In Strijards opinion, the lack of communication between the two rooms resulted 121
in the ‘total absence of ‘the defence’ as a functional organ of the ICC’.  122
The ‘green room’ focused its attention on the more ‘inflammatory’ issues, such 
as the abolition of the death penalty and the rights of victims.  Whilst Strijards notes 123
the importance of such issues, the discussion time allocated to them was 
disproportionately large.  Some attention, however, was given to the accused and his 124
entitlement to legal assistance.  In contrast, the ‘red room’ also considered defence 125
issues, but in a manner which was more ‘accidental’,  and in connection with 126
‘organisational matters’ and the establishment of the Registry.  Ultimately they took 127
the position that, for financial reasons, there was no need to define the Defence at the 
statutory level.  As a result of the two groups failing to meet and discuss such issues 128
jointly, defence issues once again fell by the wayside. Furthermore, the Rome 
sessions, being political in nature, were strongly influenced by NGOs relating to 
‘prosecutorial and victim-related issues’.  As Strijards observed, ‘the politicians 129
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seemed to adhere to the virulent tendency of considering the attorneys for the defence 
as a kind of co-accused, implicitly sympathizing with the defendant who committed the 
alleged abominable crimes’.  Such an atmosphere was surely less than conducive to 130
encouraging a balanced discussion, which included defence issues. 
The Conference took place from the 15th June to the 17th July 1998; a mere 
five working weeks. Considering the diverse and expansive nature of issues that 
needed to be discussed and reworked, this narrow and restrictive deadline was 
arguably vastly inappropriate. It is apparent that the shortness of the time period arose 
from the agreement between the UN and the Italian Government, largely based on cost 
restrictions, which also impacted on the number of UN personnel available at the 
Conference.  Walker argues that the process was ‘extremely improper’ for a complex 131
international statute.   Unavoidably, certain crucial issues and elements were at risk 132
of being overlooked. The omission of the role of the Defence is of significant 
importance, particularly as the Rome Statute is now largely fixed with a considerable 
degree of permanency.133
The demographic of the delegates who attended, from vastly varied legal 
systems, inevitably affected the quality of the discussions held. Bassiouni observed 
that many delegates ‘lacked expertise in international criminal law, comparative 
criminal law, or comparative criminal procedure’, and that most failed to have any 
‘criminal practice experience of any kind’.  Additionally, he notes, most of the 134
attendees who constituted the working groups, changed daily.  This was coupled with 135
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the fact that the number of attendees also shrank dramatically from around five 
thousand, to two thousand.  Bassiouni concludes that certain difficulties could have 136
been circumvented if the delegations had been constituted of more individuals with 
relevant expertise, and by permitting more time for the drafting of the Statute.137
The ICDAA, an INGO created in 1997, which focuses on fair trial rights, 
participated in the discussion.  Concerned with the status of the Defence, it submitted 138
a position paper at the Conference,  proposing the creation of an independent 139
defence office.  This was rejected, and no provision for the Defence was made.  140 141
Groulx who made the proposal, and who is now the president of the ICDAA, was told 
that it was ‘too late in the game for its addition’, and that she should ‘come back when 
the rules would be negotiated’.  The avoidance of this issue can perhaps be 142
explained best by the environment in which the proposal was made. Groulx recounts 
that the discussion of defence issues was notably unwelcome amidst NGOs arguing for 
victim rights, and that the ‘whole experience was far from easy’; her intervention was 
seen as ‘disruptive, because the unpopular issue of legal defence was what everybody 
wanted forgotten’.  Groulx’s experience is a clear example of Defence ‘otherisation’ in 143
practice. The attitude that Defence issues should not be discussed at this juncture can 
be said to have attributed to the ultimate structural imbalance between the parties.
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 For more info on the ICDAA, see: http://www.aiad-icdaa.org [Last accessed 12.01.2014]138
 ICDAA ‘Proposal for the Establishment of an Independent Office of the Defence’ (21 June 139
1998)
 PLACHTA, M. (2000) ‘Concerns about the Independence of Defense Counsel before the 140
(Permanent) International Criminal Court.’ 16(1) International Enforcement Law Reporter. 576 et 
seq. at 576-7
 GROULX, E. (2001) at 24141
 Ibid. at 59-60142
 Ibid. 143
!124
ii. The Preparatory Commission for the ICC (‘Prep Comm’)
The ‘Prep Comm’ was given the task of devising the RPE of the Court, as well as the 
Elements of Crimes, which took place across several sessions. It was at this stage that 
more extensive discussion took place regarding the functioning of the Defence, 
arguably as it could no longer be avoided. At the first session in February 1999, France 
put forward a working paper on the composition of the Court, which proposed an 
‘Office of the Defence to the International Criminal Court’.  Several months later, in 144
August, in what Strijards describes as a ‘tumultuous Friday morning session’  the 145
Netherlands was first to put forward a proposal concerning the establishment of a 
Defence office.  Later that same day, it was replaced by a joint proposal with Canada, 146
France, Germany and the Netherlands.  Plachta notes that the new proposal 147
contained ‘less categorical’ language regarding the creation of a Defence office, 
compared with the ICDAA proposal.  The proposal was discussed in the working 148
group, and according to Strijards, was met with a lot of opposition.  The delegations 149
were asked to revise their proposal so that it might be discussed informally at the next 
Prep Comm session.  The revised version was not discussed in the August session, 150
as there was insufficient time.  In the December session, the proposal was met with 151
‘vehement opposition’ from a ‘truly global’ mix of delegates.152
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Some of the delegates took issue with the creation of a Defence office on the 
basis that the Rome Statute does not permit the creation of new institutions within the 
Court’s framework.  Article 43(6) of the Statute states that the Registrar was 153
specifically mandated to set up the ‘Victims and Witnesses Unit’ within the Registry. 
Thus, it was argued, the Registrar was prohibited from setting up other entities.  154
However, not all delegates agreed, and instead felt that Registry would have the 
inherent power to create different units if they were required in order to improve the 
functioning of the Court.  Whilst the creation of the office may have been expressed 155
in such terms, it is possible that behind the robust resistance lay the fear that a ‘strong, 
independent defense unit would present a real threat to the prosecutor's office 
obtaining convictions’.  Groulx is not satisfied with the resulting language used in 156
relation to the responsibilities of the Registrar, and the professional independence of 
defence counsel.  Frustratingly, although some academics tried to highlight the 157
danger associated with failing to recognise the Defence, their warnings were evidently 
not heeded.158
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iii. The ‘Office of Public Counsel for the Defence’ (OPCD)
Despite earlier misgivings about the potential for the Registry to create the OPCD, it 
was established in 2004.  However, the Office took several more years to become 159
properly operational. It first functioned under an Associate Counsel, Melinda Taylor, 
before the appointment of the first ‘Principal Counsel’, Xavier-Jean Keïta, in 2007.160
The creation of the Office was a welcome step in the right direction, yet it lacks 
the status afforded to the other organs of the Court. Therefore, unless the Office is 
properly supported by the Court, both financially and logistically, it remains to be seen 
whether it will be able to provide meaningful support to the Defence, thereby fulfilling its 
mandate.  ICC Judge Adrian Fulford, who claims that the OPCD was principally his 161
idea back in 2003, seems somewhat disappointed with the Office.  His hope was that 162
it would reduce the legal aid bill and provide an effective legal resource for the 
accused.  Judge Fulford expressed concern as to whether it is providing sufficient 163
assistance so as to ‘justify the considerable costs that are involved’.  These concerns 164
appear to be rooted in financial considerations, rather than consideration for the 
Office’s effectiveness.  As Newton powerfully argues, the creation of the OPCD 165
should certainly not be regarded as a ‘panacea’ to the plight of the Defence. Newton 
reasons, 
‘the culture of the ICC has in some ways reverted to the Nuremberg era as 
the Defence offices are located in a separate building on Saturnestraat, 
away from the main Arc building that houses the majority of the Court and, 
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more significantly, the courtrooms. This has literally led to situations of 
Defence teams running through the snow back to the Defence office during 
court breaks in order to use photocopiers (to which they have no access in 
the Arc building) or access their files.’166
Thus, it can be argued that the OPCD is far from a ‘fix-all’ remedy for the institutionally 
disadvantaged Defence.
D. The architecture of the modern institutions; some brief conclusions
The modern institutions which have been examined here share the same architectural 
defect. Additionally, they all share a delay in organising and advancing the Defence in 
relation to the rest of the institution. Crucially, the creation and development of the 
Chambers, Prosecution and Registry have taken priority over the Defence.  Skilbeck 167
argues that, at the ICC, the Prosecution has been able to build its capacity in a manner 
which will ‘take many years for the Defence to equal’.  The OTP has managed to 168
establish itself remarkably effectively, with a number of different sections set up to deal 
exclusively with investigations, public relations and media, with a division specifically 
for appeals, to name just a few.  Additionally, the OTP is ‘selling itself to the world’, 169
making connections with academic institutions, and consulting with legal experts 
around the globe.  Skilbeck asks: ‘This is all extremely admirable and laudable stuff, 170
but when do the defence get to do the same?’.  Fedorova argues that due to the lack 171
of support during the initial stages of many of the modern institutions, the Defence has 
‘struggled to improve its secondary position’.  Overall, it can be argued that it is of 172
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paramount importance that the Defence be included ab initio in the conceptual 
structural organisation of a court. Skilbeck asserts that preferably this should be on an 
equal basis to the Prosecution, ‘in terms of legal capacity, administrative support, 
investigations, public relations, media coverage and outreach’, as otherwise ‘there 
cannot be a fair trial’.173
There were a number of options available to the creators of the ICC as to how 
best to conceive of the defence function. The most direct means would have been to 
make the Defence its own pillar within the architecture, just as the STL chose to do.  174
An alternative would have been to set up or employ an external independent body, 
outside the framework of the Court, such as a bar association.  Instead, many of the 175
institutions have taken the similar route of placing the Defence unit within the 
organisational structure of the Registry. 
3. Phases of Defence representation at the ICC: ‘Ad-hoc’ 
counsel during the ‘Situation’ phase: an ill-considered 
attempt at protecting defence rights?
Despite the ICC’s efforts to protect the rights of the accused via its Statutory provisions, 
it has encountered unparalleled, and therefore arguably unforeseeable, problems by 
virtue of its unique composition. In terms of the appointment of defence counsel, the 
ICC has a highly complex system, due the different ‘phases’ of trial. The ‘Situation’ 
phase at the beginning of proceedings at the ICC, which is unique to the Court, poses 
distinct difficulties concerning the provision of fair trial rights. At this phase, broad 
investigations are carried out in order to establish whether there are sufficient grounds 
to trigger a confirmation hearing, which can lead to the issuing of warrants of arrest, or 
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summons to appear.  During this phase there are no discernible accused.  The 176 177
ICC’s unique jurisdiction over vast and complex Situations necessitates the use of 
counsel to represent the broader interest of the Defence via ad-hoc counsel.  The 178
Rome Statute, together with the Regulations, provides that the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
particular may appoint counsel if the interests of justice so require.  This 179
‘revolutionary new framework’ has necessitated a ‘new’ type of defence representation: 
‘ad-hoc’ counsel, conceptualised so as to promote the overall fairness of 
proceedings.  Safferling noted the ‘genuine interest’ for the Defence, so that the 180
Situation phase could be conducted ‘in accordance with the ‘rule of law’’.  However, it 181
can be argued that despite these good intentions, how the role of ad-hoc counsel 
would work in practice was not properly considered. This becomes evident when 
examining the accused’s transition between the trial phases.
Once charges have been brought, the defendant will require ‘traditional’ counsel 
during the ‘Case’ stage. Whether the Court appoints counsel, or the defendant chooses 
from the approved list, the OPCD will assist in the process.  The Office is designed to 182
provide guidance and support, yet due to problems of underfunding it is arguably ‘no 
match for the robust OTP’.  As a result of the different phases at the ICC, and the 183
necessary transitioning between them, several issues require greater examination. In 
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particular, is the level and kind of defence representation provided at each phase 
sufficient to protect the rights of any (future or actual) accused? In addition, is there a 
smooth transition between these phases, so as to allow cases to progress whilst duly 
respecting defence rights? 
Ad-hoc counsel can be required to deal with a wide range of issues, such as 
forming responses to forensic examinations and victim’s application to participate in the 
proceedings; making submissions of observations on briefs by amicus curiae; 
producing submissions regarding the admissibility of evidence.  Certain tasks will be 184
of particular difficultly due to the absence of an identifiable accused, such as the 
examination of witnesses.  Safferling argues that, without knowing their identity, this 185
can be ‘a rather hypothetical enterprise’, as it will ‘not be possible to formulate concrete 
questions and test the reliability of the witness in a thorough way’.  Thus, the mere 186
provision of ad-hoc counsel in this instance cannot guarantee fairness, and ‘one should 
not take the bait and believe all the problems concerning the accused’s rights have 
thus been solved’.187
Despite the statutory and regulatory provisions for ad-hoc counsel, the 
parameters of the role are frustratingly vague, which in practice has created uncertainty 
as to their function and responsibilities.  Dieckmann and Kerll argue that this is a 188
result of both the ‘rudimentary nature of the provisions’, as well as the lack of 
precedent relating to their role from other international courts and tribunals.  As a 189
result, ad-hoc counsel began their operation in a rather vulnerable state, with the 
Chambers left to interpret their function, and provide or withhold support. 
Disappointingly, the Pre-Trial Chambers have been ‘quick to restrict the procedural 
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standing’ of ad-hoc counsel.  This can be observed in relation to various problems 190
faced by counsel by virtue of their transient role. One such issue arose regarding 
whether subsequent ad-hoc counsel could receive documents disclosed to them by 
their ‘predecessors’.  This question arose in the DRC Situation in 2007, in which the 191
Pre-Trial Chamber held that the decision whether to disclose confidential information 
regarding victims and witness was solely its own, and as a result the OPCD should 
‘abstain from directly contacting the former ad hoc Counsel for the defence’.  Whilst 192
such information is of course of a sensitive nature, the refusal to allow communication 
appears obstructive to the proper functioning of a continuous, and thereby effective, 
defence effort. It is argued here that as ad-hoc counsel will have met the requirements 
of the Court, they should consequently receive the same degree of trust shown to all 
employees in the handling of sensitive information. Katzman argues that the decision 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber demonstrates that ‘they viewed the OPCD and ad hoc 
defense counsel as separate entities with different functions’, yet there was no attempt 
made to clarify their respective roles.  This led the OPCD to request clarification as to 193
the mandates of the different roles.  Regrettably, the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected this 194
request, with Single Judge Steiner stating that the statements made were clear and did 
not require further clarification when read in the context of the Chamber’s other 
decisions.  195
The reluctance of the Chamber to provide clarification for this matter is 
questionable considering the continuing ambiguity surrounding the role of ad-hoc 
counsel. During admissibility proceedings in the Kony et al. case in 2009, the Appeals 
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Chamber stated that a client and counsel relationship does not exist for ad-hoc 
counsel, as they do ‘not act for or as agent of the suspects’, but instead are appointed 
to ‘represent their interests generally in proceedings’, so that ‘such counsel cannot 
speak on their behalf’.  The Chamber went on to specify that the mandate of ad-hoc 196
counsel is limited to the somewhat general safeguarding of suspects’ interests and, as 
a result, the Code of Conduct which applies to OPCD counsel does not apply to ad-
hocs.  The Code itself does not specify whether it applies to ad-hoc counsel. In 197
contrast, OPCD counsel do not share the same insecurity as to their status due to an 
explicit Regulation on the matter.  Diekmann and Kerll consequently argue that the 198
Pre-Trial Chamber appears to have been at pains to restrict the mandate of ad-hoc 
counsel.  Due to the lack of specificity across the different texts of the Court, it is 199
arguable that such an approach was not inexorable, and greater support of the role 
could have been provided, had the Chamber so desired. 
Overall, the scope of ad-hoc counsels’ mandate is regrettably narrow. Despite 
the provision and rationale behind the innovation of such counsel, the representation 
provided may be limited to the paper rights afforded to the accused during the Situation 
phase of proceedings. Karnavas feels that the model is ‘off to a disappointing start’ as 
the Court’s approach is seemingly contradictory: ‘the defence lawyer is appointed to 
represent the general interests of the accused, yet when he attempts to fulfil his duty, 
he is told that he has no standing’.  A clear example of such an instance occurred 200
more recently in 2010 in the case of Al Bashir, which arose as a consequence of an 
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article written in the Guardian newspaper by the then Prosecutor, Ocampo.  Al 201
Bashir’s acting ad-hoc counsel filed a request before the Court that the Prosecutor’s 
statements in the article be condemned, and appropriate action be taken.  The Pre-202
Trial Chamber elected to take no action, not in reflection of the seriousness and validity 
of the issue, but based on the status of the accused’s ad-hoc counsel before the Court. 
It held that the request fell ‘outside the scope and purpose of the mandate vested with 
Ms. St-Laurent’, and was ‘therefore inadmissible’, preventing the Judge from 
addressing its merits.  Such an approach resulted in a use of the mandate of ad-hoc 203
counsel to avoid dealing with what was arguably a very serious error of judgement on 
the part of the Prosecutor. 
It can reasonably be asserted that ad-hoc counsel are limited to such an extent 
that they are prevented from having a meaningful standing before the Court. The lack 
of clarity surrounding the scope of their role can be seen to have negatively impacted 
on Lubanga, which led to the case suffering significant delays by virtue of stays in the 
proceedings.  These events demonstrate that the restrictions on their role ‘potentially 204
undermine the well-intentioned efforts to foster equality of arms throughout 
proceedings’.  The restrictions limiting counsels’ mandate to issues only specifically 205
mentioned in the Statute meant that counsel was prevented from raising issues relating 
to the misuse of confidentiality agreements during the Situation phase of 
proceedings.  As Katzman explains, between 2004 and 2006, the representation for 206
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the Defence in Lubanga was provided solely by ad-hoc counsel  - a substantial 207
period of time considering the strict limitations placed on their mandate. Dieckmann 
and Kerll argue that these proceedings illustrate that the current system can negatively 
impact upon the fairness of proceedings.  The shortcomings relating to ad-hoc 208
counsel were compounded by the Prosecution’s late disclosure of material, which 
resulted in defence counsel later being unable to challenge it during the ‘Case’ 
phase.  The extensive difficulties experienced in the Lubanga trial reveals a 209
‘disjointed’ ICC defence system, particularly at the initial stages of the proceedings.210
Overall, whilst the provision for ad-hoc counsel can be seen as a vital 
component of ensuring fair trial rights are upheld during the initial stages of 
proceedings, there is ‘no guarantee that ad hoc counsel actually promote equality of 
arms through adequately and effectively serving the general interests of the 
defence’.  Katzman warns that the system during the Situation phase ‘has led to, and 211
possibly will continue to lead to, large gaps in the fair trial rights of the accused’,  thus 212
creating a serious cause for concern. This appears to be largely a result of the refusal 
of Chambers to clarify the role, and should serve as a reminder of the importance of 
giving practical effect to the ‘paper’ rights provided to the Defence.  In the Kony et al. 213
case, three separate ad-hoc counsel have been involved, all in different proceedings, 
none of whom have had any communication with each other, or the suspects.  It is 214
not unusual for different counsel to be used for different issues, which can be 
problematic if they later choose to utilise alternative, or even conflicting, strategies.  215
Furthermore, as Dieckmann and Kerll poignantly observe, there are ongoing 
 Ibid. at 78-9207
 DIECKMANN, J. & KERLL, C. (2011) at 136208
 KATZMAN, R. (2009) at 85209
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ramifications for the defence team representing the accused at trial, who must build 
their case ab initio due to the lack of procedure regarding the transfer of material from 
ad-hoc counsel.  This disjointed mechanism risks undermining the creation of a 216
coherent and robust defence strategy across the entirety of the proceedings.  Thus, it 217
can be asserted that the system is lacking in continuity, both between ad-hoc counsel, 
as well as during the transition from ‘Situation’ to ‘Case’ phases. 
4. Conclusion
The analysis of the institutions’ architecture has revealed an inherent level of inequality 
concerning the relative position of the Defence.  This includes the consistent 218
omission of the provision for a separate Defence office across the three institutions 
examined here, which contributes significantly to the hypoplasia of the Defence 
concerning its eventual establishment, institutional position, and organisation.  219
It has been argued that the architecture adopted at the institutions creates a 
systemic imbalance between the Defence and Prosecution.  As a result, it can be 220
said that the parties are operating in systems which, by their nature, pose a severe 
threat to the principle of EoA. Safferling argues that a Defence office must be 
established by Statute ‘as an independent organ of the tribunal, and its role and 
function must be clearly defined’, so that it may operate independently in an effective 
manner.  Despite the particular failure of the ICC (given its permanent nature) to 221
include a separate Defence office, any future international criminal court or tribunal 
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should undoubtedly provide the Defence with its deserving ‘foundational’, yet 
independent, status.
The use of ad-hoc counsel has revealed itself to be another area of particular 
concern, due to the vague parameters of the role which have, in practice, been 
considerably restricted by a judiciary unwilling to provide clarification.  The function of 222
ad-hoc counsel appears to have been so restricted, (as demonstrated in cases such as 
Lubanga, Al-Bashir and Kony) that they are denied from making a meaningful 
contribution to an accused’s ongoing case. Ultimately, the transition of defence 
representation, from the very initial investigations onwards, reveals a worryingly 
disjointed system, which ‘has created a gap in the advocacy and fair process rights of 
the accused’.  The role of ad-hoc counsel is yet another manifestation of the lack of 223
consideration given to defence issues. The ICC’s unique use of trial phases 
necessitated extensive reflection by its architects so as to avoid dangerous gaps in the 
‘chain’ of defence representation. This does not appear to have occurred in a 
meaningful, practical manner, serving as yet another example of measures relating to 
the Defence having been adopted hastily in an attempt to compensate for a lack of 
due consideration. 
Part II of this thesis has examined the formative influence of the NIMT (Chapter 
4), as well as the structural design of the modern institutions (Chapter 5), in order to 
highlight the extent of the ‘institutional otherisation’ of the Defence in ICL. The issues 
raised in these Chapters, when considered collectively, suggest a clear and systemic 
hypoplasia of the Defence at the modern institutions, as a result of routine 
marginalization, and even exclusion. 
It is worth reiterating that hypoplasia is a congenital restriction, rather than a 
hereditary trait. Thus, despite the trend towards hypoplasia, it remains theoretically 
 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ‘Decision’ (3 October 2007) supra p4222
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possible for any future court or tribunal to provide a meaningful EoA through the 
provision of a strong and independent Defence. However, the courts and tribunals 
which have failed to provide a foundational Defence organ will necessarily struggle to 
provide a tangible EoA given the ramifications of the ‘institutional otherisation’.
Part III of this thesis will now examine whether the modern institutions protect 
the interests of the accused in practice, despite the regrettable deficiencies in the 
structural position of the Defence. 
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Part III.
Fairness and Equality 
of Arms in Practice  
Chapter 6. 
Equality of Arms and Resources
‘If the Tribunal is not given sufficient time and money [..] 
by the international community, then it should not attempt to try those 
persons in a way which does not accord with those rights.’1
1. Introduction
Part III of this thesis (Chapters 6, 7 & 8) will examine the extent to which fair trial 
provisions, including those embodied by the principle of Equality of Arms (EoA), are 
transformed into practical protections, beyond the ‘paper rights’ and guarantees 
afforded to the accused in ICL. The collective issues raised in this final Part will provide 
considerable grounds to assert that there is a lack of both institutional and procedural 
EoA at the modern institutions. The specific implications for the defendant, and his 
defence team, in practice will be considered throughout the coming Chapters.
This Chapter will examine the ways in which the ‘modern institutions’ can be 
said to be struggling with the practical application of the principle of EoA in relation to 
financing and resources. A ‘meaningful interpretation’ of EoA necessitates an in-depth 
examination of the internal functioning of the courts and tribunals.  Tuinstra argues that 2
‘where resources are concerned, the defence is generally worse off than the 
prosecution in all legal systems’.  The creation and operation of international criminal 3
courts and tribunals is undoubtedly incredibly costly. The sources and extent of funding 
at the modern institutions are distinctly different; each will be examined in turn in order 
to appreciate their unique circumstances and challenges. In particular, any disparity 
 Prosecutor v Slobodan Milošević, ‘Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of 1
Evidence in Chief in the form of written statement.’ (21 October 2003) Case No.Case: IT-02-54-
AR73.4 para 21
 FEDOROVA, M. (2012) ‘The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal 2
Proceedings.’ Netherlands, Intersentia. p141
 TUINSTRA, J.T. (2009) ‘Defence Counsel in International Criminal Law.’ The Hague, TMC 3
Asser Press. p163
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between the parties is of particular importance regarding EoA. The difficulties 
associated with assessing the extent of any inequality must first be recognised, 
particularly in light of their different roles in the trial process. Assessing any disparity 
necessitates defining the parameters of ‘adequate time and facilities’ to prepare a 
defence which, in the abstract, is ‘virtually impossible’.  4
This Chapter will also touch on the importance of time as an essential 
component of the resources required by the Defence to prepare its case. The 
difficulties which arise when balancing the need for trial expediency with defence 
rights, (such as to be tried without undue delay) will also be examined, including the 
effect of ‘completion strategies’. Ultimately, the issues explored in this Chapter will 
suggest that the Defence is routinely under-funded, and under-resourced.
2. The comparative nature of EoA: the difficulty of 
analysing any disparity
As discussed in Chapter 2, the principle of EoA has a comparative element, and thus 
necessitates an examination of any disparity in resources. Mégret argues that in the 
context of ICJ, ‘penniless defendants with one or two lawyers are pitted against the 
comparatively very substantial resources of an international prosecuting machinery’, 
which gives a ‘formidable boost’ to the critique that in practice equality is ‘vitiated by 
considerable differences in resources’.  This is in many ways as a direct result of the 5
extensive and powerful nature of the opposition faced by the Defence. At the ICC in 
particular, the accused is opposed by an ‘international system’, including the combined 
‘resources, authority and normative structures’ of those States.  Nevertheless, as the 6
 FEDOROVA, M. (2012) p554
 MÉGRET, F. (2009) ‘Beyond “Fairness”: Understanding the Determinants of International 5
Criminal Procedure.’ 14 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs. 37-76 at 62-3
 COCKAYNE, J. (2005) ‘The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals.’ 28 6
Fordham International Law Journal. 616-680 at 670
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Prosecution has the primary responsibility for investigating Situations in order to build a 
case, for which it carries the burden of proof, it follows that it should receive a 
proportionate share of the funding.  Given the finite resources at a court’s disposal, this 7
necessitates a difficult balancing process. As Ellis argues, the ‘budgetary constraints 
associated with internationally supported tribunals often run counter to international 
rights accorded to defendants’.8
Analysing the allocation of funding within an institution has inherent difficulties, 
and there is a tendency in particular to compare the resources of the Prosecution with 
those of the Defence. While this represents an important element of EoA, it is both 
difficult and perhaps anomalous to approach the issue exclusively from this 
standpoint.  This is because the two entities have different roles and responsibilities, 9
and so discussing their ‘equality’ in the sense of similar treatment is problematic. The 
fact that the Prosecution bears the burden of proof at the ICC is often put forward as an 
argument justifying its superior resources. Karnavas argues that it is ‘farcical to 
suggest that a showing of the prosecution’s failure to meet its burden of proof will 
materialise without a robust challenge to the prosecution evidence, or the presentation 
of defence evidence proving the contrary’.  As a result, he argues that it may be 10
helpful for the Registry ‘to compare the respective resources available’ in a particular 
case.  Difficulties with the comparison also arise depending on which stage a 11
particular case has reached; Defence costs ‘skyrocket’ once the trial begins.  Instead, 12
it is perhaps more fruitful to talk of equitable treatment, in the sense that fairness 
 TUINSTRA, J.T. (2009) p1637
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should guide what each office receives in terms of funding and resources. However, 
such an analysis becomes much more subjective, and less tangible, in nature.
In light of its well equipped adversary, adequate resources are of paramount 
importance to defence teams, particularly as many accused are deemed ‘indigent’ 
under the legal aid systems which have been put in place as a result of the extensive 
costs associated with international criminal trials.  Rather than being ‘a question of 13
mathematics’, May and Wierda argue that EoA cannot be ‘reduced to an exact 
equation’ in terms of equality of resources.  14
The primary recognition must be that, in respect of resources, the Defence is 
generally in a weaker position compared with the Prosecution not just at the 
international level, but in ‘all legal systems’.  The ‘manifest inequality that generally 15
exists’  between the two must be acknowledged, along with the recognition that to 16
some extent it should be compensated.  Such compensation should, however, be 17
proportionate, taking account of the parties’ different roles.  Crucially, neither side 18
should be placed at a disadvantage in relation to the other. For the Defence, this 
means that the difference should not be ‘so disproportionate as to infringe upon the 
fundamental rights of the accused to present his or her case under the same conditions 
as the prosecution’.  However, many defence teams at international courts and 19
tribunals will often experience ‘major difficulties’ in securing suitable facilities, 
investigators and indeed their own remuneration.20
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3. The difficulties with funding faced by the Defence at 
the ICTY, SCSL & ICC
The three institutions will be examined in order to appreciate the different problems 
experienced by defence teams with respect to funding. Three broad issues are 
deserving of consideration. These include the operational costs of the Defence, the 
various sources of funding,  and the facilities provided. The latter is of particular 21
interest, as the location and quality of the space allocated to the Defence can create 
and reinforce ‘the perception of a psychological, almost cultural, divide’ between the 
Defence and the rest of the principal organs of the court.  This perception is amplified 22
by the Prosecution being firmly and ‘comfortably’ housed in most of the available space 
within the court buildings, as is the case at the ICTY and ICC.23
A. The ICTY
The cost of the ICTY has ‘spiralled’,  perhaps due in part to the lack of any precedent 24
for this kind of institution that could have provided its contributors with an approximate 
expectation of expense. The phrase ‘never again’, once used as a powerful 
denunciation of impunity, was transformed in its meaning to reflect a growing 
dissatisfaction with the cost of such a Tribunal.  Since it is supported by the UN, the 25
ICTY benefits from regular financial contributions,  allowing it to budget in advance 26
 For example, many international courts are dependent on organisations and other 21
contributions to operate. See: COGAN, J.K. (2002) ‘International Criminal Courts and Fair 
Trials: Difficulties and Prospects.’ 27(1) Yale Journal of International Law. 111-140 at 132
 METTRAUX, G. & CENGIC, A. ‘The Role of a Defence Office - Some Lessons from Recent 22
and not so Recent War Crimes Precedents.’ in BOHLANDER, M. (2007) supra p426
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with financial security. As the Tribunal draws closer to the completion of its mandate, 
clear emphasis has been placed on the scaling back of costs.  27
In terms of internal allocation of funding, academics have noted the disparities 
between the OTP and Defence. Bertodano pointed out that for 2004-5, the Defence 
budget stood at $29,500,000 - less than one third of the cost of the Prosecution, whose 
budget was estimated at nearly $100,000,000.  As McGonigle has emphasised, initial 28
justifications for this disparity were based on the argument that the Prosecution bore 
the burden of proof, as well as the cost of investigations. However, the latter does not 
stand up to scrutiny considering that investigations had formally ended by that time.  29
The projected resources for the Tribunal in 2014-5 are estimated to be $191,335,700 
(gross).  Regrettably, the breakdown of figures does not detail how the Registry’s 30
budget is allocated, making it impossible to know precisely what the Defence has been 
assigned. Such omissions, whether deliberate or accidental, contribute to a lack of 
much needed transparency. 
The Statute of the ICTY sets out a clear intention to provide adequate facilities 
for the Defence and Article 21(4), in particular, states that the accused shall be entitled 
to ‘adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence’.  Karnavas argues 31
forcefully that this ‘principle has, in practice, been reduced to a melodious yet vacuous 
slogan, a consoling though ineffectual mantra’.  Some of the problems faced by the 32
 The budget for 2014-5 represents a 34.0 per cent drop compared with the 2012-2013 27
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accused relating to financing and resources must therefore be examined in order to 
better understand Karnavas’ position. 
First, it is worth recounting (as discussed in Chapter 5) that from the outset, the 
ICTY failed to include even basic provisions for defence counsel. However, over the 
course of its operation, the ICTY has improved its organisation considerably. In 
particular, the Prosecution at the ICTY is well resourced, particularly in terms of 
personnel numbers. Prosecutorial teams consist of ‘numerous lawyers, police 
investigators and inspectors, analysts and in-house experts, case managers and 
staff’.  Defence teams are comparably much smaller. The original ICTY Directive 33
permitted that the accused’s defence may consist of only one lead counsel - a 
recommendation which was interpreted literally by the Tribunal.  It was later 34
recognised that, due to the demands of time and location, this was in some instances 
an unreasonable restriction.  However, the use of co-counsel must be requested, and 35
will only be permitted ‘in the interests of justice’.  Most cases at the Tribunal are highly 36
complex and typically last several years into the appeals stage. The Tribunal has 
actively supported the OTP, for example through its creation of the ‘Special Legal 
Services’ division, which provides prosecutors with the help and expertise of legal 
experts regarding ICL, whereas ‘nothing comparable exists for defense counsel’.  In 37
actuality, there is little in the way of additional support for the Defence, unless the trial 
chamber sees fit to provide it, which places the Defence against a ‘formidable 
adversary’.38
 ‘It can also rely on UN or international peacekeeping forces on the ground [..] to assist in 33
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Prosecutors at the ICTY are permanent employees of the UN, and thus enjoy 
the associated benefits and stability. Defence counsel, in contrast, are employed for a 
particular case and must claim their fees in a lump sum.  Moreover, difficulties can 39
arise as a result of defence payments being based on the perceived level of complexity 
which is assigned prior to the start of each case.  There have been instances where 40
defence counsel have, at various trial stages, had to continue to work unpaid in order 
to fulfil their duty.  This presents the mere illusion of choice, as the conscientious 41
defence attorney will doubtless feel bound by their professional obligation to continue 
represent their client. 
In the past, Defence counsel have themselves had to cover certain defence 
costs upfront, which have later been denied for reimbursement by the Tribunal.  42
Wladimiroff experienced this during self-funded missions whilst representing Tadić, and 
expressed his dissatisfaction with a system whereby if the Defence is unable to pre-
finance such expenses, they are precluded from carrying them out.  The Defence, 43
under the Rules and Directives, is entitled to advance payments, yet it is claimed that 
the procedure is so bureaucratic in nature that in reality, there is insufficient time in 
which to apply.  Translation costs have also been problematic, as the Prosecution has 44
translated documents for their own needs, and yet have disclosed only the originals to 
the Defence, thereby further depleting their limited resources.  45
Another important aspect is the provision of defence facilities. All too often, the 
Defence receives little office space compared with the Prosecution.  At the ICTY, the 46
 See, NEWTON, M.A. (2011) ‘Evolving Equality: The Development of the International 39
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Defence were provided with just two modest rooms for over ten years, which could not 
accommodate all the teams.  They were later given larger facilities, which were 47
located away from the main Tribunal building, ‘affectionately’ know at the ‘beach’ 
building, or ‘hut’, due to its location on the North Sea coast. Whilst this was a 
necessary extension, albeit not without its problems due to remoteness of location,  48
McGonigle argues this was needed at an earlier stage.  The building was later closed 49
in October 2011,  leaving the defence teams with only their originally allocated two 50
rooms within the main Tribunal. Due to the fact that some of the individuals indicted 
were evading capture, it was not possible to foresee if and when they might appear 
before the Tribunal. The apprehension of Karadžić and Mladić, both of whom are of 
great significance to the ICTY’s mandate, meant that the Tribunal has experienced 
important cases starting relatively ‘late’ in its existence.  Whilst there are fewer current 51
cases in session than in previous years, they are nonetheless complex and lengthy 
proceedings. The two adjoining rooms, which were literally knocked through to create 
additional space, and left in a rather unfinished manner, invite comparisons with 
Kafka’s description of the Defence offices in The Trial.  D’Amato, when shown the 52
room with which he was provided, asked rhetorically if the Defence was not permitted 
to access the OTP in order to prevent defence counsel from ‘drawing comparisons’.  53
There is some weight to this, as the Defence are restricted from most areas of the 
Tribunal, and are thus unlikely to have personally observed any disparity. 
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Over time, the ICTY has attempted to make significant improvements to its rules 
and procedures in order to alleviate some of the burdens on the Defence.  However, 54
outstanding difficulties still require attention, rather than mere dismissal due to the 
Tribunal winding down its operations. The ICC in particular should take note of the 
difficulties, which have been exposed over a prolonged period by the ICTY defence 
counsel, so as to avoid similar shortcomings. Whilst there is insufficient space to 
engage in a similarly detailed discussion of funding and resource issues at the ICTR, it 
should nevertheless be noted that the Tribunal has often been referred to as the ‘poor 
cousin’ of the ICTY, as it has not received the same level of funding, or indeed 
attention, as its counterpart.  Consequently, issues relating to funding and resources 55
are necessarily compounded. When Wladimiroff first reported to the ICTR, he was 
‘given the Statute, Rules and Directives of the Tribunal, documents of the case and 
provided with a badge. They wish you good luck and that’s it.’  One might argue that 56
the support an institution can offer the Defence will be limited by the resources it has 
been given. Where a lack of funding is institution-wide, all organs will suffer; crucially, 
however, the Defence should not experience this disproportionately.
B. The SCSL
In light of the high costs of the ad hoc Tribunals, there was a pressing need for the 
‘mixed’ Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to achieve justice on a much smaller budget. 
The expectations were high for the SCSL, despite the fact that it was ‘being asked to 
do more than their ad hoc cousins, but with fewer resources’.  The Court is funded on 57
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the basis of voluntary contributions from States, which has in the past caused a great 
deal of financial uncertainty.  Cassese, in his independent report on the SCSL, felt that 58
the necessity to routinely ‘beg for money’  from donors had ‘plagued’ the Court, 59
causing an inability to formulate a long-term strategy.  Due to a significant deficit in the 60
amount of funds needed to function, the UN has had to supplement the court budget to 
the amount of tens of millions of dollars.  Cockayne feels that operating such an 61
institution on the basis of voluntary contributions ‘has been tried - and has failed’.  62
Such a method of funding is not conducive to the proper functioning of a court, which 
cannot be expected to achieve its mandate without suitable financial backing. 
Additionally, voluntary contributions carry with them the potential for external influences 
to manipulate the workings of a court, thereby risking its autonomy.  The acceptance 63
of financial ‘bail outs’ from countries ‘may fatally taint the legitimacy of the Court’.  64
Furthermore, the timing with which the funds are dispensed has been crucial for the 
Defence, as wide-ranging cutbacks ‘left the defense counsel with drastically reduced 
budgets on the eve of beginning the defense phases of their cases’.65
The disparity of funding and resources between the Defence and Prosecution is 
perhaps most manifest at the SCSL, with the OTP taking up a large percentage of the 
Court’s budget.  The disparity was particularly pronounced at the beginning of the 66
Court’s operation. Darehshori, when first reporting for duty, recalls the doors being 
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removed from their hinges so as to create makeshift desks.  Sadly, the Defence 67
continued in their struggle to obtain the much needed resources. Jalloh argues that ‘the 
inequality of resources between the two sides led to tangible differences in terms of 
access to offices, equipment, and money for local and international investigators and 
experts to assist the various defense teams’.  Hard-pressed defence teams were 68
forced to petition the Court for increases in funding, with some degree of (albeit, 
belated) success.69
Regarding access to resources, the Prosecution has benefitted from 
transportation, security, and technology such as satellite phones, as well as a team of 
translators and investigators,  which has not been the shared experience of the 70
Defence. Rather, they have had to manage with public transport in areas lacking in 
infrastructure, with a team which can only be paid at the national salary level, causing a 
disparity in the expertise available.  This in turn has meant that the Prosecution has 71
been able to attract those with vital experience gained from the ad hoc Tribunals.  72
Charles Taylor,  whose trial took place in the Hague for reasons of security, 73
argued that his defence was ‘emaciated’, a criticism which Wilson reasons was ‘well 
founded’.  Taylor was unhappy with his initial legal aid budget, as it was insufficient to 74
secure an English QC.  Eventually, the budget was increased so as to obtain the 75
 DAREHSHORI, S. (2008) ‘Lessons for Outreach from the Ad-hoc Tribunals, The Special 67
Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court.’ 14 New England Journal of 
International and Comparative Law. 299-307 at 299-300
 JALLOH, C.C. (2010-11) at 44168
 ‘Decision on Sesay Defence Application 1 - Logistical Resources.’ (24 January 2007) 69
Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay. Case No. SCSL-04-15-T in which the Court ordered that the 
Defence be provided with a second office, a ‘second’ networked computer, a vehicle and a 
witness management officer.
 COCKAYNE, J. (2005) at 67070
 Ibid.71
 Ibid. at 67172
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services of Courtney Griffiths, QC, a barrister of ‘great experience’,  the calibre of 76
whom, it could be reasoned, was necessary for such an important and complex case. 
C. The ICC
The running costs of the permanent ICC will inevitably be the highest amongst the ICL 
institutions, due to the number of State Parties and potential situations, the complexity 
and widespread nature of the crimes, and the number of individuals, such as victims 
and witnesses, who will be involved in the trials.  The ICC is funded primarily from 77
‘assessed contributions’ made by States Parties, as well as financial support from the 
UN.  The ICC is, in theory, independent from the UN, yet contributions are made in 78
reflection of the instances where the Security Council may make referrals.  The Court 79
can also accept voluntary contributions from governments, international organisations 
and individuals.  However, it is the regular assessed contributions which largely 80
provide the ICC with financial stability, although it is not unusual for States to delay, 
reduce or fail to pay their amount. The total figure of outstanding contributions as of 
October 2013 by all States Parties (since 2002), amounts to a substantial 
€8,498,579.  Typically, the Court tends to overspend on their annual budget, which in 81
recent years has grown in excess of €100,000,000.  The ICC is also having to plan for 82
 Ibid.76
 See, SKILBECK, R. (2008b) ‘Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials.’ 15(3) Human 77
Rights Brief. 6-10 at 6
 Article 115 a) 7 b) Rome Statute78
 For example, the ‘Situation’ in Darfur was referred to the ICC by Security Council Resolution 79
1593 (31 March 2005) Doc. No. S/RES/1593 
 Article 116 Rome Statute ICC80
 ICC Assembly of State Parties, twelfth session. ‘Report of the Bureau on the arrears of States 81
Parties.’ (12 November 2013) Doc. No. ICC-ASP/12/30
 ICC, Assembly of State Parties, eleventh session. ‘Report of the Committee on Budget and 82
Finance on the work of its Eighteenth Session.’ (9 August 2012) Doc. No. ICC-ASP/11/5 p7
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the future funding of its permanent premises - the annual cost of ownership of which is 
estimated to be €14,200,000 in 2016.83
As the ICC is in its infancy, and cases have taken (albeit understandably) 
several years to progress, there is less available information regarding any disparities 
in financial support and facilities. In terms of resources, the ICC’s RPE places a 
responsibility on the Registrar, to provide ‘such facilities as may be necessary for the 
direct performance of the duty of the defence’.  The use of the phrase ‘direct 84
performance’ is troublesome, as it might suggest the duty is to supply only the ‘bare 
minimum’ for the Defence to function.
Where the budget is concerned, it is possible to look in a modest level of detail 
at the breakdown of the ICC’s annual spending. An examination of the funding received 
by the Defence, especially when compared to the Prosecution, is of particular use in 
understanding the financial support given to each party, as well as to how this has 
changed alongside the Court’s development in recent years. The development and 
progress of the ‘Office of Public Counsel for the Defence’ (OPCD), as well as other 
devisions within the ICC, will be limited by the resources allocated. The OTP is a vast 
organ, made up of three ‘functional’ divisions. The ‘Investigations Division’ is unique to 
the Prosecution in the sense that it carries this principal burden due to its duty to 
actively search for both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.  Due to such 85
differences between the parties, only the ‘Prosecution Division’ of the OTP will be 
compared with OPCD, as it is arguably the most directly comparable to the functions of 
the Defence during trial and appeal stages.
A comparison of the figures from the 2010 and 2013 proposed budgets (in order 
to demonstrate some of the broader trends), sheds some light on the scale of the 
 Ibid. paras 63; 383
 Rule 20 (1) e RPE ICC84
 The main responsibility for investigation falling to the OTP is often a justification for restricting 85
Defence funding. See, Article 54 (1) of the Rome Statute concerning the duty to investigate both 
‘incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally’.
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disparity, and the rate at which the parties have received annual increases in their 
budgets. Turning first to 2013, the proposed budget for the OPCD stood at €549,500.  86
In contrast, the proposed budget of the ‘Prosecutions Division’ was set at 
€7,109,500.  Thus the Defence is receiving around 8% of the funds allocated to the 87
Prosecutions Division. 
Comparing these figures with the 2010 proposals highlights the rate of increase 
in funds for each party. The Prosecution Division has received a 38.4%  increase 88
between these years, whilst the OPCD has received only a 4.3%  increase. As the 89
capacity of the ICC increases with more Situations and cases being brought before the 
Court, it is inevitable that an increase in funding for both offices would be required. Any 
increase in work load would be broadly experienced similarly by both teams. However, 
it does not appear from these figures that the rate of increase is proportionate even to 
what each office was already receiving. Safferling argues that vast resources of the 
OTP compared with the Defence casts a serious doubt on whether the latter is truly in 
the same position.  The ICC should exercise extreme caution when reviewing funding 90
for the OPCD, as failure to support its growth risks a return to the attitudes present at 
the NIMT regarding the Defence. The strength of a well-supported and resourced 
Defence office should be welcomed as an important contribution to a fair and effective 
Court, rather than face being undermined ‘by a financial straightjacket, or by other 
practical constraints’.91
The question of the availability of office space provided for the Defence is more 
complex, as the OPCD was not properly operational until around 2006. McGonigle 
 This is stated as being a 5.9% increase on 2012. ICC, Assembly of State Parties, Eleventh 86
session. ‘Proposed Programme Budget for 2013 of the International Criminal Court’ (16 August 
2012) Doc. No. ICC-ASP/11/10 p137
 This is stated as being a 15.7% increase on 2012. Ibid. p5987
 The total approved budget for the ‘Prosecution Division’ for 2010 stood at €5,137,900. 88
ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Eighth session. ‘Proposed Programme Budget for 2010 of the 
International Criminal Court.’ (30 July 2009) Doc. No. ICC-ASP/8/10 p53
 The total proposed OPCD budget for 2010 stood at €526,500. Ibid. p12789
 SAFFERLING, C. (2012) ‘International Criminal Procedure.’ Oxford, OUP. p1890
 METTRAUX, G. & CENGIC, A. in BOHLANDER, M. (2007) p42891
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argues that the ICTY has ‘already set a bad precedent for future international criminal 
tribunals, such as the ICC’.  When the ICC moves from its temporary building to its 92
new location, it will be interesting to observe how well the Defence are accommodated 
in terms of office space and relevant resources. Unfortunately, it can often be the case 
that the Defence lacks a ‘voice’ in the budgetary process at the international courts and 
tribunals.  Greater inclusion of the OPCD in all manner of budgetary planning would 93
be welcomed.
D. The crucial importance of adequate funding and resources
The financial resources available to an international court or tribunal will directly impact 
the effectiveness of its operation. In particular, the Special Panels of East Timor 
demonstrate the disastrous potential effects that inadequate funding has, for the 
Defence, as well as the court’s legitimacy as a whole.  Realistically, these institutions 94
will be limited to some extent by their allocated budgets, but unfortunately such 
constraints often run ‘counter’ to the rights of the accused.  Such is the importance of 95
an effective legal aid system for those defendants who have been declared indigent.  96
Restrictions on the defence budget is often justified on the basis of the parties’ 
differing roles. Such reasoning carries little weight, as Jalloh argues: ‘the fact that the 
two sides work essentially the same case, albeit from different perspectives, suggests 
that this argument is not as strong as it might initially appear.’  The Defence cannot 97
 MCGONIGLE, B. (2005) at 1292
 GALLANT K.S. (2003) ‘Politics, Theory and Institutions: Three Reasons why International 93
Criminal Defence is Hard, and What Might be Done About One of Them.’ 14 Criminal Law 
Forum. 317-334 at 328
 See, BIBAS, S. & BURKE-WHITE, W. (2010) ‘International Idealism Meets Domestic-94
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perform their crucial role in due process unless supplied with proper financing and 
facilities. Where strong investment is made in the Prosecution, so too must this 
correspond to the Defence: ‘Systematic prosecutions call for systematic defense.’  98
It should be recognised here that better financing could help to alleviate 
important issues, one example being the difficulties relating to investigations.  99
However, given the finite budgets of these institutions, how could these additional 
defence funds be secured? Cockayne suggests that where resources have been 
exhausted, the ‘radical remedy’ needed could be sourcing from the Prosecution 
budget.  Undoubtedly this would not be a ‘popular’ solution, yet where the Defence is 100
seriously underfunded, with the Prosecution enjoying an exponentially larger budget, in 
practice it is arguably a just and appropriate remedy. The Defence must be afforded a 
‘voice’ in the budgetary process, which if unheard could contribute to the erosion of the 
crucial principle of EoA.  Ultimately, the accused’s fair trial rights, which the 101
institutions claim to uphold, will fail to translate into tangible protections at trial without 
proper funding.
E. Time as resource: Balancing defence rights with expediency
It is worthing noting the importance of time as constituting another essential element of 
the resources needed to prepare the defence case. The right to have adequate time to 
prepare is closely linked with other crucial fair trial guarantees, such as the right to be 
informed promptly of the charges.  What is deemed to be adequate time to prepare a 102
 WILSON, R. (2002) ‘Assigned Defence Counsel in Domestic and International War Crimes 98
Tribunals: The Need for a Structural Approach.’ 2 International Criminal Law Review. 145-194 at 
190
 Such as State co-operation; transportation access; securing potential defence witnesses etc. 99
See, COGAN, J.K. (2002) p138
 COCKAYNE, J. (2005) at 676100
 GALLANT K.S. (2003) at 328101
 FEDOROVA, M. (2012) p55. See Chapter 2.102
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defence will depend upon the circumstances of each individual case.  Baccaria 103
argues that the time to prepare at the international level should be sizeable given the 
complexity of the cases.  104
Perhaps the most challenging aspect for the provision of adequate time 
concerns the investigation stages at the ICC. During these intervals, it is simply not 
possible to provide the Prosecution and Defence with broadly similar time frames by 
virtue of the Prosecution’s obligation to carry out pre-investigations in order to initiate 
charges against specific individuals. Thus, even an approximate equal allowance of 
time to investigate is ‘unattainable’.  This is problematic for the Defence, as it will not 105
be given an opportunity to conduct its own investigations until (often several) years 
have passed.106
There is a delicate balance to be sought between allowing an accused 
adequate preparation time, whilst also ensuring that the judicial process is as 
expedient as possible.  The expediency of trials can be measured in may ways, such 
as: the cost of each trial, the number of cases processed, or the speed or accuracy 
with which the verdict is reached.  Given the institutions’ limited resources, difficult 107
choices must be made regarding the planning and allocating of funds.  108
Trial expediency can be to the advantage of both the defendant and the 
institution in question, as the former should not be detained for a longer period than is 
necessary whilst there is ‘insecurity about his status’.  Other benefits, such as 109
reducing costs and limiting the degree to which evidence and the accuracy of witness 
testimony deteriorates, provide powerful incentives to ensure trials progress in a timely 
 MAY, R. & WIERDA, M. (2002) p272103
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manner.  However, ‘speedy’ trials can threaten an accused’s right to a fair trial if his 110
right to adequate time to prepare is diminished.  Notwithstanding, the ‘yardstick’ 111
used to assess ‘speed’ differs between national and international contexts.  As 112
Damaška explains, if an accused ‘were to languish in preliminary detention for eight or 
nine years, or if their trials lasted for three or four years, the observance of their right to 
fair trial would certainly be questioned’.  Yet in international criminal proceedings, 113
trials will easily extend into several years.  Given the complexity of the cases and 114
circumstances surrounding the alleged crimes, delays to the proceedings are, to some 
extent, to be expected.  Caution, however, should be exercised when accepting this 115
as inevitable given that the accused will often have to wait years in incarceration before 
their trials begin.  It can be argued that extensive delays have become to be 116
accepted as the ‘norm’. ICC Judge Fulford has expressed his conviction that ‘delays 
and significantly extended proceedings are the single most corrosive problem for the 
ICC’, which ‘arguably stretch the notion of a fair trial’.  Furthermore, he has noted that 117
‘each time a case is conducted in a particular way, the more difficult it is to break free 
from the trend of established precedent’.  Thus, international criminal trials are likely 118
to continue to be protracted in nature in the years to come.
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It is reasonable to assert that it is generally in the best interests of all parties for 
proceedings to be as expedient as possible, and as a result the modern institutions 
have had to find ways to ensure that cases progress. This has been a particular issue 
for the ad hoc Tribunals, given their limited mandates relating to the conflicts.  In 2000, 
the ICTY began implementing its so called ‘completion strategy’ in order to initiate the 
process of winding down the Tribunal.  Williams argues that the tension created by 119
the completion strategy concerning the rights of the accused ‘lies at the centre of the 
criticisms’, as it ‘potentially influences judicial decisions on procedural, and in some 
cases, substantive rights’.  It has also been questioned why the strategy was 120
introduced quite so early into the lifespan of the Tribunal.  Turner contends that it is 121
‘clear that it has reduced the perceived fairness of the tribunals among some defense 
attorneys and outside observers’.  Thus, it is apparent that Courts and tribunals must 122
exercise caution regarding their approach to the use of completion strategies, even in 
the face of considerable external pressure to do so. It is worth reiterating Judge David 
Hunt’s dissenting opinion in Milošević:
 
‘If the Tribunal is not given sufficient time and money to [try persons 
charged with serious violations of international humanitarian law] by the 
international community, then it should not attempt to try those persons in a 
way which does not accord with those rights. In my opinion, it is improper to 
take the Completion Strategy into account in departing from interpretations 
which had earlier been accepted by the Appeals Chamber where this is at 
the expense of those rights.’123
 At that time, high profile defendants such as Mladić (Case No. IT-09-92) and Karadžić (Case 119
No. IT-95-5/18) were in hiding.
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The ICC has already experienced significant pressure concerning the time it has taken 
for its first case to be completed.  It would be understandable for external pressures 124
to influence the Court’s strategies regarding case progression. The extensive 
department dealing with press and media would be wise to continue to reiterate the 
necessarily protracted nature of the proceedings in ICJ, particularly in comparison with 
the more familiar context of national trials. 
4. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the difficulties associated with the institution’s 
budgetary allocations to the Defence, which has particular ramifications for the 
principle of EoA when considered in relation to the financing of the Prosecution. 
Concerning the protection of the accused’s rights, it is insufficient merely to provide 
statutory, ‘paper’ rights and guarantees, without ensuring that they translate into 
tangible protections at trial.  Adequate defence funding is of primary importance for 125
an institution, as an ‘emaciated’ defence cannot fulfil its trial function, leaving an 
accused without the proper means to respond to the charges brought against him. 
Whilst this Chapter has not attempted to analyse what the Prosecution and Defence 
should receive in quantifiable terms, the degree of disparity between the parties has 
been examined via the courts’ spending and proposed budgets. This disparity is 
arguably most evident at the SCSL, due to its reliance on voluntary contributions. At 
the ICC, the considerably disparate rates of annual increases in budgets are of 
particular interest. Since both parties will experience increasing workloads over the 
coming years, the discrepancy is difficult to justify.
 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Lubanga’s charges  124
were confirmed in 2006, with the Appeals Chamber confirming the decision in December 2014.
 See, FEDOROVA, M. (2012) p67125
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An important component in assessing defence funding and resources is 
adequate time to prepare. The extreme length of proceedings at the modern institutions 
is often criticised.  This undoubtedly places additional pressures on the courts and 126
tribunals. Zappalà warns that a desire to achieve ‘speedy’ trials ‘can under no 
circumstances be taken as a justification for reducing the rights of the defendants. It 
would be dangerous to surrender to the temptation of thinking that greater 
effectiveness may justify fewer guarantees’.  Whilst goals of efficiency and 127
expedience carry benefits for both the accused and the institution, caution must be 
exercised regarding the means utilised to achieve them. If conducting speedy trials 
affects the fair trial rights of the accused, the lasting legitimacy of the institution will 
ultimately be placed at risk.  128
The next Chapter will analyse the extent to which the Defence faces opposition 
from multiple accusers, particularly at the ICC given its unique and complex 
composition. 
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Chapter 7. 
An Institutional Inequality of Arms?
Defence Opposition
“The Defence [is] facing the machine - the big machine - of the Office 
of the Prosecutor.”  1
1. Introduction
This Chapter will now turn to examine the main ‘opponents’ to the Defence during the 
trial process in order to consider whether there is an Equality of Arms (EoA) at an 
institutional level. Particular focus will be given to the unique composition of the ICC in 
its conceptualisation of the role of the Prosecution, as well as the unique means of 
including victim testimony within the trial process. 
This Chapter will begin by analysing the dual obligation which has been placed 
on the Prosecution at the ICC to both ‘investigate incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally’ under Article 54(1)a of the Rome Statute, whilst also conducting 
a prosecution case in a partisan manner. It will be argued that this complex role gives 
rise to unprecedented difficulties, worthy of rigorous examination. This will include an 
analysis of the investigatorial approaches used by the OTP in the initial cases brought 
before the Court. The delay in the implementation of a ‘Code of Conduct for the Office 
of the Prosecutor’, which has only fairly recently come into force, is a source of concern 
in relation to the institutional attitudes which could be developing within the Office.
The Prosecution is responsible for bringing charges against the accused,  and 2
carries the burden of proof.  The OTP is undoubtedly a formidable opponent, 3
 Verbatim, per Xavier-Jean Keïta, Principal Defender OPCD, ICC. IBA Video: ‘In the dock - 1
Defence Rights at the International Criminal Court’, available via: http://vimeo.com/23958341 
[Last accessed 18.3.2015]
 Articles 61, 42 Rome Statute of the ICC2
 Ibid. Article 67(1)i3
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particularly given its investigative role. Nevertheless, it must also be questioned 
whether there is an additional accuser by virtue of the inclusion of victim participation 
within the trial process. The final section will consider the role of judges and their 
unique ability to safeguard fair trial guarantees. It will be argued that there is sufficient 
cause for concern regarding issues such as bias and unprofessional conduct. 
Ultimately, it will be argued that the cumulative consideration of these issues indicates 
that the Defence can be observed as operating from within institutional structures 
which are both architecturally, and practically, organised so as to place the accused at 
a significant disadvantage. 
2. The dual role of the Prosecutor at the ICC: a workable 
and sustainable concept?
This section will analyse the role and influence of the prosecutor, particularly at the 
ICC, to reveal the extent of the OTP’s power and influence over the proceedings. This 
will in turn provide a greater understanding of the magnitude of the Defence’s primary 
opposition.
A. The role of the Prosecutor at the ad hoc Tribunals
There is a vital difference between the role of the Prosecution at the ICC compared 
with the other modern institutions. At the ICTY, there is no burden on the Prosecution to 
search for exculpatory evidence.  As a result, the role does not entail acting as a 4
 Rule 68(1) RPE ICTY states that the Prosecutor must disclose to the Defence material which 4
‘may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused’ - however, there is no prior duty 
to search for such evidence. 
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neutral, impartial investigator, but rather as a party to the proceedings.  Thus, there is 5
no duty to assist the Tribunal in its quest to establish the material (or forensic) truth.  6
Establishing the ‘truth’ will depend on a full respect of the procedural rules.  At the 7
ICTY, the OTP’s aim is to secure a conviction, in line with an adversarial trial system.  8
Karnavas argues that ‘truth, fairness and due process seem to be lost in the 
competitive process’, adding that a ‘win by all means’ attitude is reminiscent of the 
mentality at the NIMT.  There are certainly few incentives to conduct impartial 9
investigations which consciously search for both inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence.  It can be argued that this approach is detrimental to the Defence by virtue 10
of its weaker status, and comparatively smaller resources with which to investigate. 
The Tribunal has ensured that the Prosecution suffers no disadvantage in the 
investigation process, which McIntyre suggests has contributed to diminishing the 
appearance of justice at the ICTY.  11
The lack of obligation on the Prosecution has wider ramifications for its role, as 
well as the way in which it conducts itself. One such issue is that of prosecutorial ‘zeal’, 
which can risk overshadowing the other aims or needs of the Tribunal.  For example, 12
the prosecutor for Barayagwiza at the ICTR, Carla Del Ponte, made ‘overzealous’ 
comments in session, which presented the accused’s guilt as undeniable.  The 13
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Chamber noted the ‘forcefulness’ of her statements, and reiterated that it was for the 
Trial Chambers to determine the guilt of the accused.  Reasonable prosecutorial zeal 14
is natural, and is arguably a necessary part of the role. However, as Creta argues, it 
‘must not blur the focus on the rights of the accused to fair treatment during every 
phase of adjudication’.  Extensive prosecutorial zeal can contribute to a bias against 15
the Defence, even if not in an overt manner.  16
Also worthy of consideration are issues such as the attitudes of the Prosecution 
teams, and the tactics they utilise. As there is no obligation to investigate exonerating 
evidence, the Prosecution takes a ‘rather disdainful attitude’, even if there is awareness 
of its existence.  Karnavas argues that the Prosecution will ‘generally not hesitate to 17
push the envelope on what may be fair play, particularly when considering the dearth of 
resources (human and financial) available to the defence and the disparity in actual 
and perceived power between the prosecution and the defence’.  An example of 18
questionable prosecution tactics can be seen in the case of Krstić. At trial, the 
Prosecution failed to disclose taped evidence until after the closure of the Prosecution’s 
case and the evidence-in-chief, despite having been in possession of it for some 
considerable time.  The Defence argued that the decision made not to disclose the 19
tape, and use it in cross-examination, was deliberate.  The Appeals Chamber felt that 20
there were ‘sufficient grounds in the circumstances to question the propriety of the 
Prosecution as regards the disclosure of this evidence’,  and that the Prosecution took 21
‘an inordinate amount of time before disclosing material in this case, and has failed to 
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provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay’.  As the tape was excluded from 22
consideration at the trial stage, the Appeals Chamber held that a retrial was not the 
appropriate remedy.  It did not feel that it could determine whether the Prosecution 23
had deliberately breached its obligations.  In a then somewhat contradictory 24
statement, it held:
 
‘..on the whole, the Prosecution acted in good faith in the implementation of 
a systematic disclosure methodology which, in light of the findings above, 
must be revised so as to ensure future compliance with the obligations 
incumbent upon the Office of the Prosecutor. This finding must not however 
be mistaken for the Appeals Chamber’s acquiescence in questionable 
conduct by the Prosecution.’25
The late disclosure was a clear breach of the Prosecution’s duty, for which the 
Chamber felt that no adequate justification was provided. Why then did the Chamber 
assume that the Prosecution had acted in good faith, whilst at the same time calling for 
a revision of the methods of disclosure? It is difficult not to conclude, contrary to the 
Chamber’s own assertion, that this approach signifies an acquiescence in such 
behaviour. It also fails to send a strong, deterrent message regarding future conduct. 
This is highly regrettable, as this prosecution tactic ‘ties up the defence team in 
reviewing non-important documents, and drains the defence team of its resources’.  26
Whether such behaviour constitutes a deliberate tactic, rather than a mere lapse, 
remains to be determined.
 Ibid. para 19722
 Ibid. para 17423
 Ibid. para 21324
 Ibid. para 21425
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B. The role of the Prosecutor at the ICC
The ICC differs from its ad hoc predecessors regarding the obligation placed on the 
Prosecution to ‘investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally’ under 
Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute. As such, the Prosecution is not just a party to 
proceedings, but must serve as a public organ, functioning in the interests of justice.  27
This is largely due to the substantial resources provided to the Prosecution’s 
‘Investigation Division’, as well as in recognition of the other advantages provided to 
the OTP, such as immunity and co-operation with States.  28
At first consideration, the obligation is a welcomed and much needed 
development from the ad hoc tribunals, which could strengthen the position of the 
Defence.  However, the realities of this burden on the Prosecution must be considered 29
for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is a risk that because the Prosecution carries out 
the main bulk of the investigations, they are thereby in both a real and perceived 
advantageous position with regard to their knowledge of the accuracy and reliability of 
evidence collected, and later presented in Court. Kay and Swart warn that it would be 
unwise for the judges to take Article 54 in blind faith, ‘believing that in any case before 
them the prosecution must be right’.  However, such an assumption on the part of the 30
judges could be inadvertent.
Secondly, the Prosecutor’s dual role could be so difficult  to perform as to 31
render it untenable. As Fedorova explains, the expectation of the Prosecutor to act ‘as 
 ZAPPALÀ, S. ‘The Rights of the Accused.’ in CASSESE, A. GAETA, P. & JONES, J.R.W.D. 27
(Eds.) (2002) ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary.’ VOLUME 
II. Oxford, OUP. p1353
 As examined in Chapter 6.28
 BUISMAN, C. (2014) ‘The Prosecutor’s Obligation to Investigate Incriminating and 29
Exonerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality?’ 27(1) Leiden Journal of International 
Law. 205-226 at 207
 KAY, S. & SWART, B. ‘The Role of the Defence’ in CASSESE, A. et al (2002) supra p142530
 The task of the Prosecutor at the ICC has been described as one of the most important and 31
difficult legal offices in the world today.’  GROULX, E. (2010b) ‘The New International Justice 
System and the Challenges Facing the Legal Profession. Revue Quebecoise de Droit 
International. 39-74 at 50
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an impartial truth-seeker is easier stated in theory than implemented in practice’.  It 32
must be recognised that there is an inherent tension in the dual obligation to both 
neutrally investigate and disclose evidence, whilst also building the Prosecution case in 
a partisan manner. In terms of investigative capacity, the Defence is heavily reliant on 
the Prosecution’s efforts, not just in terms of funding and resources, but also due to the 
delay between the opening of an investigation and the later appointment of defence 
counsel, which can only then begin its own investigations.33
The origin of this tension can be said to be a direct result of the sui generis, 
mixed process adopted at the ICC. The obligation on the Prosecution under Article 
54(1)(a) represents an attempt to achieve a balance between common and civil law 
traditions. It originated from a German proposal, which found wide support from other 
civil law jurisdictions, which sought to build a ‘bridge’ between the adversarial 
prosecutor, and the inquisitorial investigating judge.  All too often, the ICC’s system is 34
referred to as being primarily adversarial, which fails to reflect the unique mixture 
nature of the resultant system. Buismann explains the crucial shortcoming of this 
particular hybridisation: 
‘In addition, unlike most civil-law procedures, the ICC procedure does not 
constitute a joint search for the truth, duly reported in a dossier, in which the 
defence is an active participant and engages with the prosecution to 
suggest certain investigative steps. Rather, it is an evidence-gathering 
exercise carried out by two autonomous parties.’35
Without the neutrality and accessibility of an open dossier, the Prosecution has been 
left with a particularly taxing role. Skilbeck has coherently argued that by using a ‘pick 
and mix’ approach between the systems, the necessary checks and balances found in 
domestic systems are absent, thereby creating a ‘Frankenstein's monster that fails to 
 FEDOROVA, M. (2012) p12632
 BUISMAN, C. (2014) at 207-833
 Ibid. at 206; FEDOROVA, M. (2012) p14934
 BUISMAN, C. (2014) at 22435
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adequately protect the rights of the defence’.  Others have argued that not only can 36
this result in confusion, but ‘perhaps even systemic failure’.  This issue has broad 37
ramifications across the ICC’s procedural system. In this context, it is possible that the 
concept of the dual obligation is fundamentally flawed, or at least ‘over-idealistic’, as it 
is arguably ‘not in the nature of the beast to investigate, with a high level of diligence 
and persistence, those elements that undermine one’s own case’.  If the problem is so 38
manifest within the current system, only a fundamental change in the way the ICC 
investigates and collects its evidence would provide a meaningful solution.39
The extent to which the Prosecution at the ICC has been able to fulfil its dual 
investigative role to date must be explored. It is important to try to ascertain a sense of 
whether the obligation is possible, albeit difficult, or whether the concept is inherently 
flawed. Whilst the ICC’s caseload is, relatively speaking, in its ‘infancy’ there are 
nevertheless Situations and cases which illustrate how this role is developing. The 
cases concerned with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), including Lubanga - 
the first case to be completed at the Court - suggest that the role is causing significant 
difficulties, which could potentially undermine the legitimacy of the trials themselves. 
Several shortcomings concerning Prosecution have arisen, including failing to visit 
important locations and conduct fundamental investigations, such as ascertaining the 
real ages of the child soldiers who are said to have been involved. The Prosecution 
failed to take standard measures such as, interviewing their family members, or 
collecting birth certificates.  The OTP argued that security was their primary concern, 40
 SKILBECK, R. (2010a) ‘Frankenstein’s Monsters: Creating a New International Procedure’ 8 36
Journal of International Criminal Justice. 451-462 at 452
 BIBAS, S. & BURKE-WHITE, W. (2010) ‘International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-37
Procedure Realism.’ 59 Duke Law Journal. 637-704 at 695
 BUISMAN, C. (2014) at 22438
 For more on the potential merits of an independent investigating Chamber at the ICC, see: De 39
HEMPTINNE, H. (2007) ‘The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the International Criminal 
Court. An Option worth Pursuing?’ 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 402-418
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fearing that seeking the information of particular children might put them at risk.  To 41
circumvent this issue, the Prosecution instead elected to rely heavily on the use of 
intermediaries for local investigations. The Court has been particularly critical of 
delegating such tasks to intermediaries, despite recognising the difficulties with 
security.  In Ngudjolo, the Chamber acknowledged the work of defence investigators 42
in ascertaining evidence in relation to the correct ages of the child soldier witnesses.  43
As a result, in both the Lubanga and Ngudjolo cases, the Court felt it was necessary to 
disregard all the testimonies given by the child soldiers.  44
The Chambers have not shied away from examining the investigative 
shortcomings of the Prosecution; in the Lubanga judgement, the Trial Chamber 
examined the deficiencies over 157 pages of the judgement.  The striking out of all 45
testimony which related to the nine child soldiers serves as the clearest condemnation 
of the methods employed by the Prosecution.  In terms of the failure to investigate 46
important sites and crime scenes, the Katanga case provides some worrying 
examples, in which the Defence team again argued that the Prosecution had failed to 
visit key areas, instead relying excessively on intermediaries.  This included the 47
crucial crime scene at Bogoro, which was only visited by the Prosecution in a sporadic 
manner.  Additionally, no investigations whatsoever took place at the locations where 48
the accused were said to have been based.  The Defence observed that ‘any 49
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute.’ (14 41
March 2012) Doc. No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 para 160
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516 
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute.’ (14 45
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investigation into exonerating evidence starts within the proximity of the accused’.  50
There were therefore significant omissions in the search for exculpatory evidence.  51
Whilst the situation has not been made easier by the DRC government refusing to 
disclose important documents, it can be argued that the Prosecution has ‘never made 
a serious effort to persuade it to disclose at least some of these documents’.  52
However, the cases from the DRC are not the only ones in which the Prosecution has 
claimed similar difficulties.  Kenya, for example, is in a more stable situation than 53
other, war-torn countries.  By comparison, the government of Sudan has placed 54
significant restrictions on the investigation of evidence through its own lack of co-
operation, and has gone as far as criminalising the co-operation of others.  In such 55
extreme circumstances, the Prosecution cannot fairly be criticised for a failure to 
search for and collect evidence. 
Overall, the cumulative effects of the deficiencies across the various ICC 
Situations creates a worrying picture regarding the Prosecution’s efforts to investigate 
properly for inculpatory and exculpatory evidence alike.  It has been argued that the 56
Prosecution has ‘largely ignored its obligation under Article 54(1)(a) to investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally in any of the pending or 
completed cases’ and has failed to demonstrate that a genuine effort has been made.  57
This leads to reasonable concerns as to the workability of the concept, particularly in 
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light of the sui generis system at the ICC.  Karim Khan QC, during his opening speech 58
representing Ruto, argued that Article 54 was in effect ‘dead and buried’.  59
Within the confines of the Court’s current framework, there should be a more 
conscious effort on the part of the prosecution to investigate lines of inquiry which 
might reveal exculpatory evidence. Only if the Prosecution is able to keep an open 
mind as to what investigations might reveal, will it be able to fulfil its role, and satisfy 
the obligation placed upon it under Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.60
C. The ‘Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor’
Linked with the issue of the Prosecution’s dual role at the ICC, is the manner in which it 
conducts itself. Until fairly recently, there was an absence of specific regulation for the 
OTP. Prior to the entering into force of the belated ‘Code of Conduct for the Office of 
the Prosecutor’ in September 2013,  the Prosecution was operating under the general 61
staff rules, with ‘no formal ethical constraints in carrying out their day-to-day duties’.  62
As Markovic argues, this was unfortunate, as too much discretion allowed the OTP to 
act in a manner which, albeit not in contradiction of the Statute, did not ‘fully take into 
account the interests of the ICC as a whole’.63
Given the Prosecution’s obligations under Article 54(1)a of the Rome Statute, it 
is argued here that there is a pressing need for the Office to retain a degree of 
 Ibid. at 22458
 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto; Joshua Arap Sang, Open Session Transcript (10 59
September 2013) Doc. No. ICC-01/09-01/11-T-27-ENG p58. Khan’s statements at pp.52-3 
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neutrality. Difficulties arise, arguably most strikingly, in connection with the OTP’s 
interactions with the media. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of examples in which 
members of the team have made statements in direct conflict with their role. One such 
example is that of a divisional head of the Prosecution, Ms Le Fraper du Hellen, who 
gave an online interview in 2010, commenting that ‘nothing is going to happen. Mr 
Lubanga is going away for a long time’.  The Chamber found that such remarks tend 64
to bring the Court into ‘disrepute’.  Despite this finding, regrettably no action was taken 65
beyond the Chamber ‘expressing the strongest disapproval’.66
The first Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, has been criticised for his 
tendency for ‘grandstanding’ in front of the world media.  Ocampo contributed an 67
article in the Guardian newspaper, using language which suggested the (un)proven 
guilt of Darfur’s Al Bashir, stating for example that ‘Bashir’s forces have raped on a 
mass scale in Darfur. They raped thousands of women’.  The Defence argued that his 68
article ‘violated and endangered’ the accused’s right to a fair trial,  and represented to 69
the public that Al-Bashir was both already an accused, as well as being guilty.  The 70
Court responded in a disappointing manner, deeming the Defence request to be 
inadmissible as it was put forward by an ad-hoc defence lawyer, and as such fell 
outside of her mandate before the Court.  It is suggested here that a strong critique of 71
 See, http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/03/15/interview-icc-prosecutors-will-refute-allegations-64
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such behaviour, in lieu of stronger sanctions, would have been preferable in order to 
prevent future occurrences.
Now that the ‘Code of Conduct’ for the OTP has been introduced, there are 
formal guidelines which set out the obligations and duties of the Prosecution. Section 
30 states that members of the Office ‘shall not publicly express an opinion on the guilt 
or innocence of a person under investigation or the accused outside the context of the 
proceedings’. Concerning the duty under Article 54(1)a of the Statute, it reiterates that 
investigations should be carried out ‘with the goal of establishing the truth, and in the 
interests of justice’, so that ‘all necessary and reasonable enquiries are made and the 
results disclosed in accordance with the requirements of a fair trial, whether they point 
to the guilt or the innocence of the suspect’.  Perhaps most pertinently, the Code of 72
Conduct calls for the Prosecution to ‘not strive for a conviction at all costs’.  Respect 73
for this ethos is necessary if the Court is to transcend the strictly adversarial 
competition between two parties, ‘where winning would be the only goal’.74
Undoubtedly, the Code of Conduct should have been implemented at a much 
earlier stage in the Court’s development. As a result, ethical problems arising from the 
Prosecution’s behaviour have undermined the ICC’s early work.  Whether or not the 75
Code will have had a tangible effect on the Prosecution remains to be determined. 
Whilst the Code is a necessary framework, there should not be an expectation that it 
can act as a ‘silver bullet’, ready to transform the attitudes of the OTP staff.  76
Furthermore, the delay of roughly a decade in its implementation will inevitably mean 
that the permanent staff of the OTP will have already developed norms and attitudes, 
which could prove difficult to change.
 Section 41 ‘Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor’, Doc. No. OTP2013/02432272
 Ibid. Section 7173
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Overall, the Prosecution at the ICC is a redoubtable opponent, with a great deal 
of influence and control, particularly over the investigation process, which could prove 
especially detrimental to the Defence. Due to the Court’s mixed composition, the 
Prosecution has been burdened with substantial obligations, which appear in principle 
to conflict with its other primary role, that of a partial party to the proceedings. It can be 
argued that the concept of the dual role of the OTP was not given adequate 
consideration, particularly given the lack of any guiding precedent at other institutions. 
3. Victim Participation: A threat to the defendant’s fair 
trial?
Having considered the nature of the Defence’s main adversary in the form of the 
prosecutor, it is also necessary to analyse whether there are, in practice, additional 
accusers or opponents with which the Defence must contend. This section will examine 
the extent to which victim participation has the potential to negatively impact upon the 
due process rights of the accused, with particular focus on the ICC. Johnson suggests 
that there are three problematic issues, which include the erosion of the presumption of 
innocence, a lack of notice as to the charges to be brought, and delays to the 
proceedings.  These issues will be examined, as well as the effect which victim 77
testimony has on the judiciary, and the burden which the provisions place on the 
operation of the Court. The accumulation of problems associated with the inclusion of 
victim testimony ultimately gives rise to the concern that the accused is, in practice, 
unfairly faced with multiple accusers in addition to the Prosecution. 
 JOHNSON, S.T. (2010) ‘Neither Victims nor Executioners: The Dilemma of Victim 77
Participation and the Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court.’ 16 
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At the modern international criminal courts and tribunals, the concept of victim 
participation has evolved dramatically with the ICC’s pronounced step towards the 
inclusion of victims in the trial process.  The ad hoc Tribunals attracted criticism due to 78
their lack of provisions regarding both victim participation and reparation.  The change 79
can be said to stem from the ICC’s aims regarding restorative justice, among its other 
diverse objectives.  Whilst it is perhaps axiomatic to observe that international courts 80
are set up in recognition of the terrible suffering of victims, the extent to which these 
individuals can and should be involved in the judicial process itself must be questioned. 
There is the risk that the provision of rights for the accused may conflict with the ‘rights’ 
of victims. As Damaška pertinently observes, such ‘good things’ as these ‘are not 
always compatible’.  With the desire to protect the interests of both accused and 81
victims, it must be questioned whether the ICC’s criminal procedure can ‘serve two 
masters’.  82
The Court must strive to balance the frequently conflicting needs of both victims 
and accused.  Defrancia argues that these rights ‘cannot remain in equipoise; one has 83
to take primacy over the other’.  Fair trial rights, and corresponding due process 84
protections, will be dependent on their prioritisation in relation to other interests.  85
Thus, allowing the rights of victims to substantially override those of the accused would 
be contrary to notions of fairness. As Jouet notes, victim participation is a new concept 
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in ICL, and the ‘defendants' due process rights must trump alleged victims' participatory 
rights’.  However, if the accused were to be given primacy, victim involvement could 86
become an entirely ‘untenable’ concept.87
A. Victim participation at the ICC
Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute provides that the views of victims may be presented 
and considered by the Court ‘in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with 
the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial’. Rule 85 of the RPE states that 
‘victim’ refers to ‘natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission 
of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’. Under these provisions, victims can 
participate in the proceedings ‘in a very broad and undefined manner’.  For example, 88
Rule 89(1) of the RPE provides that victims can make both opening and closing 
statements. Damaška cautions that whilst these might be beneficial to a victim, 
accounts of mass atrocities:
 
‘can easily generate an atmosphere of revulsion and anger, in which judges 
could - consciously or subconsciously - neglect alternative explanations of 
events, attribute blame more easily, or in greater measure than warranted, 
and might even lower the postulated standard of proof sufficiency’.89
Whilst the inclusion of victims at the heart of the ICC’s mission is an ‘ennobling 
ambition’,  it must nevertheless be questioned whether their role, and the means of 90
their inclusion, were duly considered. Due to the limitations of the Rome Conference of 
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the ICC,  an in-depth debate did not occur.  Zapalà interestingly notes that no State 91 92
would have dared argue the unpopular position that victim participation should not be 
incorporated into the Statute.  As a result of the considerable breadth of the provisions 93
concerning victims, the way in which they ought to be allowed to participate in the 
proceedings has largely been left to the Chambers.  Thus, a great deal of uncertainty 94
has arisen subsequently due to the adoption of different approaches, and the rendering 
of decisions which do not clarify adequately the procedural rights of victims.95
 Although the Rome Statute and RPE do not contain provisions regarding the 
ability of victims to introduce evidence relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
or to challenge evidence admissibility or relevance, the Chambers have held that they 
may do so.  In Lubanga, the Trial Chamber ruled that victims ‘may be permitted to 96
tender and examine evidence if in the view of the Chamber it will assist it in the 
determination of the truth’.  This position was later upheld by the Appeals Chamber, 97
reaffirming the breadth of participation permitted, both by the Court’s instruments, and 
the decisions of Chambers.98
It must also be acknowledged that victim anonymity, which is arguably 
necessary in some instances so that individuals feel able to participate, has been 
‘affirmed on many occasions’, including for those who have made opening and closing 
statements.  McAsey argues that the ability for anonymous victims to do so could be 99
‘very detrimental’ to the rights of the accused.  In the Lubanga case, of the one 100
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hundred and twenty-nine victims who participated in the proceedings, only twenty-three 
of the identities were disclosed.  Whilst the Trial Chamber recognised the dangers 101
associated with victim anonymity, it also expressed considerable concern for the 
vulnerability of victims and its responsibility to ensure their safety.  It then stated that 102
‘the greater the extent and the significance of the proposed participation, the more 
likely it will be that the Chamber will require the victim to identify himself or herself’.  103
Whilst this is a commendable intention, the reality is that many victims were granted 
anonymity. It is not sufficient to merely state such aims without following through with a 
robust approach regarding the use of anonymous witnesses in light of their potential 
adversely to affect the fairness of the proceedings. 
B. The term ‘victim’ and the presumption of innocence
The labelling of an individual as a ‘victim’ is arguably problematic, as their participation 
gives rise to a presumption that the crimes in question have occurred. Normally, the 
factual basis of the crime is something that the Prosecutor must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt.  McAsey considers that this may not be such an issue where the 104
occurrence of the crime is accepted, however, ‘in all other cases the danger of 
prejudgment is present’.  The risk remains that the acceptance of victims could 105
‘adversely affect the perception of the accused and by extension, their right to a fair 
trial’.  Zappalà argues that as a result, judges must exercise extreme caution in 106
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March 2012) Doc. No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 para 18
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision.’ supra (18 January 2008) paras 130-1102
 Ibid. para 131103
 ZAPPALÀ, S. (2010) at 146-7104
 McASEY, B. (2011) at 118105
 Ibid.106
!179
demonstrating in their judgement that they did not take for granted the factual basis of 
the crimes.107
This area of procedural law is formulated against a backdrop of the real needs 
of victims who have been traumatised as a result of devastating atrocities. It would be 
regrettable if those who were genuinely affected, and who wished to be considered for 
participation, were to feel at risk of being disbelieved. Whilst this also applies to victims 
at national levels, the number of potential victims involved with international crimes can 
stretch into the many hundreds of thousands, particularly in relation to armed conflicts, 
or genocides.  If the Court were to create a culture whereby victims are made to feel 108
almost on trial themselves in respect of their contributions, it could lead to a significant 
reduction in participation. This could be particularly damaging, especially concerning 
those who have a dual status as both victim and witness, given their importance to the 
trial process. Despite the need for sensitivity, it is also important to ensure that victims 
are truthful in their accounts. This is a cause of tension involving the presumption of 
innocence as, generally speaking, it will not be easy to maintain that both an alleged 
victim and the defendant are telling the truth: these mutually exclusive claims cannot 
both be ‘true’.  Thus, if we must presume the innocence of the defendant as a central 109
concept of a fair trial, it may be irreconcilable to automatically accept that victims are 
truthful in their accounts. Jouet notes that the treatment of victims as ‘actual’ rather 
than ‘alleged’ could severely undermine the presumption of innocence.  As a result, 110
he argues that victims should not participate as actual victims until ‘it has, at least, 
been proven beyond reasonable doubt that a crime occurred and that they are 
victims’.  Whilst this could be seen as a high threshold to meet prior to victim 111
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involvement, it may be required to ensure that participation does not encroach on the 
fairness of the proceedings. The distinction between actual and alleged could even 
allow those with an alleged status to participate without violating the rights of the 
accused.  112
Although this approach may seem, perhaps unnecessarily, sceptical of the 
reliability of victims, there have already been instances at the ICC which demonstrate a 
need for caution. In the Lubanga case, the Chamber was faced with victims whose 
statements were inconsistent, and thus found them to be inadmissible on the grounds 
of unreliability.  In addition, the Chamber also concluded that there was a real 113
possibility that the identities of specific individuals were stolen, so as to ‘obtain the 
benefits they expected to receive as victims participating in these proceedings’.114
C. Proper notice of charges
Intervention on the part of counsel who represent the interests of victims has caused 
concern regarding the extent to which defendants are denied a fair opportunity to 
respond adequately to a change in their charges. This arose in the trial of Lubanga, 
where the victims’ representative petitioned the Court to change and add charges 
against the accused.  At the outset of the trial, the defendant was charged with 115
recruiting, enlisting, and conscripting child soldiers under Article 8(2)b(xxvi) Rome 
Statute. In May 2009, the victims’ legal representative asked the Trial Chamber to 
reconsider the charges  so as to include sexual slavery, by virtue of the fact that 116
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several had testified as having witnessing such acts.  Johnson notes that the 117
Prosecution did not echo this sentiment, instead preferring to keep the charges 
‘narrow’, so as to ease the burden of proof.  Nevertheless, the majority of the Trial 118
Chamber ruled that it was permissible to add new charges based on trial testimony.  119
However, presiding Judge Fulford dissented, arguing that the victims’ representatives 
were seeking to add five additional charges, rather than modify them.  Zappalà 120
describes the majority decision to add new charges as ‘perplexing’.  He argues that 121
victim participation ‘should never entail turning the status of victims into that of parties 
to the proceedings’, nor should it ‘lead to a real confrontation with the defendant on an 
equal footing’.  Judge Fulford’s concerns were not without merit, and the Appeals 122
Chamber granted the appeal against the decision, holding that the Trial Chamber had 
erred in law by finding it to be permissible, under Regulation 55, to include additional 
facts and circumstances not described in the charges.  Notwithstanding this decision, 123
the concern remains that if significant changes to the charges are permitted, the 
Defence will struggle adequately to organise a defence strategy as a result of the 
uncertainty. The negative impact on the Defence case should not be underestimated; 
Johnson goes as far as to predict that Lubanga’s conviction will be reversed on appeal 
 JOHNSON, S.T. (2010) at 494117
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due the misdirection of the Court’s ‘efforts to fairly and impartially try the defendant’ 
caused by the participation of victims.124
D. Delays to proceedings
Significant delays to the proceedings can occur by virtue of the time-consuming 
process by which victims who wish to be considered for participation must be assessed 
by both the Prosecution and defence teams.  Delays to this ‘inefficient’ procedure 125
have been compounded by translational requirements, and the absence of a limit on 
the number victims who may apply to be considered.  The sheer volume of applicants 126
can reach overwhelming levels; the Trial Chamber granted victim status to more than 
four thousand applicants in the Bemba case.  If the inclusion of victims in the trial 127
process is to be retained as a worthwhile goal and endeavour of the Court, it may 
necessarily follow that, due to the workloads associated with the related assessment, 
concessions might have to be made regarding the speed at which the cases 
progress.  Further delays are unlikely to be well received, as the ICC has attracted 128
considerable criticism regarding the time it has taken to process its initial cases, but as 
Jouet argues ‘this may be a reasonable price to pay for victim participation’.  Greater 129
acceptance of lengthy delays to proceedings could be beneficial, however the right of 
the accused to an expeditious trial must also be considered.130
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E. The effect of victim participation on the judiciary
As the ultimate decision maker, judges could be affected profoundly by victim 
testimony. As Gordon observes, whilst victim participation must be exercised in a 
manner which respects the fair trial rights of the accused, ‘it is difficult to reconcile this 
with the extraordinary influences the victims may exert over the process’.  Their 131
accounts will oftentimes concern particularly disturbing events. Damaška observes that 
this creates an ‘atmosphere of revulsion and anger’, which can lead to defence 
submissions, such as those regarding innocence or mitigation, being obscured by 
‘burning sympathies for the plight of the victims’.  The concern is that this could lead 132
judges to attribute a larger role in the crimes than the defendant actually committed.  133
Damaška further warns that even the danger of scapegoating the accused ‘should not 
be ruled out’.  Judges axiomatically have a duty to remain neutral and open-minded 134
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. However, the difficulties associated with 
remaining dispassionate should be recognised. As Jouet argues, it would be unrealistic 
to expect that judges can remain detached, ‘especially in high-profile international 
prosecutions characterized by the unspeakable enormity of atrocities wrought on 
victims, extreme unpopularity of defendants, critical political stakes, and intense media 
coverage’.135
Whether out of respect for a victim, or as a result of bias, judges have allowed 
victims to go beyond that which is strictly relevant to the charges against the 
defendant.  Defence counsel have been critical of such practices, since testimony of 136
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this kind could be damaging to the accused’s case.  It is perhaps not unsurprising 137
that victim statements can contain many references to more general historical events, 
which might become prejudicial though ‘guilt by association’.  138
F. The pressure put on the ICC by victim participation
The goals of the ICC are diverse, and differ from those at the domestic level. These 
aims include: attempting to bring justice; providing the opportunity for truth-telling ‘by 
letting victims relate their painful experiences’; compiling an historical record, among 
many others.  Damaška reasons that as a result of these ambitions, one would 139
suppose the expectations to be modest, when in fact they are ‘almost grandiose’.  140
The ICC is the first modern international criminal institution to elevate the position of 
victims, and attempts to place restorative justice firmly within the trial process.  The 141
difficult, and perhaps unpopular, question which must be asked here is whether the 
Court is best placed to meet the needs of victims, and whether this is being provided at 
too costly a rate, in some ways at the defendant’s expense. Furthermore, considering 
that many victims do not travel to the Hague, but are instead represented in Court, it 
must be questioned whether victim participation is genuinely ‘effective and meaningful, 
or merely symbolic’.  If merely symbolic, is the fulfilment of this goal worth 142
jeopardising the right of the accused?
Zappalà contends that the ‘overarching purpose’ of criminal procedure is to 
‘reach a finding of guilt or innocence whilst protecting at the highest level the rights’ of 
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the suspects and accused.  This is particularly crucial given the need for the ICC to 143
be perceived as legitimate. If it failed to be perceived as such, the substantial time, 
effort and money which is invested in the Court annually would constitute a 
phenomenal waste. Thus, it is argued that any conflict between the rights of the 
accused and those of the victims should be carefully balanced.  Jouet suggests that 144
the role of victim participation should be interpreted narrowly in order to refrain from 
conflicting with the accused’s rights.  As a result of the shortcomings of the Court’s 145
founding legal texts, the ICC’s approach to developing and clarifying the role of victim 
involvement has had to be developed subsequently, in a piecemeal fashion. This has 
negatively impacted on the Defence, particularly concerning their time and facilities 
with which to prepare their case as a result of having to ‘constantly adapt its arguments 
and strategy’.  Johnson argues that the involvement of victims at the guilt phase of 146
proceedings ‘places too great a strain upon this fledgling institution and jeopardizes 
both the defendant's right to a fair trial and the ICC's legitimacy’.147
Ultimately, the ‘rights’ of victims who have been involved in mass atrocities will 
more readily attract consideration than the accused who stands charged. Jouet rejects 
as ‘flawed’ the argument of ‘excessive rights’, reasoning that as the defendant is likely 
to be committed under at least one count of the charges, victim participation is ‘not 
outcome-changing’.  Since we cannot know in advance whether an accused will be 148
acquitted, ‘we should not let unfair procedures infect any defendant's trial’.  Zappalà 149
states that under no circumstances ‘may the rights of victims prevail over the rights of 
the defendant’, as one of the main lessons to emerge from the NIMT was that fairness 
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will be ‘the main yardstick against which the legitimacy of the whole exercise will be 
measured’.150
G. Multiple accusers of the defendant?
The inclusion of victims within the central framework of the ICC, together with the wide 
scope of their involvement, raises the concern that the Defence can be said to face 
multiple accusers. As both the Prosecution and victims can advance incriminating 
evidence, it would be reasonable for the Defence to feel ‘overwhelmed’ as a result.  151
Although victims are not afforded the status of a party within the proceedings, 
Damaška reasons that ‘the defendant could easily begin to harbor the feeling that he is 
engaged in agonistic confrontation with more than one procedural adversary’.  152
Allowing victims to become direct, active parties in the proceedings can violate the 
principle of EoA if it causes a ‘serious imbalance’, which ‘would be inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused’.  As explored in Chapter 6, the Defence have limited funding 153
and resources with which to put forward their case against a very strong OTP. McAsey 
argues that having to face additional accusers ‘would almost certainly be a further 
strain on their limited resources’.  Furthermore, she notes that much will depend on 154
the Chambers to limit participation if the Defence should become overwhelmed by 
additional evidence submitted on behalf of the victims, yet recognises that such a 
dependency on judicial discretion would likely be ‘cold comfort’ for the accused.  155
Judge Pikis in his dissenting opinion in Lubanga asserted that victims are not a party to 
the proceedings, arguing that a fair trial is a pre-requisite for victims, which is ‘the only 
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context within which victims may voice their views’.  The ultimate impact of victim 156
participation is that through its contribution to creating ‘multiple accusers’ for the 
Defence, the Prosecution’s burden of proof could consequently be reduced. Jouet 
argues that due to the deficiencies in the ICC’s Statute and RPE, ‘there is a risk that 
victim participation could violate defendants' due process rights, such as by lowering 
the prosecution's burden of proof, shifting this burden to the defense, and undermining 
the presumption of innocence’.  It is argued that Chambers can actively attempt to 157
reduce the potential for victim participation to constitute another accuser, or indeed 
opponent, for the Defence.
4. The influence of the Judiciary on the trial process
The working cultures at the courts and tribunals will inevitably impact heavily upon their 
operation and ultimate success.  The influence of the judiciary is an area worthy of 158
examination, particularly regarding the employment of judges from varied domestic 
backgrounds in a mixed, international setting. Their independence and neutrality are 
crucial requirements if the accused is to receive a fair trial. This section will also 
consider the impact of influential personnel, such as the Registrar, from a wider 
institutional perspective. 
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A. The appointment criteria for Judges
The criteria regarding the appointment of judges at the ICC can be criticised as failing 
to be sufficiently rigorous, particularly given the complex nature of their role at the 
international level. Article 36 3(a) of the Rome Statute states that judges must be of 
‘high moral character, impartiality and integrity’ and ‘possess the qualifications required 
in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices’. The 
appointment of Japanese judge, Fumiko Saiga, illustrates the shortcomings of the 
selection criteria. Despite her extensive diplomatic experience, she did not possess a 
law degree, which can under certain circumstances render an individual eligible for 
appointment to Japan’s Supreme Court.  However, by virtue Article 36 3(b)ii, there is 159
nevertheless a requirement that candidates ‘have established competence in criminal 
law and procedure, and the necessary relevant experience’. It can also be criticised 
that this requirement is relaxed further by the alternative that candidates possess 
‘competence in relevant areas of international law’.  Ambos cites Judge Saiga’s 160
appointment as an example of the ICC’s ‘all-too-generous interpretation’ of the 
requirements.  Nevertheless, the current ICC judges appear to have, without 161
exception, substantial and relevant experience for the role.162
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B. The influence of the Judiciary: the need for independence and detachment
As the principle decision makers and triers of fact, the judiciary must not only be guided 
by principles of fairness, they must also be perceived to be fair.  Cockayne argues 163
that the ‘cornerstone’ of international criminal justice is ‘judicial independence and 
professionalism’, as without it, the system will ‘lose legitimacy and fail’.  If the 164
judiciary is not independent, then their impartiality is ‘open to question’.  The 165
judiciary's potential to impact upon the fairness of an accused’s trial should not be 
under-estimated, even where a court’s statute and rules provide seemingly adequate 
protections. Even with a strong set of due process protections, it does not necessarily 
follow that ‘those protections will be strictly adhered to in the process of judicial 
interpretation’.  166
Fairlie suggests that the most vital role of the judiciary can be seen to be the 
application of the rules of procedure ‘with a necessary detachment’.  To quote Lord 167
Greene, MR of the English Court of Appeal, a judge who ‘descends into the arena’ is 
‘liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict’, which could mean that he 
unconsciously ‘deprives himself of the advantage of calm and dispassionate 
observation’.  In practice, judges cannot be expected to be immune from external 168
pressures and their own intrinsic bias;  they cannot perform their role as an 169
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automaton. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 
particular has been prone to criticism regarding perceived levels of corruption amongst 
the judiciary, with ‘widespread criticism that some of them may have previously allowed 
political influence to determine the outcome of particular cases’.  170
C. The effects of a mixed procedural system
The judiciary in ICJ is yet another element of the trial which has been shaped by virtue 
of its uniquely mixed procedure. Broadly speaking, judges from adversarial systems 
tend to be passive in their approach, acting as neutral umpires, whereas those from 
inquisitorial systems tend to be more actively involved.  It has been observed that the 171
approach taken by judges at the ICC appears to be more active than at the ICTY.  172
The mixed nature of the international institutions inevitably attracts judges from diverse 
legal backgrounds, with contrasting approaches. Both passive and active styles  173
have their own respective strengths and weaknesses: the former could mean that 
judges contribute less to attempting to uncover the judicial (or forensic) ‘truth’, whereas 
the latter could result in a reduction of neutrality from the decision making process. The 
composition of the bench, particularly if dominated by judges from a particular 
background, could have a marked impact on the direction and management of a case. 
Ideally, judges will attempt to transcend their own legal systems  in a bid to increase 174
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uniformity across the Bench, yet this is easier to achieve in theory than reality, and a 
greater awareness of these tendencies should be encouraged.
There is a particularly important consequence of the adoption of an active 
judicial approach at the international courts and tribunals. Is the judiciary, by utilising an 
active approach, helping to dispel the burden of proof which should be ‘shouldered’ 
entirely by the Prosecution? Karnavas argues that judges could act as ‘the prosecutor’s 
midwife - delivering the requisite proof the prosecution has failed to amass to establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’.  He also observes that this situation is not 175
comparable to that of inquisitorial systems, in which it is within the ‘exclusive province’ 
of the judges to be convinced as the fact finder.  If the Prosecution's burden of 176
establishing guilt were to be tangibly eased by an active judiciary, a serious imbalance 
in the proceedings could result unless similar support is provided for the Defence, 
particularly in light of the already powerful nature of the Prosecution. Zappalà suggests 
that the best solution to uphold the accused’s rights is ‘to interpret the power of the 
judges to search for the truth as a mechanism to be used only in favour of the 
accused’.  The complex dynamic found here is yet another example of the difficulties 177
encountered in the process of creating a unique international procedure.
Given the weaker position of the Defence in relation to the Prosecution, 
inevitably there will be instances in which it is appropriate and necessary to provide 
assistance, which Zappalà maintains does not violate any legal principle. However, 
there are greater implications where a judge responds to the requests of other 
participants, such as the OTP or ‘Victims and Witnesses Unit’ at the ICC. If the judges 
are consequently ‘instrumental’ in gathering evidence against the accused, it could be 
considered more difficult to challenge as a result of it being ‘impartially obtained’.  178
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This could result in at least the perception of less objectivity, by virtue of ‘developing a 
sort of natural sympathy for the evidence ‘they’ obtained’.  In terms of cross-179
examination, Karnavas contends that allowing judges to question and summon 
witnesses ‘raises the spectre of impartiality’.  He also notes that judges from civil law 180
systems will often ‘unstitch what would classically appear as an effective cross-
examination, by asking the questions or seeking explanations to matters that were 
gingerly avoided by the cross-examiner’.  This gives rise to uncertainty as to how the 181
role of cross-examination is to be potentially shared between defence counsel and an 
inquiring judge. It is possible that the latter may encroach on the techniques and 
strategies employed by counsel.
D. Improper judicial conduct: evidence of bias?
Even amongst judges, it can be observed that those accused of international crimes do 
not readily receive much ‘sympathy’.  As judicial bias need not be overt,  it can be 182 183
difficult, if not impossible to fully analyse judges’ private thought processes. It is 
possible, however, to assess their conduct, both in and outside of the courtroom. Sadly, 
there is no shortage of examples of judges in international trials falling short of their 
obligations to maintain professional and unbiased positions. As a result, it can be 
argued that there is considerable evidence to suggest a bias, usually in the form of 
judicial ‘prosecutorial zeal’.  184
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The ICTY did not have the benefit of precedent concerning how best to ensure 
judges and senior figures should conduct themselves in the public eye. Antonio 
Cassese, a highly regarded academic and judge, made questionable statements in a 
Tribunal press release in 1995, stating that the ‘Judges are anxious that a programme 
of indictments should effectively meet the expectations of the Security Council and of 
the world community at large’.  Robertson criticised these comments as hardly being 185
the language of a judge, ‘whose duty is not to act as avenging angels but to do justice 
though heavens fall’.186
The conduct of Judge Karibi-White during the ICTY ‘Čelebići’ case is 
particularly worrying. The Judge had noticeably fallen asleep while the court was in 
session, which the Appeals Chamber held represented a ‘recurring pattern’ whereby he 
was not ‘fully conscious’ for periods of usually five to ten seconds.  The Chamber 187
conceded that this pattern ‘repeated over extended periods of ten to fifteen minutes on 
a number of occasions’.  Furthermore, during an examination of a witness, Judge 188
Karibi-White ‘appeared to be asleep for approximately thirty minutes’.  On a separate 189
occasion, Judge Jan had to lean over to ‘touch Judge Karibi-Whyte when his head had 
dropped’.  Despite the Appeals Chamber firmly stating that such conduct could not be 190
accepted as appropriate,  it nevertheless dismissed the challenge.  A reluctance to 191 192
take meaningful measures in response to inappropriate and unprofessional judicial 
conduct is regrettable, and only serves to further the disrepute which the original 
behaviour might have attracted. 
 ICTY Press Release, ‘The Judges of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia express their 185
concern regarding the substance of their programme of judicial work for 1995.’ (1 February 
1995) Doc. Ref. CC/PIO/003E
 Robertson, G. ‘War crimes deserve a fair trial.’ The Times (June 25 1996)186
 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo (The 187
‘Čelebići’ case) Appeals Chamber ‘Judgement.’  (20 February 2001) Case No. IT-96-21 para 
628
 Ibid.188
 Ibid.189
 Ibid.190
 Ibid. para 629191
 See, BOHLANDER, M. (2007) p375192
!194
Judge Robertson at the SCSL was disqualified as a result of publishing a book 
in 2002, prior to his appointment at the Court, entitled ‘Crimes Against Humanity: The 
Struggle for Global Justice’.  Cockayne questions the Judge’s decision to accept a 193
place on the bench,  in spite of his description of the RUF as ‘guilty of atrocities on a 194
scale that amounts to a crime against humanity’, and of Foday Sankoh as being ‘the 
nation’s butcher’.  Judge Robertson refused to withdraw from the Bench, but was 195
nevertheless disqualified by the Appeals Chamber.  A more rigorous appreciation of 196
the need for justice being seen to be done would have been welcomed. Care must also 
be exercised with respect to conduct outside the courtroom. In one instance, Judge 
Vaz, the then Vice-President at the ICTR, allowed an attorney from her home of 
Senegal - who was appearing before her in court - to reside at her house.  Cockayne 197
argues that the occurrence of such ‘unfortunate’ instances invites the criticism that the 
‘failure of judicial propriety may be systemic’.198
It is interesting to note that at the ad hoc Tribunals, there is ‘no clear disciplinary 
or oversight regime for safeguarding the proper adherence to judicial conduct and 
ethics’.  In contrast, the ICC has an (albeit brief) ‘Code of Judicial Ethics’, which sets 199
out basic guidelines covering concepts such as independence, impartiality and 
integrity.  Jones et al. argue that judges should endeavour to ‘go out of their way to 200
demonstrate their impartiality and commitment to helping the Defence overcome the in-
built handicaps to which they are prone in defending their clients against the superior 
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resources of the OTP’.  The appearance of being ‘prosecution-minded’ can 201
undermine the integrity of the entire judicial process: ‘the well-spring of the Court's 
legitimacy’.  Cogan calls for judges to take a more contextual approach towards the 202
rights of the accused ‘through the prism of the structural limitations on these courts’, 
allowing judges ‘to take into account the difficulties inherent in international criminal 
defense’.203
E. An institutional mindset?
Another form of undue influence can occur at a more local, institutional level. The 
concern is that greater value might be placed on the securing of convictions, rather 
than the commitment to ensuring a fair and rights respecting procedure.  Such a 204
mindset could risk undermining the goals of fair and dispassionate decision making.  205
This issue can become compounded by a wider culture of ‘camaraderie’. Personnel 
can become ‘mission-oriented’ by virtue of their collective task to secure convictions, 
which can be said to be the case particularly at the ad hoc Tribunals.  Herein lies the 206
potential for the creation of a divisive working culture, in which the permanent and 
extensive Prosecution, together with other personnel, form their own ‘cozy expatriate 
social community’, from which the Defence are largely excluded.  In contrast, the 207
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transient nature of defence representation, together with the associated travel 
demands can result in a ‘culture’ of excluding the Defence.  208
In relation to a court’s physical architecture,  the Registrar, Chambers and 209
Prosecution often take up a large proportion of the premises in comparison with the 
Defence.  Jalloh and DiBella observe that ‘the structural position of the defence has 210
been subordinated to the prosecution, as well as to Chambers and the Registry, in 
each of these courts’.  They argue that the use of framed pictures of Judges, as well 211
as Registry staff, in the lobby of the ICC ‘bears symbolic testimony to this’, particularly 
in light of the notable absence of any defence presence.  In a relatively small city 212
such as The Hague, where a great deal of international criminal trials take place, there 
are additional benefits of socialisation and support available to permanent staff.  213
D’Amato observes that they share a collective ‘sense of pride and accomplishment 
when a war criminal is convicted’.214
Particular roles have the potential to have a substantial impact on the running of 
an institution. For example, defence counsel at the ICC have found the power of the 
Registrar to be ‘excessively’ concentrated.  This in part is due to the conceptual 215
framework of the Court, which includes the Defence within the Registry. This results in 
the Registrar being responsible for overseeing all manner of defence requests, such as 
payment, the hiring of investigators, and the approval of financial plans for travel.  In 216
an ideal world, free from outside influence, this would not be necessarily problematic, 
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with the Registrar acting in a neutral and fair manner. However, should there be a lack 
of sympathy or understanding concerning the needs of the Defence, therein arises a 
risk that bias on the part of the Registrar could detrimentally affect the Defence. It must 
be recognised that no individual can guarantee they will be unaffected by the pressures 
and ‘politics’ inherent in any institution. However, extreme care should be taken as to 
the suitability of the Registrar, with a view to ensuring that he or she has a genuine 
appreciation of the need for neutrality, as well as an understanding of the unique, 
practical problems with which Defence teams continuously faced.
5. Conclusion
The cumulative effect of the issues discussed throughout this Chapter give rise to the 
crucial question of whether the modern international criminal courts and tribunals have 
been constructed in a manner which places the accused at an institutional 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent(s). Newton asserts that a ‘perfect equality of arms 
is a structural impossibility in the current system of international justice’.  In addition 217
to the structural inequality, there appears to be a ‘general atmosphere’ at the modern 
institutions, in which the ‘political and psychological advantages’ are weighed in favour 
of the OTP.218
This Chapter has sought to highlight the problems with the Prosecution’s dual 
role, which can be argued to be conceptually flawed. The deeply conflicted role of the 
OTP requires it to act as an independent organ, and ‘should refrain from considering 
herself as a classic counterweight to the Defence’.  If the Prosecution is unable or 219
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unwilling to fulfil its obligations to investigate, as well as later disclose, evidence in a 
neutral manner then the Defence will be placed at a significant disadvantage.  220
Fedorova argues that the Chambers ‘have not paid sufficient (explicit) attention to the 
shared responsibility of the prosecutor concerning truth finding, fair trial and equality of 
arms’, adding that the judges should ‘arguably be more explicit and consistent as to 
their vision of the prosecutorial role’.221
The process for including witness testimony at the ICC raises particular 
concerns for the Defence, whereby the proceedings can be described as ‘multiparty’.  222
This could become problematic if the inclusion of multiple ‘accusers’ detracts from the 
crucial question of whether the accused is guilty of the charges.  Judge Pikis, in his 223
‘partly dissenting’ opinion in Lubanga, raised similar concerns, stating that the 
‘adversary of the accused is the Prosecutor and none other. The defendant cannot 
have more than one accuser. It is not for the accused to prove his innocence’.  Thus, 224
the role of the judges in protecting the overall fair trial rights of the accused is of 
paramount importance. Bassiouni states that judges being free from bias and 
prejudice, so as to be ‘institutionally and personally independent from political or 
administrative control and influence’, is ‘axiomatically’ linked with the provision of fair 
trial.  The availability of examples relating to inappropriate or ill-considered conduct 225
on the part of international judges indicates that more stringent standards are called 
for. International courts and tribunals require ‘neutral, dispassionate actors’ in order 226
to demonstrate their commitment to their due regard of the rights of the accused. 
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Verrijn Stuart argues that the ICC has ‘become a fight culture with not enough 
experienced judges to manage a diverse group of individuals effectively, or to muster 
the courage to set an example’.  Thus, there is a pressing need for more judges to 227
provide clear and effective guidelines in their rulings.228
The next Chapter will examine how principles of fairness and EoA affect 
evidentiary issues at trial. This will include analysing pre-trial investigations, the 
disclosure of evidence relevant to the Defence, as well as access to other important 
forms of evidence, such as witness testimony. These aspects of the trial process 
present the Defence with specific difficulties in practice, which must be considered 
together with the issues raised in Chapters 6 and 7 in order to analyse 
comprehensively the extent of any Inequality of Arms.
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Chapter 8. 
Equality of Arms and Evidence
‘[T]he idealistic plans of all these tribunals are foundering on practical shoals, 
overwhelmed by hundreds of cases and protracted proceedings. Their substantive 
aspirations have not been built upon solid, realistic procedural foundations.’1
1. Introduction
This Chapter will focus on the Principle of Equality of Arms (EoA) in relation to three 
different aspects of evidence crucial to the trial process, namely: the difficulties 
associated with pre-trial investigations, the problems relating to the disclosure of 
evidence, and the impact of witness testimony.  There are many forms of both direct 2
and indirect evidence which can be submitted for the judge's consideration.  The scope 3
of this study necessitates limitations on the analysis of the extent to which evidentiary 
issues impact upon the fairness of the proceedings.  However, an examination of the 4
aforementioned areas in this Chapter should provide an overview of the evidentiary 
issues which affect the trial process, and in particular the defence case, most 
profoundly.  
A legitimate fact-finding procedure relies heavily upon the ability of the Court to 
gather all manner of evidence to be admitted at trial. If, for a variety of reasons, the 
Defence is routinely restricted or inhibited from accessing and presenting relevant 
evidence, the overall fairness of the trial will be substantially undermined.  Newton 5
 BIBAS, S. & BURKE-WHITE, W. (2010) ‘International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-1
Procedure Realism.’ 59 Duke Law Journal. 637-704 at 640
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Publishers.
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observes that in some instances, a ‘lack of fair and timely access to information’ may 
constitute ‘the single most troubling aspect of the international criminal justice system’.6
This Chapter will begin by analysing the difficulties experienced by the modern 
institutions in relation to pre-trial investigations, examining some broader issues, such 
as state co-operation and the provision of access to investigation teams. As Tuinstra 
observes, it is usually the case that the Prosecution experiences fewer difficulties with 
site visits, as defence teams can be perceived as being ‘on the side of the enemy’.  7
The Prosecution typically carries the primarily responsibility for the bulk of 
investigations. Thus, the budget for additional defence investigations is small. Due to 
the inevitable delay which arises by virtue of the Prosecution’s pre-trial investigations 
(which are required in order to bring charges against individuals), it will be argued that 
the Defence is in a strategically weaker position ab initio.8
The second issue to be analysed is that of disclosure. International criminal 
trials invariably involve many thousands of documents, the sheer volume of which can 
be overwhelming for small defence teams with few personnel. It is also worth noting 
that due to the advances in technology, evidentiary material is increasingly catalogued 
via electronic means, yet the degree to which this has improved organisation must be 
questioned. Furthermore, the implications of the use of confidentiality agreements will 
be examined, particularly given their controversial use in the first trial to be completed 
at the ICC.  There have also been instances of non-disclosure, whereby the 9
Prosecution has failed to disclose evidence; these must be considered, particularly in 
light of the Prosecutor's dual role to investigate both exculpatory and inculpatory 
evidence. These issues are of great importance given that access to information and 
 NEWTON, M.A. (2011) ‘Evolving Equality: The Development of the International Defence Bar.’ 6
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the disclosure of evidence are closely linked with the right to adequate time and 
facilities to prepare.  10
The final aspect of evidence to be explored will be witness testimony. Instances 
in which witness may have been remunerated for their testimony, or else have falsified 
their accounts, highlight the need for scrupulous care to be taken with the inclusion of 
such evidence, whilst remaining sensitive to the terrible ordeals some individuals will 
have endured. An area of particular tension is that of witness anonymity and its 
potential to impact detrimentally on the rights of the accused.11
It will be argued that the collective consideration of these issues indicates a 
worrying trend, whereby the principle of EoA fails to be translated into meaningful 
protections for the accused at trial in relation to accessing and presenting evidence.
2. EoA and access to evidence: Pre-trial investigations
This section will focus primarily on the ICC in light of its commitment to investigate 
broad geographic regions, in conflicts or disruption that may be continuing, which could 
involve many victims and witnesses. The Prosecutor can initiate an investigation if 
there is a ‘reasonable basis to proceed’,  provided this decision is later authorised by 12
the Pre-Trial Chamber.  This Chamber is responsible for the subsequent proceedings, 13
and will issue warrants of arrest or summons to appear, where appropriate.  As and 14
when a named individual is brought before the Court, a hearing to confirm the charges 
will take place.  These stages, which will be referred to collectively here as the pre-15
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trial/investigation phase of the proceedings, trigger the rights relating to investigations 
set out in Article 55 of the Statute.  The Prosecution has a statutory duty to disclose 16
the evidence which it intends to rely on at the confirmation hearing.  As Ambos has 17
observed, the concept of the judicially controlled pre-trial can be seen as a mixture of 
the French and German systems, and is therefore inquisitorial in origin.  18
The Prosecution carries the primary responsibility for conducting 
investigations.  The manner and extent to which it carries out its investigative duty will 19
have one of the biggest impacts on the direction and fairness of an accused’s trial.  20
The Prosecution is allocated an extensive investigation budget, yet it also benefits from 
other advantages which are not shared by the Defence. These are set out in the 
Statutes and RPEs, and include the ability to seek assistance from State authorities, 
such as co-operation with the seizure of evidence and the arrest of suspects.  Whilst 21
such measures do not necessarily guarantee the full co-operation of States, or access 
to all evidence and witnesses, its power ‘certainly enables the prosecution to conduct a 
vigorous and robust investigation.’  Caianiello reasons that whilst some might argue 22
that the disparate investigative means between the Prosecution and Defence are no 
cause for concern, this is ‘not a well-founded opinion’ due to the structural advantage 
given to the OTP under the Rome Statute during the investigation phase.  23
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At the ICTY, the OTP has benefitted from the Tribunal issuing broad search and 
seizure warrants, yet the Defence have not shared the same level of access to 
evidence.  The privileged position of the Prosecution also allows it to expedite the 24
organisation of its investigations. Stephen Kay QC, counsel in the ICTR case of 
Musema,  noted the ‘stark contrast’ in the defence’s efforts to plan their travel and 25
security arrangements to Kigali. The Prosecution was able to mobilise itself with ease 
to the very sites that the Defence had planned to visit.  Furthermore, the reception 26
which the Defence receives can impede substantially its ability to investigate, as they 
can be ‘at risk of obstruction, threats and physical abuse’.  Wladimiroff, who has 27
worked at both the ICTY and ICTR, recounts instances of local authorities blocking the 
defence investigation by harassing potential witnesses, refusing to produce documents 
and causing delays of almost nine months before granting leave to visit sites.28
At the ICC, the Defence must likewise operate on an un-level playing field with 
respect to the Prosecution, as they are given fewer powers, privileges and 
immunities.  As a result, the OTP draws an advantage from its broader and more 29
effective means of investigation.  This imbalance includes the Prosecution having at 30
its disposal a standing staff of investigators and experts on hand.  The same cannot 31
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be said for a defence team, which will only come into ‘existence’ once a particular 
accused has been charged. 
Defence teams at the Court will similarly face difficulties with State authorities 
who are reluctant to co-operate, particularly if there is a desire to stop information from 
surfacing.  Unfortunately, a lack of co-operation by State authorities could keep 32
important evidence from the hands of the defence team, and thereby compromise the 
fairness of an accused’s trial.  As Gallant contends, the act of funding defence 33
investigations is not sufficient alone to ‘create all the conditions necessary for fully fair 
proceedings’.  However, the amount of funding and resources allocated to the 34
Defence for investigations is clearly of crucial importance. There is no clear statutory 
right for the accused to be provided with investigation funding, despite the general 
‘guarantee’ of adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the Defence under 
Article 67(1)b.  At the time of writing, each defence team is given a fixed budget of 35
€73,006 for the entirety of a case with a single accused. This budget is held ‘on trust’ 
by the Registry, meaning that defence counsel cannot freely access this money.  It 36
includes all fees for one investigator and one ‘resource person’, including all associated 
travel expenses and subsistence for team members who need to travel to the field.  37
The Registry states that this core budget is ‘for identifying potential witnesses and 
reaching a decision regarding their testimony, or acquiring relevant evidence for an 
average of 30 prosecution witnesses’.  Even if this amount could be considered 38
adequate for such objectives, a typical case can surpass these ranges. For example, 
the Prosecution in Lubanga called thirty-six witnesses at trial.  Turner argues that the 39
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fact that some defence attorneys have continued with their investigations even after 
exhausting the allocated funds ‘affirms their belief in the importance of an inquiry into 
the facts’.  She also notes that the ‘frequent failure by tribunals to reimburse 40
attorneys’, has resulted in their having to spend their own money in order to provide 
what they feel is an adequate defence.  A sufficient investigation budget is of crucial 41
importance if the Defence is to undertake a thorough examination into the reliability of 
the Prosecution’s evidence, and to search for exculpatory material, which can be a 
costly process.  It is therefore extremely regrettable that the Registry has recently 42
recommended a significant cut to the defence investigation budget.43
Defence counsel have much to do during the pre-trial phase of proceedings, 
when they will often not be located near the vicinity of the Court.  Investigations in 44
order to probe the allegations which have been made by the Prosecution, and to 
search for exonerating evidence, must be undertaken.  As the collection of evidence 45
by the Defence is a crucial part of its role, it must carry out tasks similar to the 
Prosecution, without the benefit of an entire division devoted to investigations.  46
Safferling emphasises the essential nature of these early defence investigations.  47
Whether a case is won or lost depends greatly on the evidence which is uncovered 
during this phase.  Effective investigations require ‘significant time, patience, and 48
effort’.  Buisman argues that whilst the Prosecution may be best equipped to deal with 49
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the reluctant state authorities, the same cannot be said of the ‘community, family, and 
friends of the accused who may not be as open to a prosecution investigator as they 
would be to someone representing the interests of the individual accused’.  As a 50
result, there will be numerous instances in which the defence team are in the stronger 
position to collect exculpatory evidence. 
Another issue of importance to defence investigations is the, arguably 
unavoidable, investigative delay it experiences in comparison with the the Prosecution. 
This delay is typically a numbers of years after the OTP, as the latter will not issue the 
arrest warrant or summons to appear until sufficient evidence has been collected.  51
The period of time which elapses allows a competent Prosecution to examine and 
collect significant amounts of evidence.  Karnavas observes that any evidence which 52
may have been deemed to be unhelpful may not have been collected, and this could 
include exculpatory evidence.  Additionally, by the time the Defence can access the 53
sites and follow important leads, evidence may already be either lost or beyond their 
grasp.  As a result, Ambos argues that the Defence ‘never has the same or even 54
similar possibilities as the Prosecution to prepare its case’.  This issue is deserving of 55
much greater recognition due to its potential to impact upon the fairness and legitimacy 
of the proceedings, both real and perceived. As the investigation and collection of 
evidence is ‘based on uneven legal grounds’, Safferling contends that the only 
remaining course of action for the Defence is to challenge the admissibility of evidence 
at the trial stage.  It can thus be argued that the Defence begins the trial process at a 56
real disadvantage, and must try to ‘reduce the advantage of the Prosecution, which has 
been involved in the case for a long time’.57
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It is argued here that the obligation placed on the Prosecution to search for both 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence is a difficult and, arguably ‘unnatural’ or illogical, 
requirement. The utilisation of a more neutral investigative body, even within the 
Prosecution, could address the current shortcomings.  The introduction of neutral 58
investigators in international criminal justice systems would allow their investigators to 
be more readily relied upon as ‘even-handed’.  However, expectations that such a 59
body could, in practice, be capable or willing to investigate in a neutral manner is 
perhaps overly-idealistic. Nonetheless, reform of the current investigative system is 
clearly needed. This was perhaps best articulated by Karim Khan QC, lead counsel for 
Ruto, in his opening statement:
‘There may be a time, your Honours, again after this case - it's too late for 
Mr Ruto, he's come too far - that the OTP may wish to appoint an 
independent lawyer [..] in every case whose only job it is, is to research and 
investigate exonerating material in order to show how real are the efforts to 
discharge the Article 54 responsibility. [..] [I]t shouldn't be relegated into an 
inconvenience of the Prosecution.’60
3. EoA and disclosure of evidence
The duty of the Prosecution to search for both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence is 
closely connected with the obligation of disclosure. The very concept of disclosure is a 
‘subtle admission’ that the system is imbalanced, which it serves to attempt to 
equalise.  Safferling argues that disclosure is one of the most ‘complex and time-61
consuming procedural issues in international criminal procedure’.  Due to the 62
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Prosecution’s investigative advantages, it consequently enjoys greater access to a 
wide range of evidence, giving it a ‘far freer hand in shaping the contours of the case’.  63
The huge volumes of evidence inevitable in international trials means that the proper 
disclosure of evidence is crucial. Three key issues will be examined here: the problems 
associated with confidential agreements; the duty on the Prosecution to disclose 
exculpatory evidence; the problems of late and non-disclosure.
The Defence will rely heavily on Prosecution disclosure, and the mass of 
documents made available can be ‘overwhelming’.  Newton observed in 2011, that the 64
ICTY had over six million documents in its database.  The ICTY set up the ‘Electronic 65
Disclosure System’ (EDS) in 2003, whereby documents and other forms of evidence 
could be placed on the electronic server, together with an identification code. Karnavas 
argues that whilst this ‘sounds idyllic, the EDS is far from the silver bullet acclaimed by 
the Prosecution.’  This is due, he argues, to a lack of identification data attached to 66
each file by the Prosecution, which consists of a ‘rather rudimentary indexing 
capability’, and ‘cumbersome search features’.  Perhaps most importantly, there is no 67
expectation on the OTP to notify the defence team routinely as to the existence of new 
disclosure material, including to what it refers, and how it might be located.  This can 68
potentially have serious negative ramifications for a defence team, who ‘at worst, may 
not be aware of the existence of the new material, and even if alerted, may spend 
precious hours finding the new material on the EDS’.  Thus, unless such an electronic 69
system is properly administered, the practical difficulties associated with disclosing 
large volumes of documents will not be addressed. 
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The ICC has also developed an electronic disclosure system, referred to more 
generally as ‘e-court’ facilities, which seems to be improving gradually. The defence 
team in the Court’s first case, Lubanga, repeatedly protested against the lack of 
adequate electronic systems to search through the fifteen-thousand documents 
available to them.  The Trial Chamber responded accordingly by ordering 70
improvements to the facilities.  As of July 2012, the ICC has a revised ‘e-Court 71
protocol’,  which sets out a more detailed framework as to how materials are to be 72
placed onto the system, in what format, and with a specifically structured form of 
referencing. Such protocols should in theory make the system more consistent, and in 
turn easier for all parties to search for specific items, provided that the protocol is 
followed. Included at the request of the Defence is the creation of a new metadata field, 
namely ‘related to witness’, which should allow a more efficient retrieval of witness 
statements, summaries and transcripts.  Overall, it has been suggested by Safferling 73
that the ICC has at its disposal ‘the most comprehensive disclosure system’.74
Whichever technical means of disclosing evidence is used, only the materials 
which the Prosecution has chosen to place on the system will be available to the 
Defence. There is the potential for the Prosecution, whether through a technological 
failing, or by deliberate choice, to omit important evidence. Perhaps the crucial 
weakness with the system of disclosure as it now stands, is the monitoring of the 
OTP’s disclosure behaviour. As Caianiello points out, ‘only the prosecutor knows the 
entirety of the evidence gathered by his office before trial. Judges cannot search in the 
prosecutors' files to gather more information relevant to a case’.  This is arguably yet 75
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another manifestation of the ‘Frankenstein’ effect and the unanticipated problems 
which have arisen through the mixing of systems in ICJ.76
A.  Disclosure and Confidentiality Agreements
The use of confidentiality agreements has proved to be a highly contentious issue, 
particularly at the ICC.  Under Article 54(3)e of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may 77
agree ‘not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that 
the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of 
generating new evidence’.  The latter part refers to what is more commonly known as 78
‘springboard’ evidence. Such material should only be of a preparatory nature, in the 
sense that the Prosecution ‘hopes to find more (direct) evidence by evaluating the 
information presented’ by virtue of the agreement.  Problems will arise if the 79
Prosecution makes liberal use of this power, which could seriously jeopardise the rights 
of the accused.80
Any analysis of the effects of confidentiality agreements is inherently difficult 
due to the nature of such information being withheld from entering the public domain. 
Thus, as Klip contends, ‘the exact impact of confidentiality restrictions cannot ever be 
analysed’.  Whilst the extent to which important evidence might remain undisclosed 81
due to confidentiality agreements is unknown, there are nevertheless incidents which 
have occurred at the ICC which are worthy of concern. Extreme examples have arisen 
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Procedure’ 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 451-462
 In relation to the case of Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/0677
 Section d also provides the Prosecutor may: ‘Enter into such arrangements or agreements, 78
not inconsistent with this Statute, as may be necessary to facilitate the cooperation of a State, 
intergovernmental organization or person.’
 SAFFERLING, C. (2012) p26979
 Ibid.80
 KLIP, A. (2012) ‘Confidentiality Restrictions’ 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 81
645-660 at 645
!212
in the Lubanga case. In one instance, the Defence pointed out that the Prosecution 
had included within its list of protected material a document which was already in the 
public domain.  This amounts to a misuse of such agreements,  and such behaviour 82 83
can reasonably be said to raise suspicion as to the Prosecution’s practices. Fedorova 
speculates that the Prosecution might have found itself under considerable pressure 
due to the difficulties of collecting evidence amidst the on-going conflict in the DRC, 
coupled with the expectations of an expensive Court, which is perceived by many as 
taking ‘too long to warm up’.  Despite these practical difficulties and pressures, it is 84
argued here that securing evidence under a cloak of confidentiality risks damaging the 
legitimacy of the proceedings.  
It must be acknowledged that confidentiality agreements play an important role 
in obtaining co-operation from States, organisations and individuals in complex and 
difficult circumstances. The most important problem in this context is that there are 
limited means to prevent abuse, to the detriment of the accused, which can ‘easily 
compromise the fairness and balance of the proceedings’.  Bibas and Burke-White 85
argue that Prosecutors should reject such restrictive agreements, despite the 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence which may not be attainable through any other 
means.  This view is particularly pertinent considering the fact that confidentiality rules 86
remain applicable throughout the duration of the trial.  As a result, Klip feels that this 87
causes a ‘marked inequality between the ability of the prosecutor and the defence to 
access information’ most prominent during the investigation phase, for which there is 
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no later compensation.  The concealment of information important to the Defence can 88
therefore be said to infringe upon his right to a fair trial.89
B. Disclosure of exculpatory evidence
At the ICTY, the Prosecution must disclose ‘as soon as practicable’ any material which 
‘may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the credibility 
of Prosecution evidence’.  The Rome Statute of the ICC has utilised very similar 90
wording, with the somewhat broader addition that the material ‘shows or tends to show 
the innocence of the accused’.  Safferling states that as a result of this provision, the 91
Prosecution is under a corresponding duty to assess carefully ‘every piece of evidence 
vis-à-vis every reasonably conceivable line of defence’.  As a result of the breadth of 92
the obligation, the OTP is under a substantial burden to consider properly how 
evidence might be useful for the Defence. Whilst this may seem burdensome, negative 
consequences could stem from the Defence failing to receive material which, alone, 
may appear to be of small significance, yet taken together with other material, could 
prove invaluable.  Jackson argues that the principle of EoA will not in practice be 93
achieved simply through the disclosure of some of the evidence which the Prosecution 
‘deems to be exculpatory or useful to the defence’.94
It can be argued that the lack of a requirement for the Prosecution to disclose 
all evidence collected, results in a lack of incentive for the Prosecution to search 
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‘equally’ for both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence in an impartial manner.  95
Instead, as Jackson argues, the goal is to ‘make one's own case within the rules as 
strongly as possible and leave it to the defence to pursue their case’.  The mind-set of 96
the Prosecution is interesting. No ‘Code of Conduct’ for the OTP was introduced until 
September 2013.  Thus, for over a decade, the permanent Prosecution staff have 97
been developing their own norms and work ethic regarding how they approach 
discharging the dual obligation. As a result, Katzman argues that leaving the evaluation 
of exculpatory evidence to the Prosecution is a ‘violation of the accused's fair trial 
rights’.  In the system as it currently stands, the only means of redress is judicial 98
intervention, in so far as it is possible. 
C. Timing issues; late disclosure
Difficulties can arise for the Defence whereby evidence is disclosed in an untimely 
manner, namely at such a late stage in the proceedings as to leave the team with 
insufficient time and resources to investigate and respond. The OTP’s investigation 
methods have been widely criticised by Chambers.  Karnavas notes that an 99
‘unfocused, haphazard or incompetent investigation’ contributes to the problems of late 
or untimely disclosure.  Additionally, as the Prosecution's investigations can be on-100
going until a final disposition, new evidence can continue to come to light.  As a 101
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consequence, the Defence will be required to respond, yet will often lack the necessary 
funds to do so adequately.  Karnavas argues that to compound problems, 102
‘requests to the Registrar for additional funds are likely to be met with 
scepticism, followed by a bureaucratic memo-writing obstacle course; an 
unnecessarily taxing and frustrating process which results in defocusing the 
defence to the advantage of the prosecution’.103
Thus, the Defence would benefit from increased awareness of the potentially damaging 
effect of such obstructive requirements. This is particularly problematic as it seems that 
disclosure problems related to timing are unfortunately ‘the nature of the beast: more 
the norm than the exception’.104
Potential unfairness stemming from the problems associated with the timing of 
disclosure may prove particularly difficult to change. This is because, as Verrijn Stuart 
asserts, the Prosecution ‘habit’ of disclosing large amounts of evidence at a late stage 
of the proceedings ‘does not stem from a misinterpretation of the Statute and the 
Rules’, but instead suggests ‘prosecutorial mismanagement and disregard for 
fundamental rights of the accused, while at the same time excluding the Chamber from 
verifying the materials’.  This observation has been raised with reference to the DRC 105
cases of Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui,  in which the non-disclosure of evidence has 106
been an important issue. Just four days before the original fixture of the confirmation 
hearing, the Prosecution presented the Chamber with an additional 1172 documents, of 
which it was claimed none contained potentially exculpatory evidence.  Single Judge 107
Steiner was distinctly unimpressed, noting that the documents which were ‘suddenly’ 
discovered had in fact been ‘unregistered within the Office of the Prosecutor for 
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years’.  Additionally, the OTP failed to inform either the Judge or the Defence until 108
after the expiration of its deadline for effective disclosure.  Overall, the Judge 109
recognised the continuous re-occurrence of such incidences, which she strongly 
recommended the Prosecution take measures to address.110
If the Prosecution is not overtly breaching the Statute or RPE, particularly where 
there is a legitimate claim of on-going discovery of evidence, it will be difficult for the 
Chamber to both monitor and improve the system as it stands. As a result, the 
Prosecution’s disorganised and unfocused approach to investigations could mean that 
ultimately it is in violation of its obligation under Article 54(1)a.111
D. Non-disclosure (failure to disclose)
The principle difficulty with the Prosecution failing to disclose material in breach of its 
obligations under the Rome Statute and RPE is awareness. It is not possible for either 
the Defence or the Chamber to ‘effectively police the OTP's compliance with its 
disclosure obligations’.  The Defence is quite simply not in a position to know the 112
extent or detail of what has been withheld from them in any given case. Due to this 
unfair barrier between the parties, it could be argued that the dual role placed on the 
Prosecution is unworkable as a result of the serious conflict between neutrality and 
partiality. Should the OTP be expected to make reasoned decisions on disclosure 
when, by virtue of its partisan role, it is pursuing the accused’s conviction? Markovic 
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argues that this could lead the Prosecution to ‘undervalue or simply dismiss evidence 
that does not cohere with the defendant's guilt’.  The issue of non-disclosure is far 113
more than a ‘technical’ issue; it goes to the very heart of fairness in international 
criminal proceedings.  Thus, some important examples of problems which have 114
arisen in relation to non-disclosure must be examined.
One example of the Prosecution withholding evidence at the ICC can be seen 
in Muthaura.  In March 2013, the proceedings against him were formally terminated, 115
due in part to a key witness recanting his evidence, having also admitted to accepting 
bribes.  An important disclosure issue arose, as the Prosecution was found to be in 116
possession of this statement, but had failed to make it available to the Defence, who 
alleged that this was done in bad faith as a strategic move in order to strengthen the 
case against the accused.  The Prosecution responded that it had ‘erred in not 117
disclosing the affidavit at the pre-trial stage and in not alerting the Single Judge’, which 
it admitted ‘could and should’ have occurred.  However, it rejected the assertion that 118
this decision was taken in bad faith.  Ultimately, whether dishonest practices are 119
employed by the Prosecution could be difficult to substantiate. 
This area cannot be addressed without looking at the now infamous disclosure 
problems encountered by the initial ICC cases concerning the DRC, in particular that of 
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Lubanga.  The principle difficulty arose as a direct result of the Prosecution’s 120
‘wholesale and serious abuse’ of the provision for obtaining material via confidentiality 
agreements.  Pursuant to such agreements under Article 54(3)e of the Rome Statute, 121
the Prosecution was able to obtain documents, but did not have the authorisation to 
disclose them without the consent of the provider. The extent to which the Prosecution 
was reliant on evidence collected in this manner was extensive. In a submission before 
the Chamber it stated that approximately fifty percent of all documents relating to the 
DRC Situation were secured via confidentiality agreements.  Thus, the OTP found 122
itself in a serious bind,  as did the Chamber. The latter could not order the 123
Prosecution to hand over the documents, nor could it easily apply an appropriate 
remedy without their inspection.  However, due to the Prosecution’s abuse of Article 124
54(3)e, the Chamber presented the OTP with a clear choice: either to disclose ‘all the 
potentially exculpatory material in its possession (in accordance with the Statute) to the 
accused’,  or else face a permanent stay of proceedings in the future.  At this stage, 125 126
the Chamber felt it necessary to impose a stay.  This was later upheld by the Appeals 127
Chamber, (albeit without ordering the release of the accused) explaining that the Trial 
Chamber had been justified in its decision to implement a conditional stay on 
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proceedings.  Wishing to avoid a continuation of the stay, the Prosecution found 128
suitable means of both disclosing evidence to the Trial Chamber for review, as well as 
ensuring the safety of the information providers should disclosure occur.  As a result, 129
the stay was quickly lifted in November 2008, allowing the trial to continue. Whiting 
notes that, unfortunately, these proceedings did little to enhance the Court’s early 
reputation.  130
The Lubanga case demonstrates the ongoing conflict between confidentiality 
agreements and the Prosecutor’s subsequent use of ‘springboard’ evidence, with its 
disclosure obligations.  Swoboda finds it disquieting that the Prosecution would 131
attempt to build the case on what was ‘in essence, secretive evidentiary regime – a 
regime which even tried to drape vital exculpatory evidence into a cloak of 
confidentiality’.   The misuse of Article 54(3)e of the Statute has profound implications 132
for trial fairness. In fact, it is not possible to know whether Lubanga’s defence team 
received all the documents to which they were entitled to have access.  As Markovic 133
alludes,  it is somewhat questionable that of the thousands of documents obtained 134
under confidentiality agreements, the Prosecution felt it was only able to disclose 
around two hundred documents to the Defence that it felt contained potential 
exculpatory evidence.135
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E. The disclosure pitfall: the need for ongoing awareness
The issues relating to the disclosure of evidence, if not duly recognised and addressed, 
could have the potential to undermine trial fairness. This is particularly the case at the 
ICC, due to the complex and conflicting obligations on the Prosecution. The initial 
cases demonstrate a legitimate cause for concern as to the potential for exculpatory 
evidence to be either unduly withheld, released in an untimely manner, or to remain 
beyond the reach of the Defence due to confidentiality agreements. Ultimately, with the 
system as it currently stands, the Defence can only rely on the good faith of the 
Prosecution, yet there is undoubtedly the potential for a ‘prosecutorial abuse of 
power’.  The Prosecution, particularly in the Lubanga case, has demonstrated a 136
tendency to err on the side of non-disclosure.  Not only is this contrary to its role as 137
envisioned by the Rome Statute, but it could also lead to the distortion of the ‘truth’ 
finding process, and could ultimately contribute to the erosion of the rights of the 
accused. In order to strengthen the current system of disclosure and confidentiality 
agreements, active observation of inappropriate conduct must be carried out. In 
Lubanga, the Trial Chamber served as the principle check on the Prosecution’s 
power.  Nonetheless, there appears to be a judicial reluctance to sanction instances 138
of prosecutorial negligence.  However, as Caianiello argues, a pro-active judicial 139
approach can only achieve so much.  The Prosecution is ultimately the only organ 140
which can ensure its powers are conducted appropriately, in accordance with its 
obligations. The OTP must, as Swoboda contends, ‘play with open cards’.141
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4. EoA and witness testimony: issues of locating witness 
and anonymity measures
According to Cryer, the process of including witness testimony at trial can be ‘beset by 
difficulties’.  Issues of particular importance to the Defence will be discussed, such as 142
the problems associated with locating defence witnesses, and the use of witness 
anonymity. It is first worth recognising that live testimony, through the physical 
presence of a witness in court, is considered preferable to affidavit evidence.  This 143
was recognised at an early stage of the ICTY proceedings in Tadić. The Trial Chamber 
held that ‘physical presence of a witness at the seat of the International Tribunal 
enables the Judges to evaluate the credibility of a person giving evidence’, and that 
furthermore, their physical presence ‘may help discourage the witness from giving false 
testimony’.  This allows for important cross-examinations, and allows the witnesses’ 144
demeanour to be observed. Difficulties arise in the balancing process of protecting the 
fair trial rights of the accused, with the needs of witnesses who could have experienced 
particularly harrowing ordeals. Courts and Tribunals can respond through a variety of 
measures, which often centre around anonymity. The impact that such measures have 
on the defendant must be carefully considered.
A. The difficulty of locating defence witnesses
As international crimes are often committed during complex conflicts and periods of 
instability, locating witnesses can be a difficult task, particularly as institutions do not 
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have direct control over the territory in question.  Witness reluctance may arise 145
through an unwillingness to travel to and appear in court, a fear for their personal 
safety, or for those with whom they associate, or else an apprehension regarding facing 
the accused.  It can be extremely difficult for defence teams and investigators to 146
locate witnesses due to limited available funds which can restrict contact with those 
who could be of help to the accused’s case.  It is not unusual for potential witnesses 147
to be reluctant to testify on behalf of an accused, with whom they fear association.  148
The extent of the stigma  associated with such individuals can contribute to a tangible 149
unwillingness to testify, even where their testimony is both probative and helpful to a 
case.  Furthermore, as Karnavas contends, witnesses can decline to co-operate 150
through a fear of ‘being designated as suspects by the prosecution’.  Even where a 151
potential witness may be willing to co-operate, it might be too cost-prohibitive to locate 
that person, making them beyond the reach of the team.152
If a witness can be persuaded to appear before the court, problems for the 
Defence can still arise whereby a witness will happily respond to the Prosecution’s 
questions, yet when cross-examined they become elusive and uncommunicative.  As 153
Newton explains, witnesses at the international tribunals have been ‘famously 
unresponsive and difficult to control’, which is arguably a result of external pressures 
on witnesses who ‘do not wish to assist the acquittal of those charged with destroying 
the social and economic fabric of society’.  The ad hoc Tribunals have rejected any 154
legal obligation to compensate the Defence for difficulties experienced which are 
outside the control of the Tribunal, even if such factors significantly harm the defence 
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case more than that of the Prosecution.  Tuinstra argues that, as a form of 155
compensation in recognition of the difficulties faced by the Defence, judicial discretion 
could be used to exclude evidence in certain situations, such as where the Defence 
has received markedly disparate levels of co-operation.  Whilst this would go some 156
way to readjusting an inequality in practice, it is doubtful whether an approach which 
involves the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence would be well received in light 
of the aim of truth finding.
B. Witness testimony at the modern institutions
Whilst the Statute of the ad hoc Tribunals emphasises the duty of the Chambers to 
provide witnesses with protection, there was initially no explanation as to how this was 
to be achieved.  The Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) at the ICTY became 157
operational in 1995 in an attempt to provide more support and protection for victims 
and witnesses, to include protective/confidentiality measures such as the redaction of 
witnesses’ names, addresses, current locations, and other data which might reveal 
their identity.  The ICC developed on the practices of the ad hoc Tribunals, yet as 158
Ngane observes, a more thorough and well organised scheme appears to have been 
created.  This is certainly the impression given by the Rome Statute and RPE of the 159
ICC, which provides the Court with the ability to take measures to ensure the safety 
and psychological well-being of witnesses.  Rule 87(3) RPE sets out some of the 160
main protective measures which can be taken by the Court, including: the removal of 
 Prosecutor v Tadić, ‘Judgement’ Case No. IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 49. Reaffirmed by: 155
Prosecutor v Kayishema, ‘Judgement (Reasons).’ Case No. ICTR-95-1-A (1 June 2001) para 
73. See, TUINSTRA, J.T. (2009) p176
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 See, Article 22 ICTY Statute. Interestingly, it does not provide a definition of ‘witnesses’. 157
 ZAPPALÀ, S. (2003) p237158
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names and other information from Court records; provisions for presenting evidence 
via electronic means ; the use of pseudonyms and in camera proceedings.161
Whilst some witnesses may be reluctant to testify, others may identify various 
associated advantages, which could affect their motivations. This can have important 
implications with regard to the payment, or ‘expense reimbursement’, offered to 
witnesses in return for their testimony. The SCSL in particular has experienced 
difficulties with Prosecution witnesses being provided with clothing, food, 
accommodation and healthcare - all of which are of great value to the average Sierra 
Leonean.  The provision of such ‘expenses’ can give the impression that witnesses 162
are being paid for their testimony, which both undermines their reliability, and creates 
controversy.  Knowles warns that such practices result in the Prosecution securing 163
allegiances with the witness, and creates a superior-subordinate relationship.  This is 164
not conducive to encouraging witnesses to speak openly and uninhibitedly before the 
court, who should not be given the impression, overtly or otherwise, that they must 
testify with a particular objective in mind.
Another important factor to consider in the context of international trials is the 
potential for witnesses to have experienced horrendous events, which may have 
caused extensive physical and psychological suffering.  Additionally, due to the 165
protracted nature of the trials, together with the time it may take for individuals to 
appear before a court, a significant amount of time may have elapsed between the 
occurrence of the events and the moment when a witness is asked to recall them. As 
Cryer suggests, memories will decay over time, and the further away events are, the 
more difficult recalling them becomes.  The extent of this is illustrated by the temporal 166
 See also Rule 67 RPE. Rule 68 RPE also provides for pre-recorded testimony, as long as 161
both parties have had the opportunity to cross examine the witness.
 KNOWLES, P. (2006) ‘The Power to Prosecute: the Special Court for Sierra Leone from a 162
Defence Perspective.’ 6 International Criminal Law Review. 387-417 at 401
 COCKAYNE, J. (2005) at 658163
 KNOWLES, P. (2006) at 402164
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jurisdiction of the ICTY, which began in 1991, meaning that the witnesses involved in 
the on-going trials could be asked to recall incidents which took place some twenty-four 
years previously. The compounded difficulties of trauma and time elapsing should not 
be taken to mean that witnesses in such positions are not capable of providing 
meaningful testimony, yet it is advisable to exercise caution in the most extreme cases, 
particularly where their evidence may be given high evidentiary weighting by the 
judges.
Another issue, which is common to the inclusion of victims in the trial process, is 
that either due to a desire to encourage involvement, or else in sympathy for the 
experiences witnesses claim to have undergone, judges may be tempted to allow a 
witness to testify beyond what is directly relevant to the charges. Individuals may 
understandably be inclined to testify in a broad manner, rather than focus on one 
particular individual or event.  However, Cryer warns of the risks associated with the 167
admission of evidence which is not relevant to the specific charges, since to stray from 
these issues is to risk prejudicing the defendant.  It would be a mistake for judges to 168
think that they can remain immune from the often highly emotional and potentially 
unfocused evidence to which a witness testifies.169
A final issue worthy of consideration here is the potential for witnesses to falsify 
their evidence. The reliability of a witness must be tested in the judicial process so that 
their testimony can be accorded sufficient weighting. Unfortunately, there have been 
several instances over the past few decades where witnesses have falsified their 
testimony, highlighting the need for a robust approach. This was particularly notable in 
the ICTY case of Tadić, in which Witness ‘L’, who was given full anonymity, was later 
disqualified for lying about the death of his father.  Defence counsel Wladimiroff 170
 Ibid. at 419 167
 Ibid. at 418-9 168
 Ibid. at 420 169
 Prosecutor v Tadić, ‘Decision on Prosecution Motion to Withdraw Protective Measures for 170
Witness L.’ (5 December 1996) Case No. IT-94-1-T para 4
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recalls how the father was later found alive as a result of defence investigations, which 
revealed multiple inconsistencies in his testimony.  Thus, the Defence must be 171
empowered to investigate such matters, again highlighting the importance of adequate 
funding for defence investigations. However, Wladimiroff notes that such successful 
detection, as in the instance of witness ‘L’, is the exception rather than the norm.  At 172
the ICC, Chambers found in Lubanga that intermediaries ‘persuaded, encouraged, or 
assisted witnesses to give false evidence’,  suggesting that there are broader issues 173
concerning the professional and proper conduct of court officials. Ultimately, the 
truthfulness of witness testimony cannot go unquestioned, despite any inclination to 
accept their accounts unconditionally by virtue of what they claim to have experienced.
C. Witness anonymity
Anonymising witnesses’ identities is the most common means of providing protection. 
Without the ability to provide anonymity, the courts would be at far greater risk of 
witnesses refusing to testify, thereby eliminating an important form of evidence.  174
Damaška describes the use of anonymous witness as ‘one of the thorniest issues’ in 
terms of the potential impact on the accused, who is ‘greatly restricted if he is 
unfamiliar with their identity’.  It becomes difficult for defence counsel to cross-175
examine a witness effectively without knowing their identity, background, and location 
 WLADIMIROFF, M. (May 2002) ‘Challenges for Defence Lawyers Taking Cases for an 171
International Tribunal.’ 53 Deutscher Anwaltstag. Available online at: http://www.wlaws.com/
Challenges_for_defence_lawyers_taking_cases_before_an_international_tribunal.pdf [Last 
accessed 1.9.2014]
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at the time of the events.  Furthermore, information which identifies the witness 176
necessarily must also be withheld from the public domain. The use of closed in camera 
sessions, or else considerable redactions to the court records, undermines the public 
nature of trials, which is one of the safeguards to ensuring fair process.  This lack of 177
public scrutiny, Pozen argues, ‘can allow witnesses to give false or misleading 
testimony that can prejudice the outcome of a trial’.  A public trial is an important 178
means of ensuring that the accused’s fair trial rights are being respected.179
The use of anonymity has been most extensively explored in the ICTY case of 
Tadić, in which the Trial Chamber ordered various anonymity measures.  180
Interestingly, it noted that the ‘International Tribunal must be satisfied that the accused 
suffers no undue avoidable prejudice, although some prejudice is inevitable’.  Judge 181
Stephen received praise for his dissenting opinion critiquing the extent of witness 
anonymity and its inconsistency with the rights of the accused.  Robertson has 182
openly criticised the majority’s decision as being a ‘woeful piece of jurisprudence’, 
which misconstrues the Statute, as well as case precedent.  Zappalà argues that the 183
views of Judge Stephen can be confirmed as being ‘correct’ upon examination of 
Article 67 of the Statute concerning the right to a public hearing, which should not 
impact on the fairness of the proceedings, despite acceptable limitations.  Leigh 184
contends that the RPE ‘clearly do not contemplate so drastic a procedure as 
withholding from the accused the names of his accusers’.  Furthermore, he argues 185
 LEIGH, M. (1996) ‘The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused.’ 90 176
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that Rules 69 and 75 RPE in fact ‘point in the opposite direction’ so as to suggest that 
the rights of the accused must be respected, nor is it specified that the identities of 
victims may be withheld from the accused.186
Caution should be exercised in the issuing of anonymity. The Fofana case at 
the SCSL revealed the ‘the absurdity of the blanket approach’, whereby thirteen 
witnesses had testified under protective measures despite only one of them expressing 
a fear of reprisals.  In fact, numerous witnesses had expressed that they were 187
unafraid to testify.  Ultimately, although there is a need to provide genuine witnesses 188
of horrific crimes with anonymity for their own protection, they must still testify in a 
manner which accords with rigorous due process protections.189
5. Conclusion
This Chapter has attempted to provide an overview of a number of issues which 
unbalance the EoA in relation to evidentiary matters in ICJ. The proper and timely 
disclosure of evidence is of fundamental importance to the Defence. There is particular 
cause for concern regarding the approach taken by the Prosecution at the ICC. Where 
the OTP fails to disclose exculpatory evidence in a manner which is ‘repeated and 
blatant’, Caianello argues that ‘it should lead to the dismissal of the charges against the 
accused’.  Certainly a much tougher stance should be taken by the judges. The 190
inappropriate use of confidentiality agreements to create ‘springboard’ evidence must 
also be firmly rejected by the Court. As Swoboda argues, the ‘ICC must combat 
 Ibid. at 236-7. N.B. the phrasing of Rule 75, which states: (a) A Judge or a Chamber may, [..] 186
order appropriate measures for the privacy and protection of victims and witnesses, provided 
that the measures are consistent with the rights of the accused. Emphasis added.
 KNOWLES, P. (2006) at 400 & see fn 48 for more detail. 187
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secretiveness at the disclosure stage’.  Late disclosure by the Prosecution is 191
arguably deserving of most criticism. Although the Prosecution could be seen to be 
technically acting within the Statute and Rules, the fairness of the proceedings could 
be jeopardised. Defence teams have complained that the Prosecution will reveal 
thousands of pages of documents, with no indication as to which might be relevant or 
exculpatory.  Certainly some defence attorneys believe that the delaying of disclosure 192
is an intentional tactic ‘designed to overwhelm them and exhaust their resources’.  193
Thus, issues of disclosure can impact significantly on the fairness of the proceedings 
which, as Swoboda argues, ‘will almost inevitably vitiate the whole trial’.194
There are clear examples across the institutions which serve as a warning 
regarding the potential dangers associated with witnesses who falsify their evidence, or 
accept bribes. Wherever possible, there should be an emphasis on live testimony over 
written, so that the accused’s right to ‘examine or cross-examine witnesses’ is 
‘respected in the most practicable way possible’.  The incidents of untruthful 195
witnesses further confirms the need for a defence investigation budget which provides 
a meaningful opportunity to verify the truthfulness of their statements. 
Part III of this thesis has considered a vast array of issues relating to the 
practical application of fair trial principles, in particular EoA. Chapter 6 examined the 
comparative funding of the Prosecution and Defence at each of the modern institutions, 
consistently revealing worrying discrepancies between the two parties. Chapter 7 
highlighted crucial shortcomings concerning institutional EoA, exploring issues such as 
the dual role of the Prosecutor at the ICC, the impact of victim participation and the 
influence of the judiciary. Chapter 8 then analysed the problems associated with 
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evidentiary matters, highlighting the numerous difficulties associated with pre-trial 
investigations, the disclosure of evidence, and the impact of witness testimony. 
The issues explored across the Chapters in Part III strongly suggest that it is 
reasonable to assert that the theoretical commitment to crucial principles of fairness, 
and the corresponding rights of the accused, have failed to translate into meaningful, 
practical protections throughout the trial process. Evidence of an Inequality of Arms 
with respect to just one of these important aspects could risk undermining the fairness 
of the proceedings. That there is a marked disparity between the parties with respect to 
such a vast array of issues indicates that there is an extensive and systematic 
Inequality of Arms at the modern institutions. This is perhaps most vehemently 
expressed by Xavier-Jean Keïta, the Principal Defender at the OPCD at the ICC:
 
“Equality of arms doesn’t exist at all in ICC. Why? It’s natural and it’s not 
only ICC, it is in all systems. The Defence arriving is not organised like the 
Prosecutor; it’s just a counsel, freely chosen by his client, who organises 
his defence team, facing the machine - the big machine - of the Office of 
the Prosecutor.” 196
 
The true extent of the InEquality of Arms in ICL is deserving of far greater recognition. 
The inherent conflict between idealistic fair trial aspirations, and the anxiety which 
surrounds the international accused, could threaten the legitimacy of the modern 
institutions if the latter is permitted to corrode the important principles upon which the 
courts and tribunals have been founded.
 Xavier-Jean Keïta, Principal Defender OPCD, ICC. IBA Video: ‘In the dock - Defence Rights 196
at the International Criminal Court’, available via: http://vimeo.com/23958341 [Last accessed 
25.8.2014]
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Chapter 9.
Conclusion
The Hypoplasia of the Defence in ICL: 
An Institutional (in)Equality of Arms?
‘No system is perfect. All war criminals will not be caught. 
Fair trials can never be taken for granted.’1
1. Introduction
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that the inferior position of the Defence has 
arisen as a result of a profound conflict at the heart of ICL, which has led to its 
institutional ‘otherisation’. The tension arises as a result of a conflict between the 
anxiety which surrounds the international accused and his trial, and the substantial 
international effort and commitment to the realisation of important ‘cosmopolitan ideals 
and practices’,  including fair trial rights and protections. Despite the impressive 2
developments in ICL over recent decades, it is argued that the anxieties which 
surround the accused have placed at risk the commitment to important principles of 
fairness, due process and Equality of Arms (EoA). The institutional ‘otherisation’ has 
resulted in the Defence having been marginalised, forgotten and even excluded at the 
modern institutions. This Conclusion will begin by reflecting in Section 2 on the extent 
of the ‘otherisation’ of the defendant in ICJ, whereby the tendency is to treat the 
accused as less than human, and thus undeserving of fair trial protections and 
guarantees. 
 GROULX, E. (2010b) ‘The New International Justice System and the Challenges Facing the 1
Legal Profession. Revue Quebecoise de Droit International. 39-74 at 65
 HAYDEN, P. (2009) ‘Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah Arendt and International Theory.’ 2
Oxon, Routledge. p9.
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Section 3 will address the other concept central to this thesis: the ‘hypoplasia’ of 
the Defence in ICL. The institutional otherisation has contributed towards the systemic 
hypoplasia which, in turn, has created an Inequality of Arms at the modern institutions. 
The limited and delayed development of the Defence has given rise to significant and 
long-lasting disparities with the Prosecution in regards to many issues such as 
architectural structure, financial resources and complex procedural issues.3
Section 4 will then consider the most difficult challenges which are unique to the 
Defence at the ICC, as well as some wider lessons which would be of value to any 
future ICL institution. In Section 5, the seductive danger of the ‘aura of credibility’ which 
surrounds many of the international institutions will be highlighted, arguing that true 
legitimacy cannot be achieved through rubber-stamping convictions. Thus, a healthy 
degree of scepticism and incisive critique is required to ensure that the modern 
institutions create lasting and meaningful legacies of justice. Ultimately, this thesis will 
conclude that the unique nature of ICL poses particular and complex difficulties for the 
provision of an accused’s defence. Greater awareness of the structural ambiguity 
which surrounds the international accused is indispensable if the theoretical 
commitment to fair trials is to translate into a genuine opportunity for the accused to 
defend himself of the charges.
2. The institutional ‘otherisation’ of the Defence in ICL
The rejection of those accused of international crimes, who are deemed to be ‘evil’ or 
‘monstrous’, can perpetuate a culture of Defence ‘otherisation’. The dichotomy of good 
and evil greatly oversimplifies the profound complexity of international crimes. It has 
been observed that the most important legacy of the NIMT, despite its delayed impact, 
 As discussed in Part III.3
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is that the international criminal trial has come to be regarded as the dominant 
response to the perpetrators of serious crime.  Through such trials, idealisations of 4
‘pure guilt and pure innocence’  are sought in an attempt to rationalise the actions of 5
individuals. Yet, as Groulx reminds us, ‘very few cases are clear-cut’ in the international 
context, as they often comprise ‘many shades of grey’.  Furthermore, the lengthy 6
decisions of the modern institutions will not provide clear answers for many issues, as 
such judgements will ‘encompass a wide range of possible states of the world, from 
clear innocence and scant evidence of guilt, to its substantial probability’.7
The process of ‘otherisation’ can have profound consequences for the ICL 
accused. In order to be considered worthy of human rights, an individual must be 
regarded as being human. Labelling another as ‘monstrous’  can in turn suggest that it 8
is ‘considered acceptable to eradicate this threat’.  Svendsen observes that, as a 9
result, it is essential to recognise the ‘humanity of each and every person’.  In 10
addition, he argues that our perception of their evil does not in turn guarantee our own 
virtue, nor does it follow that ‘whatever means we use to fight them is good’.  Thus, 11
any ‘thirst for revenge’ must not amount to an eagerness for a guilty verdict.  As 12
Wladimiroff argued in his opening remarks in defending Tadić at the ICTY, the danger is 
that this thirst is ‘satisfied at the well of polluted justice’.  Furthermore, Newton 13
 NIELSEN, C. (2008) ‘From Nuremberg to the Hague: The Civilizing Mission of International 4
Criminal Law.’ 14 Auckland University Law Review. 81-114 at 102
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observes that ‘authentic justice is not achieved on the wings of societal vengeance, 
innuendo, or external manipulation’.  14
This thesis has sought to highlight the institutional nature of the otherisation of 
the Defence in ICL. The profound lack of interest in Defence issues has given rise to a 
culture of exclusion at the modern institutions. For example, at the ICTY, the Defence 
has been omitted routinely from various events, such as press briefings and working 
groups relating to the scheduling of cases, which has caused difficulties with 
developing strategies and allocating funding.  The Defence units at the modern 15
institutions are often physically located either off-site, or at a significant distance from 
the main organs, such as the Registry, Prosecution and Chambers.  Tolbert asserts 16
that this is ‘perhaps a metaphor for where the defense fits into the scheme of things’.  17
Starr observes that the isolation of the Defence ‘may undermine performance’, since 
counsel are ‘less able to build a collaborative community with institutional memory that 
may improve the quality of representation’.  Ultimately, defence counsel appear to be 18
‘less integrated’,  and even excluded at an institutional level. This is regrettable given 19
the invaluable and substantial role of defence counsel in the trail process.20
It has been argued here that the strength of the hostility towards the accused in 
ICJ exceeds that which is experienced by the accused at national levels. As observed 
in Chapter 3, defence counsel are for more likely to be ‘stigmatised than praised’ in the 
 NEWTON, M.A. (2011) ‘Evolving Equality: The Development of the International Defence 14
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course of representing their clients.  This is evidenced by the fact that, for example, 21
during the course of the Iraqi High Tribunal, four defence lawyers were murdered.  22
Defending an accused is by no means an easy task, as they must ‘act with due 
diligence regarding the truthfulness of his or her own strategies and statements’, whilst 
still striving to secure the ‘‘best’ result possible’ with the client in mind.  As Safferling 23
argues, these ‘antagonistic tasks are not easy to bridge’, making the role of defence 
counsel one of the ‘most challenging amongst all the participants in a criminal trial’.  24
The stigma which attaches to those accused of international crimes, even when 
later acquitted, demonstrates the longevity of the otherisation. The internationalisation 
of courts and tribunals presents unique difficulties for the relocation of the acquitted. 
Van Wijk notes that at the time of writing in 2013, Ntagerura, who was acquitted at the 
ICTR in 2006, had little choice but to reside in a safe-house in Tanzania.  The 25
acquitted are at risk of being left ‘stranded’, with institutions having to rely on the 
‘benevolence of individual states’, which are ‘not known for basing their policy on 
compassion’.  It will be difficult for the modern institutions to continue to claim that 26
rehabilitation is amongst their expressed objectives, if ‘such rehabilitation can de facto 
not take place’.27
Unfortunately, the problem of the Defence in ICL is unlikely to become a topic 
which will readily attract a level of concern commensurate with its importance to the 
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trial process. Damaška argues that there is a reluctance to critique the shortcomings of 
international justice, since it ‘implies the frustrating abandonment of noble intentions’.  28
When discussing issues relating to the unpopular plight of the accused, these feelings 
are compounded. As discussed in Chapter 5, Groulx recalled the unwelcome response 
provoked by the proposal calling for a separate defence office at the Rome Conference 
of the ICC, which ‘everybody wanted forgotten’.  Arguments for the importance of fair 29
trial rights and procedures are even more unpalatable when they question, for 
example, the suitability of including victims at the ‘centre of the mission’ of the modern 
institutions.  Damaška reflects on the ‘unenviable position’ of maintaining such a 30
critique, which can ‘easily be interpreted as evincing a gravedigger's indifference to 
human suffering’.  Regrettably, the otherisation of the Defence therefore can be said 31
to extend as far as academic commentary. Increased insightful discussion of issues, 
such as those explored in this thesis, would help to draw attention to the plight of the 
Defence, in turn strengthening and legitimising the work of the modern institutions, 
rather than damaging their hard-won achievements. 
3. The institutional ‘hypoplasia’ of the Defence and EoA
The institutional ‘otherisation’ of the Defence has significantly limited and delayed its 
development at the modern institutions. This thesis has sought to explore the concept 
of ‘hypoplasia’, which arises as a result of the systemic institutional otherisation. 
Hypoplasia best represents the resultant arrested development of the Defence in ICL, 
as well as the ongoing struggle to progress and mature as a unit. This hypoplasia 
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poses a serious threat to upholding the principle of EoA given the significant and 
enduring disparities in comparison to the Prosecution, which in contrast benefits from a 
strong institutional standing, and considerable resources.  32
Chapter 5 of this thesis examined the structural position of the Defence, 
revealing a consistent hypoplasia in the unit’s formation within the institutions’ 
frameworks. As Newton observes, EoA is a ‘structural impossibility in the current 
system of international justice’.  This issue is troublesome, not just from a theoretical 33
perspective; defence teams have, ‘over and over again’, suffered the ‘same problems 
and frustrations’.  Particularly at the permanent ICC, it was crucially important that the 34
architectural design of the institution be carefully considered. As Groulx has noted, the 
structure needed to ‘stand the test of time’, and the inclusion of a defence organ would 
have strengthened ‘the system itself’.  It is somewhat disheartening to note that both 35
academics and practitioners forewarned of the need for a separate, independent 
defence unit.  For example, Creta advised in 1998 that the design adopted at the ad 36
hoc Tribunals ‘should not serve as a model for a permanent international criminal 
court’.  The Rome Statue of the ICC, and thus the Court’s structure, is now almost 37
irrevocably fixed in practical terms. An amendment is unlikely due to the ‘lengthy 
process of ratification’ which would be required,  let alone the lack of impetus to 38
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strengthen the position of the Defence.  Nevertheless, some commentators are 39
convinced that an amendment, giving the Defence the status of a truly independent 
organ, is still necessary.  Ultimately, due to the lack of institutional presence of the 40
Defence, together with limited financial support, there is the risk that the ‘legitimacy of 
the international criminal justice system will erode’.41
 The most significant manifestation of the hypoplasia of the Defence from a 
practical, operational perspective relates to funding, as discussed in Chapter 6. As 
Mettraux and Cengic explain, the provision of ‘adequate resources’ for the Defence 
does not necessitate extravagance.  Rather, funding should be ‘proportionate to the 42
tasks and responsibility assigned to the defence office, and should not be 
disproportionately lower than those attributed to the prosecution having taken into 
account the difference in their respective mandate and obligations’.  Regrettably, the 43
Registry has more recently recommended reducing the Defence investigation budget 
from €73,006 per team, to €50,000  - a decrease of more than thirty percent. The 44
risk inherent with inadequately funding the Defence is that justice which is ‘obtained too 
cheaply, risks becoming no justice at all’.  As Cohen asserts, the ‘final question must 45
always be, “cheaper, but at what cost?”.’  Ultimately, Mettraux and Cengic argue that 46
if there is a lack of commitment to properly fund the Defence, so as to ‘meet the basic 
requirements of fair trial and guarantee effective representation for the accused’, then 
 The Defence was given little attention at the Review Conference held in 2010 in Kampala, 39
Uganda. The focus largely fell to defining the crime of aggression. See, IBA ‘What did the ICC 
Review Conference achieve? (November 2010) Volume 2(2) EQ: Equality of Arms Review. 
Available at: http://goo.gl/np5RQK [Last accessed 12.9.2014]
 GALLANT K.S. (2003) ‘Politics, Theory and Institutions: Three Reasons why International 40
Criminal Defence is Hard, avnd What Might be Done About One of Them.’ 14 Criminal Law 
Forum. 317-334 at 328 
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the trials should simply not be conducted.  Groulx echoes this view, arguing that ‘if the 47
trial is worth conducting, it is worth conducting fairly’.  However, in fairness to the ICC, 48
if Member States paid their assessed contributions on time and in full, which many fail 
to do,  the Court might be more willing to allocate increased funding to the Defence.49
It should also be recognised that a well-funded, and therefore strong Defence 
should not be met with apprehension, as it would ‘help ensure that international 
Prosecution can more effectively fulfil its own mandate’.  In the Lubanga decision, the 50
Chamber was overtly critical of the Prosecution, particularly with regard to the use of 
intermediaries, highlighting its ‘negligence in failing to verify and scrutinise’ the relevant 
material.  Thus, it can be argued that a stronger Defence would help to encourage 51
better practices on behalf of the Prosecution, and thus the system as a whole. A 
meaningful EoA relies upon respect for the role of the Defence, as well as adequate 
funding and support during the trial process in order to provide the accused with a 
reasonable opportunity to defend the accusations against him. 
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4. Unique challenges for the Defence at the ICC, and 
valuable lessons for future institutions
A. Problems unique to the Defence at the ICC
Due to the ICC’s permanency, and thus its longevity in comparison with the other 
modern institutions, a rigorous programme of self-critique and self-improvement is 
essential in order to avoid complacency. Regarding defence issues, this necessitates 
questioning institution-wide attitudes. The NIMT demonstrated a ‘dichotomy between 
prosecutors and defence counsel’, which Sarvarian argues, ‘largely continues before 
the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC’.  Perhaps the key to addressing the ‘fight culture’ 52
which has emerged at the Court,  lies with all personnel who must make a conscious 53
effort to ‘transcend’ their own legal backgrounds. As discussed in Chapter 7, this is 
particularly true of the Prosecution, whose role extends beyond a mere party to the 
proceedings,  by virtue of its complex dual role, obligating them to investigate in a 54
neutral manner. As a result, the fairness of the proceedings is, to great extent, at the 
discretion of the judiciary.  The Lubanga case has demonstrated the pressing need for 55
judges to ‘watch very carefully over the investigative activities of the prosecutor’.  56
However, judges cannot shoulder this burden alone, nor can they oversee all the 
activities of the parties. The improper use of confidentiality agreements by the 
 SARVARIAN, A. (2012) ‘Ethical Standards for Prosecution and Defence Counsel before 52
International Courts. The Legacy of Nuremberg.’ 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
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Prosecution has meant that the ‘core role of the judges to guarantee a fair trial and to 
be the custodian of the custodians, has become moot’.57
The ICC is an unique system, without parallel in ICL. Fedorova argues that, in 
recognition of this, ‘one should look beyond the procedural adversarial-inquisitorial 
dichotomy’.  Attempts to balance and combine the two systems should be abandoned 58
in favour of establishing a system which is ‘autonomous and coherent’, as well as 
‘effective in the achievement of its objectives’.  Certain features of the Court are now 59
largely fixed, such the internal architecture. Thus, the Defence will have to operate from 
within the Registry, which requires organisational measures to enhance its 
independence, as well as to ensure a ‘just distribution of powers’ between the organs 
of the Court.60
Chapter 5 examined the role of ‘ad-hoc’ counsel, unique to the ICC by virtue of 
its trial structure, which is arguably one of the most pressing concerns relating to the 
rights of the accused. As Katzman argues, the current system is ‘disjointed’, and thus 
‘creates an opportunity for prosecutorial abuse of power’.  The gap which is created in 61
the fair trial process needs to be addressed without delay. Dieckmann and Kerll 
suggest the appointment of a lead ad-hoc counsel, who would be given a broad 
mandate to address all manner of issues of concern to the Defence.  Furthermore, 62
they suggest that the ad-hoc counsel should be given funds for ‘co-counsel, legal 
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assistants and a case manager to provide support as required for every potential pre-
trial procedure’.  63
Ultimately, the ICC’s sui generis system has produced unique ‘pitfalls’. Chapter 
7 examined some of the key examples of these pitfalls, including: the dual role of the 
Prosecutor; the differences in judicial approaches; and the way in which victim 
testimony is actively included in the trial process. Arguably, recognising the Court as 
being without parallel could help to encourage more incisive discussion regarding such 
issues.
B. Wider lessons concerning the Defence in ICL
Chapter 5 highlighted the lack of consideration given to the Defence in the formation of 
the modern institutions; its late implementation in comparison to the other organs;  64
and its lack of institutional independence; all of which are just some examples of the 
profound hypoplasia of the Defence in ICL. The difficulties experienced by the Defence 
to date ‘provide current and future international tribunals with ample opportunity to 
avoid mistakes’.  Emphasis should be placed on the individuals involved with making 65
critical decisions regarding the formation of an institution’s structure and operation, as 
they ‘must understand the particular difficulties and challenges’ which are specific to 
the Defence.  Mettraux and Cengic argue that defence offices which operate from 66
within the Registry have often ‘been the source of much of their administrative 
headaches’, ‘rather than helping them out of the paper forest’.  The inclusion of an 67
 Ibid.63
 ‘The suggestion that a Defence office only needs to be set up once a case is before the court 64
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independent defence office at every such institution would provide invaluable support, 
particularly during the early stages of representation.  A defence office must be 68
created ‘as early as possible into the life’ of a court or tribunal, and should go beyond 
dealing with mere administrative or financial matters.  69
In terms of institutional attitudes, Karnavas argues that actors involved with 
trials, such as the judiciary, Prosecution and Registry personnel, ‘express only the 
faintest of interest’ in levelling the ‘playing field’.  Unfortunately, it may be the case that 70
an internal ‘institutional bias’ with respect to the Defence has now become deeply 
‘entrenched’ amongst the ‘permanent prosecutorial, judicial, and administrative staff’.  71
From an external perspective, Cogan argues that ‘court proponents’, would ‘do well to 
speak more of the rights of the accused’.  In addition, particular care should be taken 72
to avoid issuing statements which impute the guilt of the accused prior to their trial, and 
the issuing of the judgement.  Particularly where the Prosecution has the benefit of 73
spokespeople, or a public relations office, any ‘unfortunate utterances’ which are made 
in relation to an accused cannot be justified easily.74
Ultimately, the many difficulties associated with defence representation which 
arise in the international context, including the organisation and funding of the Defence, 
provide important lessons for any future institutions. However, the perpetual risk that 
the anxiety which surrounds those accused of serious international crimes will 
influence the institutions to the detriment of the accused, still remains.  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5. Demanding more than a ‘veneer of respectability’
The presumption of innocence has been observed as being ‘often taken for granted, 
and thus only paid lip service’.  Damaška persuasively articulates its importance for 75
the modern institutions: 
‘In order to preserve their moral muscle, international criminal tribunals 
must maintain a degree of suspense in regard to the final outcome. If the 
perception were to spread that they stack the deck against the defendant, 
or that their proceedings are programmed to lead to convictions, their 
legitimacy in the eyes of their audiences would be doomed.’76
If the modern institutions are perceived to deteriorate into mere sentencing 
mechanisms, designed only to convict individuals without due process protections, 
there will be little justice for any of the interested parties. The institutions’ legitimacy 
would be substantially endangered.  Groulx warns of the perils of ‘rubber stamping’ 77
convictions.  Some of the pressures on the modern institutions arguably would be 78
relieved if ‘international criminal justice were more modest in its ambitions’.  Damaška 79
notes that even national systems, which have far greater institutional support and 
enforcement powers, ‘could buckle under the weight of a comparable agenda’.80
The influence of ICL’s ‘reputation’ is worthy of consideration. Law is imperialistic 
by virtue of its ability to legitimise the use of force and control over individuals, through 
all manner of institutions, particularly the trial process.  It should be questioned 81
whether the modern institutions maintain only a ‘veneer of legitimacy’. As Fedorova 
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explains, ‘the state retains the legitimacy aura through the process’.  This ‘initial 82
credibility’, she argues, ‘is already present in citizens who believe that a State is 
democratic and legitimate’.  Mégret has warned of the dangers of assuming that the 83
international institutions ‘can do no wrong’, arguing that this attitude may have 
contributed to them taking ‘liberties with rules based on a faith in the ethics and good 
faith of international judges and prosecutors, and the self-correcting virtues of the 
system’.  Ultimately, the modern courts and tribunals should always be analysed with 84
a healthy degree of scepticism, looking beyond any veneer of respectability. As Cogan 
argues, all ‘observer-participants’ must act as ‘watchdogs’ in ‘sniffing out injustice to the 
internationally-accused and working to keep all the relevant actors on their toes’.  85
6. Conclusion
‘The defense should never again be stereotyped as an 
ignoble and inconvenient afterthought.’86
This thesis has sought to draw attention to the extent of the otherisation and 
hypoplasia suffered by the Defence in ICL at all stages of its development. Its arrested 
development can be observed from the NIMT onwards, which, it has been argued, 
formed a defective blueprint regarding the role of the Defence at the subsequent 
modern institutions. 
The collective consideration of the manifestations and consequences of the 
Defence’s hypoplasia suggest there is an Inequality of Arms in ICL today, which is 
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deserving of wider recognition. Whilst the Defence is provided with fair trial protections 
and guarantees in the statutes and working instruments, there is particular cause for 
concern regarding the practical manifestation of these rights into meaningful 
protections at trial. The procedures which are developed are of paramount importance, 
given that the ‘very essence of a fair trial is a verdict based on regularized process’.  87
The Principle of EoA is crucial in ensuring that the Defence is able to assist the 
accused in confronting the charges brought against him. EoA is at odds with the 
concept of seeking convictions regardless of culpability, since ‘a battle between two 
equally equipped persons may well end undecided, or with the death of both.’  88
Whilst there may be a theoretical agreement concerning the vital importance of 
the Defence to the functioning of fair trials, the mixed, sui generis, nature of the 
procedure at the modern institutions can be said to constitute one of the biggest threats 
to the fairness of the proceedings.  The aim of blending adversarial and inquisitorial 89
features in order to produce a ‘new hybrid’ system should ideally incorporate ‘the best 
of both worlds’.  However, the reality is that without the appropriate checks and 90
balances, the system can include the worst features of both, as well as producing 
entirely new pitfalls of its own.  Fairlie has referred to this as ‘cafeteria inquisitorialism’, 91
whereby adopting features which (at least in theory) can speed up trials, they in turn 
bypass important ‘inherent procedural safeguards’.  To the detriment of the accused, it 92
can be observed that ‘bureaucratic considerations have clearly been given priority over 
due process and adversarial ones’.  93
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As the statutes and internal structures of the modern institutions are now largely 
‘set in stone’, the burden of ensuring the Defence is supported in its difficult role must 
fall, at least in part, to the judiciary. Judges must recognise the limitations of the 
institutions, and become more actively aware of the ‘difficulties inherent in international 
criminal defense’.  They should therefore be ready and willing to provide meaningful 94
support in order to begin to take account of the perpetually disadvantaged position of 
the Defence.
Whilst the denial of impunity is undoubtedly an important aim for ICJ, this 
should not be sought at any cost. To fail to uphold fair trial protections is to risk placing 
the modern institutions ‘under a cloud’,  whereby they fail to be perceived as 95
legitimate. This would be the most profound waste of the collective effort and resources 
which have given rise to the development of ICL over the past half century. Ultimately, 
the desire to convict those who are perceived to be guilty of serious crime will conflict 
with the provision of fair and dispassionate trials. Despite this tension, arguably the two 
are not fundamentally disconnected. As Zappalà observes, there is ‘no truth outside the 
process; there is no truth that can be reached without full respect of the rights of the 
accused’.  96
In conclusion, it is worth reiterating that hypoplasia is a congenital restriction, 
rather than a hereditary trait. Thus, the message for future institutions is one of hope; 
the arrested development of the Defence can be circumvented if it is provided, ab initio, 
with the necessary institutional standing and continuous support. The provision of a 
meaningful EoA is indispensable to conducting fair trials. The commendable 
international effort which has been invested into establishing the modern institutions 
must not be undermined by the pervasive fear which surrounds the accused in ICL. 
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